The Afghanistan Conundrum: Navigating The Fine Line Of Military Intervention

The Afghanistan conflict, also known as the War in Afghanistan, was the longest war in US military history. It began in 2001 as a direct response to the 9/11 attacks and ended in 2021 with the Taliban's recapture of the country.

The US-led coalition invaded Afghanistan to topple the Taliban-ruled Islamic Emirate and establish the Islamic Republic. The conflict officially ended with the 2021 Taliban offensive, which overthrew the Islamic Republic and re-established the Islamic Emirate.

The US military withdrawal from Afghanistan was completed on 30 August 2021, a day ahead of schedule. The evacuation flights left behind thousands of Afghans who had worked with the coalition forces and were eligible for expedited US visas.

The US spent billions of dollars to support the Afghan government and security forces, but the Taliban's resurgence took place due to several factors. These included the withdrawal of most foreign forces, the Pakistani military's operation that dislodged militants into Afghanistan, and the lack of interest from the international community.

The US's initial response to the 9/11 attacks

On September 11, 2001, the world watched in horror as two planes slammed into New York City's World Trade Center, another crashed into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, and a fourth plane crashed in a field outside of Shanksville, Pennsylvania. The attacks, carried out by 19 al-Qaeda members, killed 2,977 people and marked the deadliest terrorist assault in US history.

In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, the US government commenced rescue operations at the World Trade Center site, grounded civilian aircraft, and began long-term responses, including official investigations, legislative changes, military action, and restoration projects.

President George W. Bush, who was in Florida at the time of the attacks, addressed the nation, vowing to “hunt down and punish those responsible for these cowardly acts." He returned to Washington, DC, and met with his senior staff before addressing the nation again from the Oval Office. Bush emphasized that the attacks were conducted by extremist terrorists and did not represent the Islamic religion. He also declared a national state of emergency, granting him expanded powers to mobilize the military.

The US government launched terrorism investigations, leading to the declaration of a "War on Terrorism." This marked the beginning of military engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq. Congress authorized the president to use "all necessary and appropriate force" against those involved in the 9/11 attacks or those who harbored them.

The public overwhelmingly supported military action, with 77% favoring US military intervention, even if it resulted in thousands of American casualties. Patriotic sentiment surged, and the public largely set aside political differences, rallying in support of the nation's institutions and leadership.

To facilitate the domestic response to the attacks, Congress passed the controversial USA PATRIOT Act, which expanded the search and surveillance powers of federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Additionally, a cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security was established to centralize various domestic security functions.

The initial response to the 9/11 attacks set in motion sweeping changes to US intelligence and counterterrorism practices, reshaped foreign policy, and altered Americans' daily lives, particularly regarding airport security and civil liberties.

The role of Pakistan

Pakistan has played a significant and complex role in the Afghanistan conflict, leveraging strong influence on both sides of the war. The country shares a border region with Afghanistan that has never truly been under the control of any government, which has been used strategically by various groups throughout the conflict.

In the 1980s, the CIA used Pakistan as a safe haven to engineer the largest covert operation in its history, to defeat the Soviet army in Afghanistan. Pakistan served as a secure base for the mujahideen fighting against the Soviet intervention, and the U.S. funnelled billions of dollars in covert assistance to the mujahideen through the Pakistani intelligence agency, the ISI.

However, Pakistan's relationship with the Taliban has been a source of tension and conflict with the U.S. and Afghanistan. Pakistan has provided substantial financial, logistical, and military support to the Taliban, including soliciting funding, bankrolling operations, providing diplomatic support, arranging training for fighters, recruiting manpower, planning and directing offensives, and facilitating shipments of ammunition and fuel. The porous border between the two countries has facilitated the transshipment of men and materiel. Pakistan's support for the Taliban is driven by a desire to gain "strategic depth", bolstering its position against India and seeking to contain nationalist aspirations of tribes along the border.

The U.S. has relied on Pakistan as an ally in the war on terror following the September 11th attacks, but Pakistan's passive support for the Taliban has been a source of tension and mistrust. Pakistan's role as a safe haven for the Taliban insurgency and its logistical supply line has given it strong leverage over the conflict. While Pakistan has occasionally arrested senior Taliban leaders, its overall passive support for the Taliban is seen as a hedge against the day when NATO decides to withdraw from Afghanistan.

