The Untraceable Trillions: Afghanistan War Funding And The Black Hole Of Reconstruction

Since the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the United States has spent trillions of dollars on the war. The exact amount is difficult to pinpoint, but estimates range from $2 trillion to $2.3 trillion. This money was spent on a variety of expenses, including war-fighting costs, nation-building efforts, counternarcotics campaigns, and training and equipping the Afghan military and police forces. Despite this massive investment, the war ultimately proved unwinnable, and the Taliban regained control of the country in 2021. In the end, the US withdrawal left Afghanistan with a fragile democracy, a booming illicit economy, and a staggering human cost.

Counternarcotics efforts: $10 billion spent, but opium production has quadrupled

Counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan have been largely ineffective. Despite the US spending $7.6 billion on counternarcotics operations in Afghanistan, opium production hit an all-time high in 2013, with Afghan farmers growing 209,000 hectares of opium. This was an increase from 193,000 hectares in 2007.

The US government spent roughly $8.62 billion on counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2017. Despite this investment, Afghanistan remains the world's largest opium producer, and opium poppy is the country's largest cash crop.

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has released a report criticizing US counternarcotics efforts in the country. The report warned that the nearly $7.6 billion the US government spent on counternarcotics operations in Afghanistan failed to reduce drug production in the region.

The report calls for a reevaluation of current policies and a reallocation of aid resources. It notes that profits from opium production increased to $3 billion in 2013, a 50% increase from 2012. The report also found that some US-led initiatives were inadvertently encouraging opium production. For example, arable land in southwest Afghanistan, cultivated for alternative livelihood assistance programs, was instead used for opium cultivation.

The US Embassy in Kabul and the Department of Defense defended their counternarcotics efforts, explaining that they needed more support from the Afghan government. The Embassy also criticized the scope of the report for focusing primarily on the failure of the alternative livelihood assistance program in southwest Afghanistan and Nangarhar while ignoring other successful programs like specialized interdiction units and rehabilitation centers for drug addicts.

The failure of counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan can be attributed to several factors. Firstly, the lack of a stable security environment made it difficult to effectively curtail poppy cultivation and drug production. Additionally, the US government failed to develop and implement counternarcotics strategies that outlined or effectively directed US agencies toward shared goals. There was also a lack of coordination between eradication and development assistance efforts, with these initiatives not being consistently implemented in the same geographic locations.

Furthermore, counternarcotics goals were often not incorporated into larger security and development strategies, hindering their achievement and the wider reconstruction effort. The Afghan government also did not bring consistent leadership to counternarcotics efforts, with a "lack of unity of purpose" within the government being cited as a contributing factor to the failure.

The emphasis on eradication was also misguided, as it was based on weak data and assumptions that did not accurately reflect the situation on the ground. Eradication efforts failed to provide alternative livelihoods for affected farmers, and officials did not fully appreciate the risk of alienating rural communities.

The US push for aerial spraying of chemical herbicides damaged US-Afghan relations and hindered cooperation on other fronts. Alternative development programs were also too short-term and often relied on the simple substitution of other crops for poppy, which did not bring about lasting reductions in opium poppy cultivation.

To effectively address the counternarcotics issue in Afghanistan, a whole-of-government strategy is needed, with the US ambassador and military commander in the country directing agencies to implement a coordinated counternarcotics strategy. The strategy should be aligned with and integrated into larger security, development, and governance objectives. Additionally, counternarcotics programs should be based on a robust understanding of how the illicit drug economy functions and its relationship to local socioeconomic and political conditions.

Eradication efforts should be targeted towards areas with improved security, a persistent state presence, and diverse livelihood opportunities. Development assistance programs should also include measures to mitigate the risk of inadvertently contributing to drug production and trafficking.

Training Afghan military and police forces: $87 billion spent, but Afghan forces still can't support themselves

The United States has spent nearly $89 billion on training, equipping, and paying Afghanistan's security forces since 2001. However, despite all the assistance, Afghanistan's military and police forces have proven incapable of securing the country.

The failure of the Afghan security forces to hold their ground against the Taliban has been years in the making. The U.S. military officials have long harbored doubts about the competency and dependency of the Afghan forces on U.S. money and firepower. The sudden collapse of the Afghan security forces and their wholesale surrender to the Taliban is considered one of the worst debacles in the history of proxy warfare.

Several factors have contributed to the failure of the Afghan security forces to support themselves:

• Corruption and Incompetence: The Afghan security forces have been plagued by incompetence, corruption, poor training, and desertion. U.S. military trainers described the Afghan forces as "incompetent, unmotivated, poorly trained, corrupt, and riddled with deserters and infiltrators." There were also reports of Afghan police recruits deserting with their government-issued weapons to set up their own checkpoints and extort payments from travelers.
• Lack of Motivation: Afghan security forces lacked the motivation to fight, with reports of Afghan troops looting equipment supplied by the Pentagon and wasting ammunition.
• Poor Leadership and Chain of Command: The Afghan security forces suffered from a lack of effective leadership, with reports of Afghan battalion commanders being charged with raping their male soldiers and being killed by their own men.
• Low Literacy and Basic Knowledge: Only about 2 in 10 Afghan recruits could read or write, and U.S. trainers had to teach them basic human anatomy and how to use urinals.
• Ethnic and Tribal Tensions: Ethnic and tribal tensions within the Afghan security forces posed a perpetual problem, with promotions being doled out based on patronage rather than merit.
• Rapid Expansion and Lack of Training: The Obama administration's decision to rapidly expand the size of the Afghan security forces led to recruits being rushed through boot camp, resulting in inadequate training and poor performance on the battlefield.
• Inability to Operate Independently: The Afghan security forces were never expected to operate without high-tech air and ground support from foreign allies. They heavily relied on U.S. air support, which was crucial in providing them with a tactical edge on the battlefield.
• Poor Planning and Execution: The U.S. training programs for the Afghan security forces were ill-designed, poorly coordinated, and thinly staffed. There was a lack of certified law enforcement professionals to train the Afghan police, and the constant rotation of U.S. military trainers every six to twelve months led to a loss of institutional knowledge.
• Political and Social Differences: American soldiers training their Afghan counterparts faced very different political and social conditions than those encountered by the U.S. military domestically. This made it challenging to create militaries in the U.S. image that were congruent with the local political and social circumstances.
• Misaligned Objectives: The objectives of the Afghan forces' leaders often differed from those of the U.S., prioritizing personal enrichment or survival over the strength of their nation's military, leading to higher rates of corruption within the force.

