Austria-Hungary's German Defense In Wwi: Explained

The origins of World War I can be traced back to the alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary, which formed the Central Powers, one of the two main coalitions that fought in the war. In 1914, Germany gave Austria-Hungary its unconditional support in its conflict with Serbia, which was backed by Russia, thus setting off a chain of events that led to the outbreak of World War I. This assurance, known as the blank check, marked a pivotal moment as it escalated the conflict from a localised one to a global war. The Central Powers faced and were defeated by the Allied Powers, which included Russia, France, and Great Britain, among others.

Germany's alliance with Austria-Hungary

The alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary was born out of necessity. The unification of Germany in 1871 had disrupted the old 'balance of power' in Europe, and Germany's growing strength and pursuit of 'world power' status worried its neighbours. France and Russia formed an alliance in 1894, and in response, Germany drew closer to Austria-Hungary. The two powers maintained mass armies through compulsory military service and spent huge sums on military technology.

However, the "brotherhood in arms" between Vienna and Berlin was an alliance of two very mismatched partners with differing aims and sometimes rivalrous sentiments. Vienna often overestimated Germany's potential, while Germany underestimated the strength of the old Habsburg Monarchy. There was little in the way of military-strategic cooperation between the two allies, and the respective military staffs operated in secrecy, sharing as little as possible about their strategic and logistic affairs.

When war broke out in July 1914, the divergent ideas and aims of the two partners became clear. Austria-Hungary's strategy was focused on Serbia and the Balkans, while Germany had its eye principally on the conflict with France. Germany's support for Austria-Hungary was driven by its foreign policy ambitions and its fear of 'encirclement' by rival powers.

As the war progressed, the Austrian army and administration experienced massive problems with supplies and reinforcements and became increasingly dependent on assistance from German forces. By the summer of 1916, the supreme command was taken over entirely by the Germans, who now had the final say over the Austrian generals. While in public, there was a highly emotive emphasis on 'Nibelung loyalty' between the two allies, in private, the Austrian Chief of General Staff, Conrad von Hötzendorf, referred to Germany as 'our secret enemy'.

The invasion of Serbia

The second campaign was launched under German command on October 6, 1915, when Bulgarian, Austro-Hungarian, and German forces, led by Field Marshal August von Mackensen, successfully invaded Serbia from three sides. This resulted in the Great Retreat through Montenegro and Albania, the evacuation to Greece, and the establishment of the Macedonian front. The defeat of Serbia gave the Central Powers temporary control of the Balkans, opening a land route from Berlin to Constantinople. Serbia was then occupied and divided between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Bulgaria.

The third Austro-Hungarian invasion of Serbia commenced on November 6, 1914, with intense artillery fire on Serbian border towns. The Austro-Hungarian forces attacked across the Drina River but were met with fierce resistance from the Serbian army, which was forced to retreat. The Serbian army mounted a counterattack, and the Austro-Hungarians were forced to retreat to Belgrade. The Serbian army retook Belgrade on December 15, forcing the Austro-Hungarians to retreat into Austria-Hungary.

The Schlieffen Plan

Von Schlieffen's plan was inspired by the Battle of Cannae (216 BCE), a pivotal engagement during the Second Punic War. At Cannae, the Carthaginian general Hannibal defeated a much larger Roman force with a successful double envelopment, turning the Roman army's flanks and destroying it. Convinced that a modern enemy force could be defeated in the same way, von Schlieffen proposed that Germany's advantage over France and Russia—its likely opponents in a continental war—was that the two were separated. Therefore, Germany could eliminate one while keeping the other in check. Once one ally was defeated, Germany would be able to combine its forces to defeat the other through massive troop concentration and rapid deployment.

Von Schlieffen's plan called for four army groups, called the Bataillon Carré, to mass on the extreme German right. The northernmost force would consist of 5 cavalry divisions, 17 infantry corps, 6 Ersatzkorps (replacement corps), and several Landwehr (reserve) and Landsturm (men over the age of 45) brigades. These forces were to wheel south and east after passing through neutral Belgium, turning into the flanks and rear of the hardened French defenses along the German border. After crossing the Somme west of Paris, the main body of the Bataillon Carré would turn to engage the defenders of the French capital, with the Ersatzkorps lending support. The central group—consisting of six infantry corps, Landwehr brigades, and a cavalry division—was to attack the French at La Feré and Paris, eventually encircling the capital on the north and east. The third group would concentrate on the most southern right wing, with eight corps, five reserve corps, and Landwehr brigades, with the help of two mobile cavalry divisions. The last group consisted of three cavalry divisions, three infantry corps, two Ersatzkorps, and a reserve corps on the left wing. That last group was to block any French attempt to counterattack, and it could be detached and transported to the extreme right if necessary. The Upper Rhine to the Swiss border and the Lower Alsace were to be defended by Landwehr brigades.

Von Schlieffen worked out a detailed timetable that took into account possible French responses to German actions, with particular attention paid to the lightly defended Franco-German border. With this plan, von Schlieffen believed Germany could defeat France within six weeks, concluding with a decisive "super Cannae" in the south.