The impact of Pakistan's role in the conflict is far-reaching. The more the Afghan insurgency and al-Qaeda are able to operate in Pakistan, the more relations between Kabul and Islamabad deteriorate. Additionally, the possibility of internal conflict in Pakistan increasing could lead to a breakdown of the state, which would have disastrous consequences for the region.

The Taliban's resurgence

Former CIA Director and Commander of US troops in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus, noted that the collapse of the Afghan army in the face of the Taliban was somewhat predictable. He attributed it to the withdrawal of US troops, air support, and contractors who maintained US-provided helicopters and planes. The Afghan forces were left without critical support, such as resupply, additional forces, air medevac, and close air support, which are crucial when under attack in multiple locations across the country's challenging terrain.

Leon Panetta, former US Secretary of Defense, CIA Director, and Chief of Staff to President Clinton, also expressed his surprise at the speed of the Taliban's advances. He attributed it to the Taliban's preparation and pre-positioning of weapons in the north and west while negotiations were ongoing in Doha. Panetta emphasized the serious national security threat the Taliban poses to the US, as they are likely to provide a safe haven for terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIS.

The US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban's resurgence have far-reaching consequences. The Taliban's victory boosts morale among extremist groups worldwide and provides a rallying point for radical new forms of Islamist thinking. It also deals a blow to the concept of humanitarian intervention and a rules-based world order, as advanced by Western nations.

The US's counter-insurgency strategy

The U.S. counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan was based on the assumption that the COIN goal of protecting the population was clear and attainable and would prove decisive. The strategy was to secure the Afghan people by employing the method of "clear, hold, and build"—in other words, push the insurgents out, keep them out, and use the resulting space and time to establish a legitimate government, build capable security forces, and improve the Afghan economy. The U.S. military was successful in ensuring that the major tenets of COIN doctrine were also incorporated into the revised operational plan. The stated aim was to secure the Afghan people by employing the method of "clear, hold, and build." With persistent outside efforts, advocates of the COIN doctrine asserted, the capacity of the Afghan government would steadily grow, the levels of U.S. and international assistance would decline, and the insurgency would eventually be defeated.

However, more than three years after the Afghan surge’s implementation, what can be said about the efficacy of COIN and the U.S. experience in Afghanistan? Proponents might, with some merit, claim that the experiment was too little, too late—too late because an industrial-strength COIN approach was not rigorously applied until eight years after the war began, and too little because even then, limits were placed on the size and duration of the surge, making it more difficult to change the calculations of Afghan friends and enemies. Moreover, even though President Obama announced plans to end U.S. participation in combat operations in Afghanistan by 2014, the war continues and the outcome remains indeterminate. Still, it is possible to answer the question by examining the major principles of COIN and analyzing how these fared on the ground.

The COIN-surge plan for Afghanistan rested on three crucial assumptions: that the COIN goal of protecting the population was clear and attainable and would prove decisive, that higher levels of foreign assistance and support would substantially increase the Afghan government’s capacity and legitimacy, and that a COIN approach by the United States would be consistent with the political-military approach preferred by Afghan President Hamid Karzai. Unfortunately, all three assumptions were spectacularly incorrect, which, in turn, made the counterinsurgency campaign increasingly incoherent and difficult to prosecute. In short, COIN failed in Afghanistan.

The withdrawal of US troops

In the final days of his presidency, Donald Trump was expected to cut a significant number of US troops in Afghanistan, a decision that would counter the advice of military commanders. Trump's new Pentagon chief, Christopher Miller, hinted at the possibility of troop withdrawals, stating that ""all wars must end". The plan would involve reducing the number of troops in Afghanistan from 4,500 to 2,500, a decision opposed by senior military leaders given the fragile state of the country.

The accelerated withdrawal goes against the longstanding advice of Trump's military leadership, including Marine Gen. Frank McKenzie, the top US commander for the Middle East. However, officials suggested that commanders would be able to live with a partial pullout, which would allow them to keep counterterrorism troops in Afghanistan and give them time to remove critical equipment from the country.

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