Weapon Wielding Contractors: The Complexities Of Afghanistan's Civilian Security

The question of whether civilian contractors can carry weapons in Afghanistan is a complex one, and the answer may depend on a variety of factors, including the company they work for, the nature of their job, and the location in which they are operating.

In a 2011 forum post on AR15.com, several individuals shared their experiences and perspectives on the issue. Some asserted that only certain types of contractors, such as those working in security, intelligence, or training roles, were typically authorized to carry weapons. Others noted that it could depend on the company's discretion and the specific contract involved. Still, others suggested that, regardless of official policies, weapons could sometimes be acquired through unofficial channels or the black market, although doing so carried significant risks.

In terms of legal regulations, a 2009 hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives' Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs addressed concerns about the accountability of weapons provided to Afghan security forces by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). The hearing revealed that lapses in accountability had occurred throughout the supply chain, with the DoD unable to account for about 36% of the weapons procured for the Afghan National Security Forces.

The issue of weapons accountability in Afghanistan has continued to be a focus of scrutiny. A 2021 article in Foreign Policy magazine highlighted the role of private contractors in maintaining U.S.-supplied weapons and equipment for the Afghan military. The article noted that the departure of these contractors was a contributing factor in the collapse of the Afghan military, as they had provided essential support for aircraft maintenance and other critical functions.

Additionally, a 2023 report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the U.S. had lost track of millions of guns sold to the Middle East after 9/11, with a significant number ending up in Afghanistan. The report raised concerns about the potential for these weapons to fall into the hands of extremist groups or be used to fuel conflict and instability in the region.

Private contractors in Afghanistan are at risk of being killed by the Taliban or other insurgents

Up to half of the $14 trillion spent by the Pentagon since 9/11 went to for-profit defense contractors, according to a study by Brown University's Costs of War project and the Center for International Policy. The U.S. saw about 7,000 military members die in all post-9/11 conflicts, but nearly 8,000 contractors, another Costs of War study estimates.

The U.S. war effort in Afghanistan has relied heavily on so-called Third Country Nationals (TCNs), who perform work ranging from guarding convoys to building installations. TCNs often risked their lives for far less pay than their American counterparts, and are often exploited by their employers.

The U.S. military's withdrawal from Afghanistan has meant that many TCNs are now leaving the country and fanning out around the world. Some are looking for work with contractors in Iraq, while others are considering work with the militaries of Gulf countries, in oil refineries in West Africa, or in casinos in China.

The U.S. military's reliance on contractors in Afghanistan has been deemed a key factor in the collapse of the Afghan military. Contractors provided key maintenance and military support, and the Afghans had relied on them for everything from training and gear maintenance to intelligence gathering and close air support in their battles against Taliban fighters.

The U.S. saw about 7,000 military members die in all post-9/11 conflicts, but nearly 8,000 contractors, another Costs of War study estimates.

Private contractors in Afghanistan are at risk of being killed by their Afghan allies

The U.S. Department of Labor confirmed that by March 31, 2021, a total of 1,822 civilian contractors were killed in Afghanistan. Of these, 121 were Americans, 22 were Britons, 19 were Nepalese, 17 were Ukrainians, and 13 were Canadians.

Additionally, the ANSF faces challenges in safeguarding and accounting for weapons due to issues such as illiteracy, corruption, and high desertion rates. The GAO reported that the ANSF could not fully safeguard and account for weapons, placing them at particular risk of theft and loss. Furthermore, the training of the Afghan police continues to lag significantly behind that of the army, and there is a shortage of trainers and mentors to address this issue.

The security situation in Afghanistan further exacerbates the risk faced by private contractors. The GAO reported that there were 7,000 security incidents in Afghanistan in the first 10 months of 2008, compared to 508 in 2003, indicating a deterioration in security. The presence of insurgent groups such as the Taliban and Al Qaeda also poses a direct threat to private contractors.

The combination of these factors contributes to the risk faced by private contractors in Afghanistan, making it possible for them to be killed by their Afghan allies or other insurgent groups.

Private contractors in Afghanistan are at risk of being killed by their own allies

The U.S. Department of Labor confirmed that by March 31, 2021, a total of 1,822 civilian contractors were killed in Afghanistan. Of these, 121 were Americans, 22 were Britons, 19 were Nepalese, 17 were Ukrainians, and 13 were Canadians.

• Lack of proper training and equipment: Many private contractors are not properly trained or equipped to handle the security threats they face in Afghanistan. This includes a lack of weapons and inadequate protection.
• Poor working conditions: Private contractors often work in dangerous and hostile environments, with limited access to basic necessities and medical care. This can lead to health issues and increase their risk of injury or death.
• Insurgent attacks: Insurgent groups such as the Taliban frequently target private contractors, as they are seen as supporting the U.S. military and Afghan government.
• Friendly fire: In the chaos of combat, it is possible for private contractors to be mistakenly fired upon by their own allies, leading to accidental deaths.
• Criminal activity: Private contractors can also be victims of criminal activity, such as kidnapping, robbery, or murder, by local gangs or insurgent groups.
• Mental health issues: The stressful and traumatic nature of their work can take a toll on private contractors' mental health, leading to an increased risk of suicide or self-harm.

To mitigate these risks, it is essential to provide proper training, equipment, and support to private contractors working in Afghanistan. This includes ensuring adequate security measures, improving working conditions, and providing access to mental health services. Additionally, efforts should be made to improve coordination and communication between private contractors and their allies to reduce the risk of friendly fire incidents.

Private contractors in Afghanistan are at risk of having their weapons stolen by the Taliban or other insurgents

In 2007, the U.S. military shipped 600,000 light weapons such as M-16 and M-4 rifles to Afghanistan. However, the U.S. government has struggled to keep track of the weapons it has provided to the country. In 2009, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that the U.S. military failed to "maintain complete inventory records" for about 87,000 weapons shipped to Afghanistan.

The U.S. has also provided Afghan forces with at least 16,000 night-vision goggles, which are particularly sought after by the Taliban. In 2008, the U.S. began issuing these devices to Afghan National Army units without establishing controls or conducting enhanced end-use monitoring.

Private contractors in Afghanistan are at risk of having their weapons stolen by their Afghan allies

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the U.S. military did not maintain complete records for about 87,000 weapons (36%) of the 242,000 weapons shipped to Afghanistan. In addition, the U.S. military did not provide clear guidance to personnel in Afghanistan regarding weapons accountability procedures. As a result, there was a lack of systematic accountability for over half of the weapons obtained for the ANSF, approximately 200,000 weapons.

Furthermore, the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), which is responsible for receiving, storing, and distributing weapons to the ANSF, did not maintain complete and accurate inventory records for weapons at the central storage depots in Kabul. There were also issues with port security, as weapons were sometimes shipped to Afghanistan without corresponding shipping manifests.

The lack of proper weapons accountability procedures has led to the theft and loss of weapons. For example, during routine physical inventories at the central storage depots, CSTC-A discovered the theft of 47 pistols. Additionally, there are reports of weapons being sold to enemies and insurgents.

The Afghan Security Forces themselves also face challenges in safeguarding and accounting for weapons. Factors such as illiteracy, corruption, and high desertion rates contribute to the difficulties in establishing effective weapons accountability systems.

To improve weapons accountability, the GAO has made several recommendations, including establishing clear accountability procedures and conducting routine physical inventories. The Department of Defense has concurred with these recommendations and has taken steps to implement them. However, there are still significant challenges and shortages in personnel and resources that need to be addressed.

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