Prigozhin's Safety In Belarus: A Precarious Situation

is prigozhin safe in belarus

Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner Group, a Russian mercenary group, is in Belarus after a short-lived insurrection against the Russian military in June 2023. Prigozhin was offered a deal by the Belarus President, Alexander Lukashenko, to leave Russia and settle in Belarus. However, his safety in the country is uncertain. Franak Viacorka, the chief political adviser of exiled Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, has stated that Prigozhin will face hostility from the locals and influential figures within the country's military and security establishments. Viacorka also believes that Putin could order Prigozhin to be killed.

Characteristics Values
Is Prigozhin in Belarus? Yes, Prigozhin has moved to Belarus.
Is Prigozhin safe in Belarus? No, Prigozhin is not safe in Belarus.
Who is Prigozhin? Yevgeny Prigozhin is the owner of the Wagner Group military company.
Why is Prigozhin in Belarus? Prigozhin was exiled from Russia after leading an aborted mutiny against President Vladimir Putin.
What will Prigozhin do in Belarus? It is unclear what Prigozhin will do in Belarus. He might try to use Belarus as a launchpad for future attacks.
What do Belarusian people think about Prigozhin's presence in Belarus? Belarusian people do not welcome Prigozhin in their country. They believe that Prigozhin's presence will threaten their country and their neighbours.

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Prigozhin's deal with Lukashenko

Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner Group, a private military company in Russia, struck a deal with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko to end his armed conflict with the Russian government. Prigozhin's group had taken control of military sites in at least one city, Rostov-on-Don, and was advancing towards Moscow, before negotiations with Lukashenko led to a truce.

The deal, which was facilitated by Lukashenko, included security guarantees for Prigozhin and his fighters, as well as the dropping of criminal charges against them. In exchange, Prigozhin agreed to move to Belarus, along with thousands of his Wagner fighters, and end his insurrection against the Russian government.

Lukashenko's role in negotiating this deal has elevated his diplomatic status and transformed him into an influential figure within Russia. He has effectively joined the ranks of Russian grandees vying for Putin's favour by eliminating a domestic problem that could have distracted Putin from his geopolitical agenda.

However, the Kremlin resents the nature of the agreement, as it puts Prigozhin on an equal footing with Putin. For Moscow, Prigozhin is a traitor, and there is no question of entering into a deal with him. The Belarusian leader, on the other hand, portrays himself as a skilled negotiator who single-handedly defused a potentially disastrous situation.

Lukashenko has also offered Prigozhin and his mercenaries legal jurisdiction and safe haven in Belarus, which could further tie the country to an unpopular war and potentially destabilize his relationship with Putin and the foundations of his regime. Moreover, it raises concerns among domestic elites and the public, who worry about increased involvement in the war and the presence of questionable individuals in the country.

While the deal provides temporary refuge for Prigozhin, his fate and that of the Wagner Group will ultimately be decided in Moscow. The Kremlin could use Belarus as a convenient dumping ground to neutralize Prigozhin, rather than dispose of him outright, especially considering his rising domestic popularity.

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The Wagner Group's future

The future of the Wagner Group is uncertain, with leader Yevgeny Prigozhin's plans unclear. Prigozhin and his mercenaries have been offered safe haven in Belarus by President Alexander Lukashenko, but it is doubtful that they will stay there long-term.

Prigozhin's presence in Belarus is dangerous for Lukashenko, as it further ties the country to the war in Ukraine, which is unpopular with Belarusian citizens. It also has the potential to destabilize Lukashenko's relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin, as well as the foundations of his regime.

Prigozhin's exile to Belarus was part of a deal to end the Wagner Group's short-lived mutiny in Russia. However, it is unlikely that Lukashenko had the political clout to genuinely mediate at the top level in Russia. Instead, Belarus was likely a convenient and temporary "dumping ground" for Prigozhin, decided by Moscow.

There are also questions about the costs of hosting the Wagner Group in Belarus, with Lukashenko himself saying, "it would be good for our army if we could invite them [the Wagner Group] at their own expense." There are concerns that the Belarusian army, which has never fought a real battle, would benefit from learning about Wagner's combat experience.

The presence of the Wagner Group in Belarus could also upset both the domestic elites and the public, who worry about further involvement in Russia's war and about welcoming "dodgy individuals." Belarusian law criminalizes mercenary activity, punishable by between three and seven years in prison.

It remains to be seen how many Wagner fighters will accompany Prigozhin to Belarus, and what their future role will be. Some reports suggest that they will continue recruitment and establish bases in the country. However, it is unclear if they will remain loyal to Prigozhin or be absorbed into the Russian military as contract soldiers.

The future of the Wagner Group is closely tied to the fate of Prigozhin, and their presence in Belarus is likely to be temporary. The group's expertise in suppressing rebellions and training security services could be of interest to Lukashenko, but the costs and political risks may outweigh the benefits.

