Turkey's Home Games In Baku: Why?

Azerbaijan and Turkey have historically shared strong relations, with Turkey being one of the first countries to recognize Azerbaijan's independence in 1918 and its restoration of independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Turkey has been a staunch supporter of Azerbaijan in its efforts to consolidate its independence and preserve its territorial integrity. Both countries have close linguistic, cultural, and economic ties, and have collaborated on infrastructure projects such as the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline and the South Caucasus Pipeline. Turkey has also supported Azerbaijan politically and militarily, including during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Armenia. Turkey's role in the Southern Caucasus region has grown in recent years, particularly after Azerbaijan's victory over Armenia in 2023, which has shifted the geopolitical landscape in the region. Given these close ties and Turkey's support for Azerbaijan, it is not surprising that the two countries would cooperate and coordinate their actions, including in military operations.

Turkey's military support for Azerbaijan

Turkey and Azerbaijan have historically strong relations, with both countries being the only two predominantly Turkic countries located west of the Caspian Sea. Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize Azerbaijan's independence in 1918 and was the first to recognize its restoration of independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Since then, Turkey has been a strong supporter of Azerbaijan in its efforts to consolidate its independence and preserve its territorial integrity.

Turkey has supported Azerbaijan politically and militarily since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. In September 2022, Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar reiterated Turkey's support for Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia. Turkey supplied arms to Azerbaijan during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, and Turkish senior military personnel played an advisory role in Azerbaijan's operational plans and command. Unmanned aerial vehicles sourced from Turkey were considered one of the "magic bullets" that led to Azerbaijan's military victory over Armenia.

The military cooperation between the two countries dates back to 1992, with an agreement signed between the two governments on military education and weapon equipment. The Azerbaijani military doctrine adopted in 2010 allows for foreign military bases in the country, leading to speculation that Turkey could station its troops in the Nakhchivan region, an Azerbaijani exclave surrounded by Armenia and Turkey.

In June 2021, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed the Shusha Declaration, pledging to increase military cooperation between the two countries. They plan to establish a factory in Azerbaijan for the joint production of armed drones.

Turkey's military assistance to Azerbaijan is part of its broader strategy to expand its regional and global military relations and attract more buyers for its military equipment, particularly its drones. Additionally, strengthening defense ties with Azerbaijan helps Turkey distance itself from Russia in their competition for regional influence.

Turkey's diplomatic relations with Armenia

Turkey and Armenia have historically had hostile diplomatic relations, with Turkey refusing to establish diplomatic relations with Armenia despite recognising its independence in 1991. In 1993, Turkey closed its border with Armenia in support of Azerbaijan during the war in Nagorno-Karabakh. This border remains closed, with Turkey demanding that Armenia withdraw from Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding districts of Azerbaijan as a precondition for establishing diplomatic relations.

Turkey has supported Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia, supplying arms and holding joint military drills. The ongoing border blockade against Armenia has resulted in infrastructure projects, such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, bypassing Armenian territory. Turkey has also supported various indirect bilateral talks between Azerbaijan and Armenia and initiated trilateral dialogue in an attempt to resolve the ongoing conflict.

In 2008-2009, Armenia and Turkey experienced a brief thaw in bilateral relations, signing the Zurich Protocols in 2009, which aimed to establish diplomatic relations and develop bilateral ties. However, the protocols were never ratified, and the rapprochement came to a close.

In December 2021, both countries appointed special envoys to discuss steps towards normalising relations, with several meetings taking place in 2022 and 2023. Despite these efforts, the normalisation process has been challenging due to the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and differences regarding the Armenian genocide.

Turkey's role in the Southern Caucasus has grown in recent years, particularly following Azerbaijan's victory over Armenia in September 2023, which resulted in the suppression of self-determination for the ethnic Armenian population in Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey's influence in the region is expected to expand further with the potential opening of the Zangezur Corridor, a transport route linking Turkey with Central Asia via Azerbaijan.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

The conflict escalated into a full-scale war in the early 1990s following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The war was won by the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh and Armenia, and led to the occupation of regions around Soviet-era Nagorno-Karabakh. There were expulsions of ethnic Armenians from Azerbaijan and ethnic Azerbaijanis from Armenia and the Armenian-controlled areas. A ceasefire ending the war, known as the Bishkek Protocol, was signed in 1994 in Bishkek, followed by two decades of relative stability.

