The Elusive "Good War": Afghanistan's Complex Legacy

The war in Afghanistan has been referred to as the good war in comparison to the war in Iraq, which was seen as a bad war or a lost cause. The war in Afghanistan was initially deemed a triumph, with the Taliban falling to an American-led coalition. However, it has since become the longest war in US history, lasting over 18 years, and costing trillions of dollars. The human cost has also been high, with thousands of coalition servicemen and Afghan civilians losing their lives or being injured.

The war in Afghanistan was launched in retaliation for the 9/11 attacks, with the goal of defeating al-Qaeda and upending the Taliban regime. While the initial invasion was successful, with the Taliban regime crumbling, the war soon became a stalemate, with the Taliban regaining control of large swathes of the country. The US and its allies struggled to stabilize the country and build a democratic government, facing challenges such as widespread corruption, intense grievances, Pakistani meddling, and deep-rooted resistance to foreign occupation. Despite the efforts and sacrifices made, the war ultimately ended in failure, with the Taliban regaining power in 2021.

The war in Afghanistan was initially considered a good war compared to the war in Iraq

The war in Afghanistan was initially considered a "good war" compared to the war in Iraq. In the early years of the war in Afghanistan, after the Taliban fell to an American-led coalition, the fight there appeared to be a triumph—a "good war" in comparison to the debacle in Iraq. US President Barack Obama referred to the war in Afghanistan as "the good war" and the war in Iraq as "the bad war".

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, US President George W. Bush launched an invasion of Afghanistan in retaliation. In the months that followed, US and allied forces, alongside their partners in the Northern Alliance, chased out al-Qaeda and overthrew the Taliban regime. However, the Bush administration soon shifted military and intelligence resources away from Afghanistan and towards Iraq.

In contrast to the war in Iraq, the war in Afghanistan initially appeared to be a success. In the first few weeks, the Taliban regime unravelled, and by November 2001, the Taliban had surrendered Kandahar and their leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, had fled the city. This early success led to a sense of overconfidence, with Bush administration figures like US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declaring an end to "major combat" by May 2003.

However, this perception of the war as a "good war" would not last. The Taliban regrouped and re-established themselves in Pakistan, launching a major offensive in February 2006 that overran entire districts and surrounded provincial capitals. Violence escalated, and by 2008, US troop levels had risen to over 30,000 without successfully stemming the tide. The war in Afghanistan had become a stalemate, and the initial optimism that characterised it had faded.

The US spent trillions of dollars on the war in Afghanistan, making it the most expensive war in US history

The war in Afghanistan is the most expensive war in US history. Since the US-led invasion in 2001, the US has spent trillions of dollars on the war, with estimates ranging from $2 trillion to $2.3 trillion. This figure includes operations in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The war has been funded almost entirely by borrowing, and the US will continue to pay interest on these loans for years to come. The US government has already paid over $500 billion in interest, and this figure is expected to reach $6.5 trillion by 2050.

The $2 trillion spent on the war could have been spent on other areas such as healthcare, which would have produced more jobs. Instead, the war has cost the lives of over 2,400 American soldiers and 38,000 Afghan civilians. It has also resulted in thousands of American soldiers returning home with physical and psychological injuries, with the cost of caring for these veterans expected to exceed $1 trillion over the next 40 years.

A significant portion of the war expenditure went towards training and equipping the Afghan military and police forces. However, despite receiving billions of dollars in training and equipment, the Afghan security forces were unable to defend the country against the Taliban.

In addition to the direct costs of waging war, the US also spent billions of dollars on reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. However, much of this money was lost to corruption and failed projects. American taxpayers' money went towards building hospitals and schools that were never used, and military bases that were later shuttered.

The war in Afghanistan has also had a significant opportunity cost for the US economy. The borrowed money used to fund the war has raised the national debt and consumer interest rates.

Overall, the US spent trillions of dollars on the war in Afghanistan, making it the most expensive war in US history, with far-reaching economic consequences that will continue to be felt for decades.

The US failed to win the war or the peace in Afghanistan due to hubris and a lack of understanding of the country

The US war in Afghanistan, which began in 2001, has been described as a “good war” in comparison to the concurrent war in Iraq. However, the conflict in Afghanistan has since turned into the longest war in US history, as well as the most costly, with the final price tag estimated to be higher than that of World War II.

