The Haunting Presence Of Terrorism In Afghanistan: A Lingering Threat

Afghanistan has been a haven for terrorist groups for decades. The country's weak and failing state, coupled with the Taliban government's close links to several terrorist groups, has allowed these organisations to rebuild and re-establish training camps in the country.

Al-Qaeda and the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Khorasan (ISIS-K) are the most prominent terrorist groups in Afghanistan. They have grown in strength since the U.S. withdrawal and pose a significant threat to the country and beyond.

Other groups, such as the Haqqani network, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, Islamic Jihad Group, Khatiba Imam al-Bukhari, and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, also operate in Afghanistan.

The Taliban government has taken some security measures, but terrorist attacks remain frequent and the country is still considered unsafe for foreigners.

The Taliban's relationship with Al-Qaeda

The Taliban and Al-Qaeda have a long history of collaboration and cooperation. The Taliban, a predominantly Pashtun Islamic fundamentalist group, emerged in the early 1990s in northern Pakistan following the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda, on the other hand, was founded in 1988 in Afghanistan by Osama bin Laden, a Saudi Arabian millionaire.

The Taliban and Al-Qaeda have a close relationship that dates back to the 1990s. Al-Qaeda provided material and manpower assistance to the Taliban as it waged a civil war against the Northern Alliance, and in return, the Taliban provided sanctuary to Al-Qaeda. This marriage of convenience was based on a shared, albeit not identical, radical Islamist ideology.

The Taliban and Al-Qaeda's relationship has evolved over time. Following the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban was ousted from power by a US-led military coalition. The Taliban then regrouped across the border in Pakistan and began taking back territory. During this period, the Taliban maintained close ties with Al-Qaeda, and analysts raised concerns that the Taliban could provide safe havens for international terrorist attacks.

In 2020, the Taliban signed an agreement with the US, committing to restrain jihadist groups, including Al-Qaeda, from organizing international terrorism from Afghanistan. However, there are concerns that the Taliban may not uphold this agreement, given their history of collaboration with Al-Qaeda.

Despite the Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan, the nature of their relationship with Al-Qaeda remains uncertain. Some analysts argue that the Taliban's victory is also Al-Qaeda's victory, and it has global implications. Al-Qaeda's messaging and political direction indicate that it sees the Taliban as an important partner in its global jihad.

The Taliban's relationship with the Islamic State in Khorasan

The Taliban and the Islamic State in Khorasan (IS-K) have a hostile relationship, with the IS-K viewing the Taliban as an "irreconcilable enemy". The conflict between the two groups is driven by sectarian differences, with the IS-K subscribing to the Jihadi-Salafist ideology, while the Taliban follows the Hanafi madhhab, an alternative Sunni Islamic school of thought. The IS-K considers the Taliban ideologically deficient and accuses them of being "filthy nationalists" due to their focus on ruling Afghanistan rather than committing to a universal Islamic jihad.

The enmity between the groups has been exacerbated by military hostilities, with the Taliban targeting IS-K bases and hideouts in Afghanistan. The Taliban's counter-terrorism efforts have been intelligence-led, allowing them to carry out "surgical" strikes against the IS-K. The IS-K, on the other hand, has employed hit-and-run tactics, targeting and assassinating Taliban members. The conflict has resulted in casualties on both sides, with the IS-K also carrying out attacks against civilians.

Despite their differences, there have been instances of collaboration between the two groups. Elements of the Haqqani Network, which is integrated into the Taliban, have allegedly coordinated with the IS-K on certain occasions. Additionally, the Taliban and IS-K have both fought against common enemies, such as the Tehrik Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other jihadist groups.

The Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan in 2021 has altered the dynamics between the two groups. The Taliban has worked to contain or purge potential opponents, including Islamic State supporters and Salafists. This has led to the closure of Salafist mosques and seminaries and the arrest of prominent Salafist scholars. The IS-K, meanwhile, has sought to take advantage of the political instability and the withdrawal of U.S. and partner forces to challenge Taliban control and expand its recruitment efforts.

The conflict between the Taliban and the IS-K remains ongoing, with both sides continuing to engage in military operations and propaganda campaigns against each other. The Taliban's superior military power and control of the Afghan state pose a significant constraint to the IS-K, but the group has proven resilient and continues to pose a threat to the Taliban regime.

The Taliban's relationship with the Pakistani Taliban

The Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban, also known as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), have a complex relationship. The TTP is an anti-Pakistan insurgent group that seeks to establish a Taliban-style, Sharia-compliant state in Pakistan. The TTP has killed thousands of Pakistanis and has been responsible for dozens of terrorist attacks inside Pakistani cities. The TTP has been provided safe haven by the Taliban in Afghanistan, which has stunned and angered Islamabad, which was operating under the assumption that the Taliban would be beholden to Pakistan out of gratitude for years of support.