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The Kremlin's response

Firstly, it provided a convenient and temporary solution to neutralise Prigozhin without resorting to outright disposal, especially considering his rising domestic popularity. By allowing Prigozhin to leave Russia, the Kremlin avoided further escalation and potential bloodshed. Additionally, the deal preserved the appearance of Putin's authority and stability, as he could portray himself as being in control of the situation.

Secondly, the Kremlin likely used Lukashenko as a messenger and a convenient intermediary to negotiate with Prigozhin. This allowed Putin to save face and avoid direct communication with the leader of the mutiny. Lukashenko, being dependent on the Kremlin's support, was a reliable ally who could be trusted to act in Russia's interests.

Thirdly, the deal provided an opportunity for the Kremlin to further entangle Belarus in the war in Ukraine. By allowing Wagner troops to be based in Belarus, Russia could exert more pressure on Ukraine and potentially launch new invasions or provocations from Belarusian territory. This also served to destabilise Lukashenko's relationship with Putin and tie Belarus even more closely to the war, which is unpopular with Belarusian citizens.

Moreover, the Kremlin may have viewed this deal as a way to eventually bring the Wagner Group under its direct command. By offering the mercenaries a choice to either come under Russian military command or leave for Belarus, Putin could potentially regain control over these forces and utilise their combat experience and expertise.

Finally, the deal provided an opportunity for the Kremlin to pursue financial wrongdoing charges against Prigozhin's affiliated organisation, the Concord Group. Putin hinted at potential financial irregularities in a contract between the Concord Group and the Russian military, suggesting that an investigation into the matter would be conducted.

In conclusion, while the Kremlin's immediate response was to allow Prigozhin and his mercenaries to seek exile in Belarus, this move served multiple strategic purposes. It allowed the Kremlin to neutralise an immediate threat, retain control over the situation, and further its interests in the region. However, the long-term stability of this arrangement remains uncertain, especially given the unpredictable nature of the individuals involved.

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The Belarusian opposition's stance

Franak Viacorka, the chief political adviser of Tsikhanouskaya, has echoed similar sentiments, stating that Prigozhin and his Wagner troops will face hostility from the Belarusian people, including influential figures within the country's military and security establishments. Viacorka also predicted that the arrival of Wagner troops would create more trouble for Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, and urged Western nations to tighten sanctions on Minsk.

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The potential impact on Belarus-Russia relations

The potential impact of Yevgeny Prigozhin's move to Belarus on Belarus-Russia relations is multifaceted and complex. On the one hand, Prigozhin's presence in Belarus could further strengthen the relationship between the two countries, as it demonstrates their alignment and willingness to support each other. This could be particularly beneficial for Belarus, as it has faced strict sanctions from the West and relies on Russia's economic and political backing. By hosting Prigozhin and his Wagner Group, Belarus may gain favour with Russia and strengthen its position in the region.

However, there are also potential risks and challenges that could impact Belarus-Russia relations. Prigozhin's presence in Belarus could upset the domestic balance of power in Belarus, as he is a wealthy and ambitious individual with a private army of mercenaries. There are concerns that he could destabilize the internal dynamics in Belarus and potentially sour Minsk's relationship with Moscow. If Prigozhin were to turn the Belarusian security services against the current regime or attempt to subordinate the Wagner mercenaries to the Belarusian armed forces, it could pose risks to the stability of the country and the region.

Additionally, Prigozhin's presence in Belarus could lead to increased tensions with Western countries, particularly those that have imposed sanctions on Belarus. There are already concerns from the West about the potential use of Belarusian territory to launch a new invasion of Ukraine or to provoke border conflicts with neighbouring Poland and Lithuania. If Belarus is seen as harbouring a war criminal and providing a safe haven for the Wagner Group, it could face further international condemnation and isolation.

Furthermore, Prigozhin's exile in Belarus may not be a long-term solution, as his fate and that of the Wagner Group will ultimately be decided by Moscow. Belarus may only offer temporary refuge, and Prigozhin could find himself on the move again if the situation changes.

Overall, the potential impact of Prigozhin's move to Belarus on Belarus-Russia relations is difficult to predict and depends on various factors, including the intentions of Prigozhin, the reactions of the Belarusian people and security forces, and the responses from Western countries. While it could lead to a strengthening of the Belarus-Russia relationship, it also carries risks of destabilization and increased tensions in the region.

Frequently asked questions

No, Prigozhin is not safe in Belarus. Although he was granted safe passage into exile in Belarus by President Alexander Lukashenko, he is still within reach of Putin and under his control. Influential figures within the country's military and security establishments are hostile towards him.

The Wagner Group is a private military company owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin. It is made up of prison recruits and other mercenaries who have fought alongside Russian troops in Ukraine.

Prigozhin went to Belarus as part of a deal to end his short-lived mutiny against the Russian military.

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