**Afghanistan's Ever-Changing Leadership: A Historical Perspective**

Afghanistan has had many leaders throughout its long history, dating back to the formation of the first modern Afghan state, the Hotak Empire, in 1709. The country has been ruled by various empires, dynasties, emirates, and kingdoms, with frequent changes in leadership due to foreign invasions, internal conflicts, and political upheaval.

- Hotak Empire (1709-1738): Founded by Mirwais Hotak and other Afghan tribal chiefs, this empire was the first modern Afghan state.

- Durrani Empire (1747-1823): Established by Ahmad Shah Durrani, also known as the Father of the Nation.

- Emirate of Kabul/Emirate of Afghanistan (1823-1926): Ruled by the Barakzai dynasty, with Sultan Mohammad Khan as the first ruler.

- Kingdom of Afghanistan (1926-1929, 1929-1973): Period of monarchy, with Zahir Shah becoming king in 1929 and ruling for 40 years.

- Republic of Afghanistan (1973-1978): Established by Mohammed Daoud Khan, cousin of Zahir Shah, who overthrew the monarchy and became president.

- Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (1978-1992): A communist state led by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.

- Islamic State of Afghanistan (1992-2002): Formed after the fall of the communist regime, with Sibghatullah Mojaddedi as the acting president.

- Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996-2001, 2021-present): The Taliban regime, which imposed a strict interpretation of Islamic law and restricted women's rights. Mullah Mohammed Omar was the supreme leader during their first rule, and Mullah Mawlawi Hibatullah Akhundzada is the current supreme leader.

- Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2004-2021): Hamid Karzai became the first democratically elected president, followed by Ashraf Ghani.

The Taliban's return to power in 2021

The Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan in 2021 came two decades after they were removed from power by a US-led military coalition.

The Taliban, an Islamic fundamentalist group, swept across the country in a lightning offensive as US-led foreign forces were withdrawing after 20 years of inconclusive war. The group had struck a deal with the Americans in 2020 for US troops to withdraw, following a bloody but ultimately successful guerrilla campaign lasting many years.

The Taliban took the capital, Kabul, on 15 August 2021, as the US-backed president, Ashraf Ghani, fled the country and the Afghan security forces disintegrated. Within weeks, the Taliban were in control of all of Afghanistan.

The Taliban's return to power has had a devastating impact on the rights of women and girls, who have been prohibited from attending secondary school and university and banned from most work. The economy has also suffered, with malnutrition soaring and hundreds of thousands of jobs lost.

The Taliban's rule has also been marked by a crackdown on civil and political rights, with journalists intimidated, press freedoms restricted, and protesters and activists forcibly disappeared.

The future for Afghans living under Taliban rule remains highly uncertain. While most are relieved that the war is over, millions are struggling to survive, and no country has recognised the Taliban government.

The Taliban's harsh rule and crackdown on women's rights

Since the Taliban took control of Afghanistan in 2021, they have imposed several restrictions on women's rights, limiting their access to education, employment, and public spaces.

Education

The Taliban have barred girls from attending secondary school and banned women from universities, reversing two decades of progress in women's education. This has disrupted the education of hundreds of thousands of girls and young women across Afghanistan. In some cases, girls have been allowed to continue their primary education, but their future prospects remain uncertain.

Employment

The Taliban have prohibited women from working in most sectors, with exceptions for healthcare and, in some cases, primary education. This has resulted in the loss of livelihoods for many women, who were previously the primary breadwinners for their families. The ban on female employment has also disrupted the operations of aid organisations and NGOs, as they often rely on female staff to reach and assist vulnerable women and girls, especially in conservative rural areas.

Public Spaces and Conduct

The Taliban have imposed strict rules on how women must dress and conduct themselves in public. Women are required to wear the burqa or a full-body covering when outside the home and are often expected to be accompanied by a male chaperone (mahram). They are banned from certain public spaces, such as parks, gyms, and bathhouses, and face restrictions on their use of technology, with some being told to use only basic phones without internet access.

Healthcare

The restrictions on women's employment have severely impacted the healthcare sector, as there are now fewer female healthcare professionals available. This has limited women's access to healthcare, especially in cases where they require treatment by male doctors. The Taliban have also disrupted the operations of humanitarian aid organisations, putting the lives of vulnerable Afghans at risk.