The failure of the Afghan security forces to support themselves despite billions of dollars in training and equipment highlights the challenges of training foreign militaries and the need to consider local political, social, and cultural factors in such endeavors.

Economic development: $24 billion spent, but most Afghans still live in poverty

Despite the $24 billion spent on economic development in Afghanistan, the country's economy remains in a dire state, with most Afghans still living in poverty. The failure to build a sustainable economy can be attributed to various factors, including:

Dependence on Foreign Aid: The Afghan economy heavily relied on foreign assistance, which evaporated overnight following the US exit and the Taliban takeover. This loss of aid money has left the country's economy on the verge of collapse, as it was a significant source of income for the government, funding salaries, infrastructure, and the national army.

Lack of Self-Sustaining Private Sector: Critics argue that foreign aid focused primarily on building infrastructure but failed to develop a robust private sector capable of sustaining the economy independently. The money often went into projects that were not feasible or sustainable in the long run without continued external support.

Corruption and Mismanagement: The influx of aid money also fed corruption, undermining the legitimacy of the US-backed government. Public distrust of leaders in Kabul, along with allegations of corruption, facilitated the Taliban's return to power. Additionally, there were complaints about a lack of influence by Afghan officials over how the aid money was spent.

Ineffective Agricultural Development: Despite $2 billion in US spending on agricultural development, farming output has barely increased over two decades. The share of agriculture in GDP has declined, and alternative crop initiatives, such as soybean introduction, were poorly planned and failed to take into account the local farming conditions and crop suitability.

Healthcare and Education Challenges: While there have been improvements in healthcare and education access, with decreasing infant mortality rates and increasing life expectancy, the Taliban's restrictions on girls' education and women's access to healthcare have reversed some of these gains. The Taliban's policies have also negatively impacted the economy, as women were often the sole or main earners in households.

International Sanctions and Isolation: The US and other governments' decision to cut off the Afghan Central Bank from the international banking system has led to a liquidity crisis and severe shortages of banknotes. This has crippled the banking sector and further exacerbated the economic woes of the country.

The combination of these factors has resulted in a situation where, despite the billions spent on economic development, Afghanistan's economy remains fragile and vulnerable, with most Afghans continuing to live in poverty and facing food insecurity.

Reconstruction programs: $30 billion spent, but much of it was lost to corruption and failed projects

The US government has spent about $141 billion on reconstruction in Afghanistan since 2002. However, reviews of these reconstruction efforts have shown mixed results, with systemic weaknesses in internal controls and governance structures increasing the risks of fraud, waste, and abuse.

Corruption in aid has been a major topic of discussion in Washington in recent years. While it is difficult to determine exactly how much aid funding is lost to corruption, it is clear that it is a significant issue. Investigative cases, survey evidence about bribe payments, and expert perceptions all suggest that corruption is a problem within the aid sector.

One example of corruption in the Afghanistan reconstruction efforts is the improper accounting practices by the US Department of Defense. An internal audit revealed that the Pentagon could not account for over 95% of $9.1 billion in Iraq reconstruction money, with no records at all for $2.6 billion in funds. This mismanagement and reckless spending have led to criticism and calls for improved transparency and oversight.

To address corruption and ensure effective reconstruction, organizations must implement preventive and strategic approaches. This includes measures such as asset and ownership disclosure requirements to prevent and mitigate conflicts of interest and potential corrupt influence. Additionally, explicit expectations for public officials to safeguard funds, clear roles and responsibilities, and an emphasis on prevention through activities like surprise audits are crucial.

Interest: $500 billion spent on interest payments for borrowed money

The war in Afghanistan was funded with borrowed money, and the US will pay a high price for this decision in the long term. The US government borrowed heavily to finance the war, and the interest payments on this debt are expected to be significant.

The US has already paid more than $500 billion in interest, and this figure is expected to rise dramatically. By 2050, the cost of interest alone could reach $6.5 trillion, according to researchers at Brown University. This amounts to $20,000 for every US citizen.

The decision to borrow money to fund the war, rather than raising taxes or selling war bonds, has shielded Americans from the financial burden of the conflict. However, the true cost of the war will be felt by future generations, who will be paying off the interest for decades to come.

The total cost of the war in Afghanistan, including interest, is expected to be far higher than the initial $2 trillion price tag. With interest, medical costs, and other expenses included, the final bill could be more than $8 trillion. This is a massive sum that will have a significant impact on the US economy and the lives of American citizens.

The war in Afghanistan has been incredibly costly, and the decision to borrow money to fund it will have consequences for the US for many years to come. The interest payments on the debt will be a significant burden, and the true cost of the war will only become clear in the coming decades.

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