The Elusive Victory: Afghanistan's Historical Resistance To Foreign Conquest

Afghanistan's strategic location, rough terrain, and multiple ethnic groups and tribes make it a challenging place to wage war. Since 1839, Afghanistan has been the centre of competing foreign powers, with the British, Soviets, and Americans all fighting wars there. The country's location connecting Central Asia, the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia makes it a policy way station towards a political agenda. As a result, when large empires go to war in Afghanistan, they come up against other countries' attempts to exert influence in the region.

The US war in Afghanistan, which began in 2001 following the 9/11 attacks, became the longest war in American history. The US aimed to defeat Al-Qaeda and the Taliban quickly and decisively, but the conflict dragged on for nearly 20 years. Despite spending over $2 trillion and losing 2,461 American personnel, the US was unable to achieve a decisive victory.

One reason for the lack of success in Afghanistan is the unclear and shifting war aims of the US. Initially, the objective was to destroy Al-Qaeda and ensure they could not use Afghanistan as a base for terrorist attacks. However, once this goal was accomplished, the mission was broadened to include nation-building objectives such as establishing a stable democracy and improving medical care and education. While these goals were noble, they were not accompanied by clear benchmarks for success or a defined endgame.

Another factor contributing to the difficulty of winning a war in Afghanistan is the complex dynamics between the country's various ethnic groups and tribes. Outside forces often struggle to understand the unique relationships between these groups, which can lead to missteps in their military and political strategies.

Furthermore, the Afghan government's corruption and dysfunction have hindered efforts to establish stability and security in the country. The Taliban, meanwhile, has been able to exploit safe havens in neighbouring Pakistan, receiving support from the country's powerful spy agency.

The war in Afghanistan has also been characterised by a lack of clear definitions of victory and success. US officials often declared they were winning or making progress, even as evidence to the contrary mounted. The repeated failure to meet objectives, despite increases in troop numbers and resources, underscores the challenges of achieving a decisive victory in Afghanistan.

The US has been unable to prevent Pakistan from supporting the Taliban

Pakistan's support for the Taliban has been a significant factor in the US's inability to win the war in Afghanistan. Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has been the Taliban's principal external patron, providing financial resources, training, weapons, logistical support, and safe havens in Pakistani territory. This support has been crucial to the Taliban's ability to wage an insurgency against the Afghan state and international forces.

The US has long been frustrated with Pakistan's acquiescence to safe havens for the Taliban and its Haqqani branch, which have resulted in the deaths of US soldiers, Afghan security personnel, and civilians, as well as significant destabilization of Afghanistan. Despite years of US pressure on Islamabad, alternating with economic aid and attempts to forge a strategic partnership, Pakistan has failed to crack down on its support for the Taliban.

There are several reasons for Pakistan's continued support for the Taliban:

• Pakistan seeks to limit India's influence in Afghanistan and cultivate radical groups within the country as proxies. It views the Taliban as its only ally among Afghanistan's political actors.
• Pakistan fears an unstable Afghanistan that becomes a safe haven for anti-Pakistan militant groups and a playground for outside powers. It bets that the Taliban will maintain significant power in Afghanistan and does not want to alienate them.
• Pakistan wants to counter India by having a Pakistan-friendly government in Afghanistan. It accuses India of seeking to exploit its ethnic and linguistic divisions to destabilize and break up the country.
• Pakistan aims to contain Pashtun nationalism by supporting the Taliban, whose ideology emphasizes Islam over Pashtun identity. Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan and have traditionally dominated the Afghan state.

US efforts to persuade Pakistan to crack down on the Taliban, through military and economic means as well as punitive measures, have failed. Pakistan's influence with the Taliban could decrease as the Taliban attempt to build ties with China, Iran, and Russia. However, the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan could have negative consequences for Pakistan, including increased terrorist activity, refugee flows, and strained relationships with China and the US.

The US has failed to address the root causes of the war, such as opium and corruption

The US has been unable to address the root causes of the war in Afghanistan, such as opium and corruption, due to a variety of factors. Here are some key reasons:

• Lack of Clear Strategy: The US has struggled to define clear and achievable goals for its involvement in Afghanistan, leading to a lack of focus and coordination in its efforts.
• Inadequate Understanding: A poor understanding of the local context, including the role of opium in the country's economy and society, has resulted in ineffective policies.
• Counterproductive Measures: Measures such as eradication and bans on opium poppy cultivation have often backfired, generating political capital for the Taliban and undermining counterinsurgency efforts.
• Insecurity and Instability: The unstable security situation and lack of governance have hindered the implementation of alternative development programs and economic initiatives.
• Corruption: Corruption within the Afghan government and security forces has hindered counternarcotics efforts, with officials often benefiting from the drug trade.
• Limited Resources and Capacity: The Afghan government has lacked the necessary resources, institutional capacity, and control mechanisms to effectively combat the drug trade and provide alternative livelihoods for farmers.
• External Factors: External factors, such as the involvement of other countries and the influence of powerful elites, have complicated counternarcotics efforts and hindered unity among partners.
• Diversification of Taliban Income: The Taliban's diverse income sources, including taxation, extortion, and foreign funding, have made it challenging to cut off their financial support completely.