International Response

The Taliban's rollback of women's rights has been met with widespread international condemnation, including from Muslim-majority countries that usually maintain working relationships with the Taliban. There have been calls for the Taliban to respect women's rights and for the international community to take concrete actions to support and realise these rights. However, there is a delicate balance to be struck, as a complete withdrawal of aid and isolation of the Taliban government could further exacerbate the humanitarian crisis and ultimately harm the very people it aims to help, particularly women and girls.

The Taliban's neglect of basic services and the economy

Since the Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan in 2021, the country's economy has been in a downward spiral. The Taliban's neglect of basic services and the economy has led to a worsening of the humanitarian crisis in the country.

The Taliban's takeover has resulted in the loss of hundreds of thousands of jobs, with most women being banned from working. The group has also cracked down on women's rights, prohibiting most girls from attending secondary school and banning women from working at local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has estimated that restricting women's employment could cost up to 5% of Afghanistan's gross domestic product (GDP).

The Taliban's failure to effectively govern and manage the economy has led to a collapse in the banking system and a shortage of cash. The group's lack of financial expertise and inexperienced appointments to key positions have further exacerbated the situation. The Taliban's inability to curb corruption and their heavy-handed approach to justice and dispute resolution have also contributed to the economic crisis.

The freezing of foreign reserves and aid by the United States and other international donors has further crippled Afghanistan's economy. The country was heavily dependent on foreign aid, which accounted for a significant portion of its GDP. The loss of this aid has resulted in a decline in government revenue and public spending, leading to cuts in government services and layoffs of public employees.

The Taliban's economic policies have also led to a decline in the value of the Afghan currency, the afghani, causing widespread inflation and increasing the cost of imports. This has resulted in a rise in food and fuel prices, further exacerbating the humanitarian crisis.

The Taliban's reliance on illegal mining, opium production, and taxation of trade routes for revenue is unsustainable and has negatively impacted the country's economy. Their failure to effectively manage the economy and provide basic services has resulted in a worsening of the humanitarian crisis, with increasing malnutrition rates and a crumbling healthcare system.

The Taliban's ties with al-Qaeda and other terrorist organisations

The Taliban has maintained close ties with al-Qaeda, and analysts are concerned that the Taliban could provide it with safe haven and allow it to launch international terrorist attacks from Afghan soil.

The Taliban is a predominantly Pashtun, Islamic fundamentalist group that returned to power in Afghanistan in 2021 after waging a twenty-year insurgency. The Taliban's victory is likely to embolden Islamist radicals worldwide. In the accord that former President Trump negotiated with the Taliban in February 2020, the group agreed to "not allow any of its members, other individuals or groups, including Al Qaeda, to use the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and its allies." However, that agreement now seems to have little value, and many doubted at the time that the Taliban would or could keep its promises on that score.

The Taliban has provided increased protection and support for al-Qaeda members since regaining control over Afghanistan in 2021, when U.S. forces pulled out. Al-Qaeda has established eight new training camps and maintains several safehouses in Afghanistan, according to a report provided to the United Nations Security Council. The report, compiled by the council's committee created to monitor al-Qaeda, indicates that the Taliban has not honored its pledge to the U.S. – outlined in the Doha agreement – to sever ties with the terror group, and that the two organizations remain close.

Al-Qaeda's current leader, Sayf al-Adl, is believed to be based in Iran, according to the United Nations and the U.S. Justice Department, which is offering a $10 million reward for information on his exact whereabouts.

Taliban-al Qaeda relations

A year after the Taliban's takeover of Kabul, the U.S. killed al-Qaeda's then-leader Ayman al-Zawahri with a drone strike in Kabul's diplomatic district. He was inside a guest house belonging to the Taliban's Interior Minister, who is also the leader of the powerful Taliban-affiliated Haqqani network, Sirajuddin Haqqani.

"The presence of al-Qaeda senior figures in the country has not changed, and the group continues to pose a threat in the region and potentially beyond, the U.N. report warns. It notes, however, that in its assessment, "the group cannot at present project sophisticated attacks at long range."

Analysts believe al-Qaeda is now a much weaker organization than it used to be, and many doubt the Taliban would allow activities that would jeopardize the U.S. humanitarian support provided to Afghanistan, which remains vital to preventing a humanitarian crisis in the country.

"Are there training camps in Afghanistan? It is entirely possible. But their capacity to hit targets outside the immediate South Asian region is minimal, veteran regional analyst Torek Farhadi told CBS News. "The Taliban are careful not to let such activities develop, as they are in contact with U.S. authorities."