The TTP has strengthened its bases in Afghanistan to attack Pakistan, especially in areas where the Taliban's territorial influence as an insurgency was significant. After taking over the country, the Taliban gave the TTP de-facto political asylum. The TTP has used its improved political status in Afghanistan to step up cross-border attacks and is now regularly sending fighters into Pakistan. In April 2022, the TTP launched a spring offensive named "Al-Badr", the most significant insurgent onslaught against Pakistan in recent years. In response, Pakistan carried out coordinated airstrikes inside Afghanistan at suspected TTP locations but ended up killing civilians. The Taliban summoned Islamabad's envoy in Kabul and threatened retaliation in the case of more attacks, without directly naming Pakistan.

The TTP is subordinate to the Taliban, with the former pledging allegiance to the latter. There are strong interpersonal and wartime bonds between the influential Haqqani family and the TTP, and between some southern Taliban leaders and the TTP's political leadership. There is also abundant ethnic amity, built around tribal ties and disdain for the Pakistani state, at least in the rank-and-file and middle tier of the Taliban. Many in the TTP supported the Taliban in its nascence, including by providing suicide bombers. The Taliban and the TTP also share al-Qaeda as an ally.

The Taliban's support for the TTP may be because they want to use the TTP as bargaining leverage with Pakistan. Another perspective is that the Taliban want a like-minded political actor such as the TTP to ultimately rise to power in Islamabad. A third perspective is that given the deep support the TTP enjoys in the Taliban rank-and-file, as well as the size of the TTP in Afghanistan, the Taliban face capacity constraints to go after the TTP. Finally, some Afghan opposition leaders see the Taliban's position and the TTP's violence as an elaborate ruse by Pakistan's powerful intelligence agency, the ISI, to absolve itself of supporting the Taliban over the last many years.

Whatever the motive, the bottom line is that the Taliban are unwilling to act against the TTP in any meaningful way.

The Taliban's relationship with the Haqqani Network

The Taliban and the Haqqani Network have a long history together, with the latter being a key part of the former's leadership structure. The Haqqani Network was founded by Jalaluddin Haqqani, who was a member of the Hezb-e Islami faction and a top Afghan warlord and insurgent commander during the anti-Soviet war. Jalaluddin later allied with the Afghan Taliban as their Minister of Tribal and Border Affairs when they held power in Afghanistan in the mid-to-late 1990s.

Jalaluddin's son, Sirajuddin Haqqani, currently leads the day-to-day activities of the group and was named a deputy to the newly appointed Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mohammed Mansur in 2015, further cementing the alliance between the two groups. The Haqqani Network is primarily based in North Waziristan, Pakistan, and conducts cross-border operations into eastern Afghanistan and Kabul. They are considered one of the most lethal and sophisticated insurgent groups targeting US, Coalition, and Afghan forces in Afghanistan.

Throughout the Afghan War, the Haqqani Network was responsible for some of the deadliest and highest-profile attacks on US forces, including the June 2011 assault on the Kabul Intercontinental Hotel and two major suicide bombings against the Indian Embassy in Kabul in 2008 and 2009. The group has also been involved in criminal activities such as extortion, kidnapping for ransom, and smuggling.

The Haqqani Network has been designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the US Government due to its involvement in the Afghan insurgency, attacks on US personnel, and ties to the Taliban and al-Qa'ida. The relationship between the two groups is complex, with the Haqqani Network maintaining distinct command and control, and lines of operation within the larger Taliban organization.

The Haqqanis have long been considered the most lethal and vicious element of the Taliban, and with Sirajuddin in a leadership role, the Taliban is expected to grow more radical over time. The Haqqanis have pushed for complex, high-casualty attacks that often result in significant civilian casualties and are thought to be even more anti-United States than other parts of the Taliban.

The Haqqani Network has also played a central role in mediating negotiations between the Pakistani Taliban and the Pakistani state, further showcasing their influence within the region. The relationship between the two groups has evolved over the last two decades, with the Haqqani Network officially becoming affiliated with the Taliban in 2007 and gaining representation in their Leadership Council.

In summary, the Haqqani Network and the Taliban have a deep-rooted and complex relationship, with the former being a key part of the latter's leadership structure. The Haqqanis have pushed the Taliban towards more extreme ideologies and tactics, and their influence is expected to continue shaping the Taliban's future path.

The Taliban's relationship with the Afghan people

The Taliban is a Sunni Islamist nationalist and pro-Pashtun movement that ruled most of Afghanistan from 1996 until October 2001. The Taliban's relationship with the Afghan people has been tumultuous, with the group enforcing a strict interpretation of Sharia law, banning women from working and girls from attending school, and committing massacres against civilians. The Taliban has also been accused of cultural genocide, destroying historical and cultural texts, artifacts, and sculptures.

The Taliban has also been accused of ethnic cleansing, with people from Hazara, Uzbek, Turkmen, and Tajik ethnic groups facing growing marginalization and forced evictions from their homes and land. The Taliban has also been accused of human rights abuses against the LGBTI community, with consensual same-sex relations remaining illegal and punishable by death.

Despite the Taliban's tumultuous relationship with the Afghan people, the group has maintained support from some factions. The Taliban's promise to restore peace and security and enforce their own version of Sharia law has garnered support from some Afghans, particularly those who are weary of the mujahideen's excesses and infighting.

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