Von Schlieffen insisted on an immediate attack on France in 1905 as a "preventive war," arguing that Russia had just been defeated by Japan and France was involved in a crisis in Morocco. However, German Emperor William II and his chancellor, Bernhard von Bülow, believed that Great Britain's alliance with Japan would lead to an encirclement of Germany and were cautious of such an attack. Rebuffed, von Schlieffen responded with belligerence and was dismissed.

Von Schlieffen's plan was later modified by his successor, Helmuth von Moltke, prior to and during its implementation in World War I. Moltke's changes, which included a reduction in the size of the attacking army, were blamed for Germany's failure to win a quick victory.

The Austro-Hungarian army's shortcomings

The shortcomings of the Austro-Hungarian army were evident from the outset of World War I. The army's combat doctrine was outdated, ignoring modern military experiences from the early 1900s in Africa, Asia, and the Balkans. This resulted in high casualties during the initial months of the war, forcing a change in tactics.

The army lacked proper equipment, strategic vision, and tactical training. The troops were deployed as they had been during peacetime manoeuvres, with a strong emphasis on offensive tactics. The conviction that an offensive was essential to defeating the enemy led to massive troop losses. The Austro-Hungarian army faced two modern armies on the eastern and Balkan fronts, and their tactics were inadequate. There was no coordination between the infantry, cavalry, and artillery branches, with each branch operating independently according to its criteria.

The army's leadership was inadequate, with an overemphasis on the "will of the commander" rather than effective tactics. The political situation within the Dual Monarchy also played a role, with top political figures blamed for overly cautious defence policies. However, military leaders used these political problems to disguise their outdated combat methods.

The Austro-Hungarian army suffered from a lack of unity due to its multi-ethnic composition. Language barriers created logistical challenges, as orders were given in German, which many soldiers did not understand. This led to ethnic tensions and political violence, with Slavic battalions frequently mutinying. The army's funding and equipment were inadequate, with governments favouring their own units over equitable distribution. The army was poorly prepared for modern warfare, especially in aviation, where they lagged far behind other European powers.

In summary, the shortcomings of the Austro-Hungarian army included outdated tactics, inadequate equipment and funding, a lack of unity due to ethnic diversity, and poor leadership. These factors contributed to their struggles during World War I.

The collapse of Austria-Hungary

The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was catalysed by a multitude of factors, including the growth of internal social contradictions, the separation of different parts of Austria-Hungary, the 1918 crop failure, general starvation, and the economic crisis. The Austro-Hungarian Empire had also been weakened over time by a widening gap between Hungarian and Austrian interests.

The Austro-Hungarian monarchy collapsed with dramatic speed in the autumn of 1918. Leftist and pacifist political movements organized strikes in factories, and uprisings in the army had become commonplace. These leftist or left-liberal pro-Entente maverick parties opposed the monarchy as a form of government and considered themselves internationalist rather than patriotic. Eventually, the German defeat and the minor revolutions in Vienna and Budapest gave political power to the left/liberal political parties.

As the war went on, ethnic unity declined; the Allies encouraged breakaway demands from minorities, and the Empire faced disintegration. With apparent Allied victory approaching, nationalist movements seized ethnic resentment to erode social unity. The military breakdown of the Italian front marked the start of the rebellion for the numerous ethnicities who made up the multi-ethnic Empire, as they refused to keep on fighting for a cause that now appeared senseless. The Emperor had lost much of his power to rule, as his realm disintegrated.

On 14 October 1918, Foreign Minister Baron István Burián von Rajecz asked for an armistice based on President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points. Two days later, Emperor Karl I issued a proclamation ("Imperial Manifesto of 16 October 1918") altering the empire into a federal union to give ethnic groups decentralisation and representation. However, on 18 October, United States Secretary of State Robert Lansing replied that autonomy for the nationalities – the tenth of the Fourteen Points – was no longer enough. In fact, a Czechoslovak provisional government had joined the Allies on 14 October. The South Slavs in both halves of the monarchy had already declared in favour of uniting with Serbia in a large South Slav state in the 1917 Corfu Declaration signed by members of the Yugoslav Committee. The Croatians had begun disregarding orders from Budapest earlier in October. Lansing's response was, in effect, the death certificate of Austria–Hungary.

During the Italian battles, the Czechoslovaks and Southern Slavs declared their independence. With defeat in the war imminent after the Italian offensive in the Battle of Vittorio Veneto on 24 October, Czech politicians peacefully took over command in Prague on 28 October (later declared the birth of Czechoslovakia) and followed up in other major cities in the next few days. On 30 October, the Slovaks did the same. On 29 October, the Slavs in both portions of what remained of Austria–Hungary proclaimed the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs and declared that their ultimate intention was to unite with Serbia and Montenegro in a large South Slav state. On the same day, the Czechs and Slovaks formally proclaimed the establishment of Czechoslovakia as an independent state.

On 17 October 1918, the Hungarian Parliament voted in favour of terminating the union with Austria. The most prominent opponent of continued union with Austria, Count Mihály Károlyi, seized power in the Aster Revolution on 31 October. Charles was all but forced to appoint Károlyi as his Hungarian prime minister. One of Károlyi's first acts was to formally repudiate the compromise agreement on 31 October, effectively terminating the personal union with Austria and thus officially dissolving the Austro-Hungarian state.

Frequently asked questions