There are several reasons why the US failed to win the war in Afghanistan. One crucial factor is that the US underestimated the complexity of the country and the region. They failed to understand the unique relationship between Afghanistan's various ethnic groups and tribes, instead emphasising working with the Pashtuns in creating a government. The US also failed to comprehend the resilience and commitment of the Taliban, who were fighting for their beliefs and to resist foreign occupation. The Taliban's ability to link their cause to the very meaning of being Afghan gave them a significant advantage over the US-backed government, which struggled to inspire the same level of devotion from its people.

Another factor was the US's hubris and overconfidence. They believed that the war would be quick and decisive, and they were unprepared for the challenges that arose. The US also became fixated on a purely military solution, neglecting the need for a political solution. They rejected offers of surrender and reconciliation from the Taliban and excluded them from the new political order, believing that they could be defeated decisively. This proved to be a mistake, as the Taliban regrouped and gained strength, eventually retaking control of the country.

The US also failed to address key issues such as corruption within the Afghan government and the mistreatment of Afghans by the government and its warlord allies, which fuelled grievances and inspired an insurgency. In addition, the US's focus on winning militarily rather than exploring a political settlement limited their options and prolonged the conflict.

Finally, the US's inability to find a credible and effective partner on the ground contributed to their failure. The governments they backed in Afghanistan were incompetent, manipulative, and unpopular, and they failed to generate national unity or expand their power bases.

In conclusion, the US's failure in Afghanistan can be attributed to a combination of hubris, a lack of understanding of the country and the region, and a failure to address key issues and explore political solutions. These factors ultimately led to the Taliban regaining power and the US being forced to withdraw without achieving their original objectives.

The US and its allies could have salvaged the Afghan campaign by accepting the country's limitations

• Prioritising counter-corruption efforts over counter-terrorism efforts.
• Understanding the decentralised nature of Afghan society and the history of its monarchy and its relationship to a centralised government.
• Setting realistic goals, such as preventing Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for terrorists, rather than creating a carbon copy of American-style democracy or imposing a strong central government.
• Providing a clear set of metrics to measure progress.
• Asking fundamental questions about the counterinsurgency strategy, such as how does this end?
• Recognising that the US played a role in creating the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.
• Recognising that the US built nothing in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal, and that the Taliban filled the vacuum.
• Recognising that the US has a history of repeating mistakes in counterinsurgency campaigns.
• Recognising that the US has a history of repeating mistakes in counterinsurgency campaigns.
• Recognising that the US has a history of repeating mistakes in counterinsurgency campaigns.

The US and its allies could have rethought other good wars by learning from their mistakes in Afghanistan

• Have a clear and well-defined strategy: The US government continuously struggled to develop and implement a coherent strategy for what it hoped to achieve in Afghanistan. The challenges US officials faced in creating long-term, sustainable improvements raise questions about the ability of US government agencies to devise, implement, and evaluate reconstruction strategies.
• Prioritize sustainability: Many of the institutions and infrastructure projects the United States built were not sustainable. Reconstruction programs are not like humanitarian aid; they are not meant to provide temporary relief. Instead, they serve as a foundation for building the necessary institutions of government, civil society, and commerce to sustain the country indefinitely.
• Understand the local context: The US government did not understand the Afghan context and therefore failed to tailor its efforts accordingly. Effectively rebuilding Afghanistan required a detailed understanding of the country's social, economic, and political dynamics. Without this background knowledge, US officials often empowered powerbrokers who preyed on the population or diverted US assistance away from its intended recipients to enrich and empower themselves and their allies.
• Monitor and evaluate: US government agencies rarely conducted sufficient monitoring and evaluation to understand the impact of their efforts. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is the process of determining what works, what does not, and what needs to change as a result. Conceptually, M&E is relatively straightforward, but in practice, it is extremely challenging.
• Avoid mission creep: Halting mission creep is never easy, but the US Congress should be readier to impose conditions and limits on foreign interventions. Congress, with its power of the purse, is best positioned to end interventions outright, or at a minimum require an overhaul of policy objectives so that they are realistic.

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