Since the bilateral acceptance of a ceasefire in 1994, which formally remained in force until September 2020, the use of attack drones, shelling, and special operations activities by Armenian and Azerbaijani troops have led to intermittent clashes. Early April 2016 witnessed the most intense fighting since 1994, leading to hundreds of casualties along the line of separation. After four days of fighting, the two sides announced they had agreed to cease hostilities. However, a breakdown in talks resulted in both sides accusing each other of ceasefire violations, and tensions remained high.

In late 2020, the large-scale Second Nagorno-Karabakh War resulted in thousands of casualties and a significant Azerbaijani victory. An armistice was established by a tripartite ceasefire agreement on November 10, resulting in Azerbaijan regaining all of the occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh as well as capturing one-third of Nagorno-Karabakh itself. Ceasefire violations in Nagorno-Karabakh and on the Armenian–Azerbaijani border continued following the 2020 war.

In December 2022, Azerbaijan began blockading Nagorno-Karabakh, and launched a large-scale military offensive in September 2023, resulting in a ceasefire agreement. Most ethnic Armenians fled, and Artsakh was officially dissolved on 1 January 2024.

The Zangezur Corridor concept

The Zangezur Corridor is a proposed transport route that would give Azerbaijan access to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, which is separated from the rest of Azerbaijan by Armenian territory. The corridor would pass through Armenia's Syunik province, which borders Iran.

The concept was introduced by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev following the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement, which did not include the corridor. Azerbaijan and Turkey have promoted the idea, while Armenia has objected, arguing that it deviates from the ceasefire statement and is a form of propaganda.

The Zangezur Corridor is part of a broader strategic transportation route extending from Azerbaijan's capital, Baku, to Türkiye's eastern province of Kars. This route passes through Armenian territory and is intended to improve connectivity across the Caucasus region, connecting Europe with Central Asia and China.

The corridor has geopolitical implications, as it would unite the Turkic world by connecting Türkiye to the rest of the Turkic states. It is also significant for Türkiye's aspirations to become a regional energy hub, increasing its bargaining position relative to the West.

The implementation of the Zangezur Corridor has been a source of tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan, with Armenia proposing alternative routes to improve regional connectivity while preserving its sovereignty.

Turkey's economic partnership with Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan and Turkey have historically shared strong relations, being the only two predominantly Turkic countries located west of the Caspian Sea. This has resulted in a close economic partnership between the two countries.

Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize Azerbaijan's independence in 1918 and the first to recognize its restoration of independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Since then, Turkey has been a strong supporter of Azerbaijan in its efforts to consolidate its independence, preserve its territorial integrity, and develop its economy.

One of the key aspects of the economic partnership between the two countries is energy. Turkey, which lacks significant natural resources of its own, relies on Azerbaijan for natural gas supplies. The two countries have collaborated on several infrastructure projects, including the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, the South Caucasus Pipeline, the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railway, and the proposed Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline. These projects have enhanced Turkey and Azerbaijan's role in European energy security.

In addition to energy, Azerbaijan and Turkey have also cooperated in other economic sectors. For example, in 2018, the STAR oil refinery, owned by the Azerbaijani State Oil Company SOCAR, was opened in the Turkish city of Izmir. The two countries have also signed agreements to strengthen their overall economic cooperation, such as the Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Support, which includes provisions for economic collaboration.

The economic partnership between Turkey and Azerbaijan extends beyond bilateral ties. Both countries are also working together to develop transport corridors that connect Turkey with Central Asia via Azerbaijan. This includes the Zangezur Corridor, which is intended to link Turkey with its Nakhichevan exclave, as well as broader initiatives like the Middle Corridor, which is part of China's Belt and Road Initiative.

The close economic partnership between Turkey and Azerbaijan is underpinned by their shared linguistic, cultural, and historical ties, as well as their strategic interests in the region.

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