"The U.S. is currently the largest humanitarian donor in Afghanistan through the U.N., but ultimately, this support has resulted in avoiding a further humanitarian crisis in the country. The Taliban recognize this precious U.S. support and will not risk upsetting this arrangement, he said.

On the other hand, the Taliban's return to power has emboldened Tehrik-e-Taliban, a militant group sometimes referred to as the Pakistani Taliban. In late 2022, the group ended a cease-fire with the Pakistani government and launched attacks across the country. Pakistani officials have accused the Afghan Taliban of providing the militants with a safe haven in Afghanistan.

The Taliban's leadership and internal power struggles

The Taliban's leadership is centred around a supreme leader, the emir, believed to be endowed by God with authority to oversee all affairs of state and society. Since their takeover, the group has only offered vague insistences that they will rule in accordance with "Islamic law and Afghan values". The emir, Haibatullah Akhundzada, has ruled with an iron fist, repeatedly dismissing input from other Taliban factions, especially more pragmatic, internationally oriented Taliban leaders.

Since the Taliban takeover, internal disagreements have spilled into public view. A fundamental divergence has grown between Taliban elites over their visions for the future. Sirajuddin Haqqani, acting minister of the interior and leader of the notorious Haqqani network, said the Taliban's "monopolization" of power was "defaming" their entire system. Mohammad Yaqoub, acting defence minister and son of the movement's revered founder Omar, said days later that the Taliban must always listen to "legitimate demands of the people". A deputy prime minister and several other ministers offered similar remarks. In response, the emir's defenders chided critics and called for obedience.

The Taliban's future appears bleak, and some among their ranks have begun to speak out. The emir's increasingly frantic micromanagement of governance appears prompted in part by perceptions of rampant disobedience; he can either accept being undermined, or double down. In this light, it seems the emir is issuing ever-harsher edicts from a place of weakness, not unquestioned supremacy. This assessment is bolstered by his establishment of ulema councils in every province—which seem to function as the emir's eyes and ears, like a nationwide "neighbourhood watch" for loyal clerics to report violations among the Taliban's own officials.

Dissenters, who seem to want to develop the economy and engage with the outside world without betraying their militant roots and ideals, assume a more complicated stance than the emir. More than anyone, Haqqani embodies this struggle between former identities and aspirational new ones: he is an ambitious state builder yet believed to be responsible for hosting al-Qaeda's former chief in Kabul.

The emir, in contrast, offers consistency. In one of his rare public speeches, he said the jihad or struggle did not end when foreign military forces withdrew and the Afghan republic collapsed. The struggle continues to this day, with purification of society as its aim (and with enemies still set against them).

Having built a movement based on obedience, with the emir notionally anchoring their organisational discipline, attempting to sideline or overthrow him would pull the rug out from under their own feet. The leadership's Byzantine decision-making process lacks any solid mechanism for challenging the emir, who for the past 20 years—across different leaders—had almost always deferred to the group's consensus. Too direct a challenge to the emir's authority, and local commanders could quickly lose faith in the movement.

Public criticisms are a creative attempt among dissenters to fight back against the emir's overreach, and perhaps lay the groundwork for a move against him. But it is yet unclear if these critiques are the opening salvo in an impending contest, or acting more like a pressure release valve, allowing leaders to blow off steam while they bide their time.

Dissenters are caught in what some political scientists term the moderates' dilemma, or what some analysts in Kabul call the Taliban's "propaganda trap". To prove resilient against a superpower's military might, the Taliban radicalised their fighters (many practically from birth) and flooded them with extremist propaganda. To shift away from the insurgency's narratives too suddenly, to ramp up diplomatic engagement and moderate social policies, would be a betrayal to many Taliban fighters. It would cast the leadership as just another "puppet" regime, beholden to foreign interests—exactly what they fought against.

The emir, rather than being portrayed as a fanatical recluse, may be continuing to operate in the same style that won him the job in 2016: a careful listener, deferential to other views and interests. It must be considered a possibility that the emir is not implementing a harsh gender apartheid regime solely out of personal zealotry, but out of firm belief that core constituencies in the Taliban zealously demand it.

If true, policymakers shouldn't hope for too much "moderation" from dissenters, even if they manage to gain the upper hand against the emir and his camp. Even the most pragmatic Taliban figure, elevated to supreme leadership, would be bombarded by the same internal expectations and pressures. The militancy boiling within the movement has not yet cooled.

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