The US has not had a clear strategy or vision for victory

The US has been involved in Afghanistan since 2001, making it the country's longest war. However, the US has never had a clear strategy for victory.

The initial goal of the war was to defeat Al-Qaeda and the Taliban quickly and decisively. However, the conflict dragged on for nearly 20 years.

The US government never defined the terms of victory. Instead, they kept insisting publicly that they were winning—even in the face of mounting evidence to the contrary. In private, however, they expressed serious doubts.

The US has tried various strategies, including drone attacks, a light-footprint option, and counterinsurgency. However, none of these strategies have succeeded in achieving a clear victory.

The US has also struggled to define what winning would look like. Some have argued that winning means defeating the Taliban, while others have said it means creating a stable, democratic government. The lack of a clear definition of victory has made it difficult to develop an effective strategy.

The US has also faced challenges on the ground in Afghanistan. The country's rough terrain, multiple ethnic groups, and tribes make it a challenging place to wage war. Additionally, the US has struggled to gain the support of the local population, who often see the US presence as an occupation.

The US has also had difficulty building an effective Afghan security force. The US has repeatedly asked for more troops, but even with additional resources, the Afghan security forces have struggled to make progress.

The lack of a clear strategy and vision for victory has made it difficult for the US to achieve its goals in Afghanistan.

The US has struggled to adapt to the challenging terrain and ethnic makeup of Afghanistan

Afghanistan's challenging terrain and ethnic makeup have been significant factors in the US's struggle to win the war in the country. The country's landscape of deserts and mountains has long been a challenge for invading forces, and its fiercely independent peoples have a history of resisting outside influence.

Afghanistan is a landlocked country with a forbidding landscape of deserts and mountains. It is bordered by Iran to the west, Pakistan to the south and east, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan to the north, and China to the far northeast. The country's main geographic feature is the Hindu Kush mountain range, which creates a natural divide between the central highlands, the northern plains, and the southwestern plateau. The central highlands include lofty mountains with peaks rising above 21,000 feet, as well as high mountain passes that have served as important strategic routes throughout history. The northern plains region is more fertile and densely populated, while the southwestern plateau is characterised by high plateaus, sandy deserts, and semi-deserts.

Afghanistan's ethnic makeup is equally complex and diverse. The country is home to dozens of ethnic groups, with the Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and Turkmens being the largest groups. These ethnic groups are dispersed throughout the country, with the Pashtuns mainly concentrated in the south and southeast, the Tajiks in the north and northeast, the Hazaras in the centre, and the Uzbeks in the north. Afghanistan's ethnic groups also extend beyond its borders, with kin populations in neighbouring countries such as Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Iran, and Pakistan. This cross-border ethnic interconnectedness has influenced the country's politics and social dynamics.

The US has struggled to adapt to Afghanistan's challenging terrain and ethnic makeup in several ways. Firstly, the rugged mountains and remote deserts have posed logistical challenges for US forces, making it difficult to move troops and equipment. Secondly, the diverse ethnic landscape has made it hard for the US to navigate the complex power dynamics and alliances between different ethnic groups. The US has also faced challenges in trying to impose a centralised government structure on a country with strong tribal and regional loyalties. Additionally, the US has been accused of favouring certain ethnic groups, particularly the Pashtuns, in its nation-building efforts, further exacerbating ethnic tensions. Finally, the US has struggled to counter the influence of the Taliban, which draws much of its support from the Pashtun ethnic group, the largest in the country.

The US has been unable to build an effective Afghan security force

Secondly, the US military training program suffered from a lack of coherent policy and strategy. The training of Afghan forces was treated like a pickup game, with small teams of soldiers being taught basic survival skills and a few hours of language lessons before being placed with foreign units. The focus was on tactical tasks such as rifle ranges and obstacle courses rather than building the necessary infrastructure for effective security forces, such as military education, training, pay systems, career progression, personnel, and accountability.

Thirdly, the US military did not have the capacity or experience to train police forces effectively, as the US does not have a national police force. Attempts to bridge this gap by hiring retired police officers as advisers were insufficient, as they too lacked the experience to build national police institutions and systems.

Fourthly, the Afghan security forces suffered from poor leadership, lack of recruitment, desertion, weak battlefield performance, and corruption. The high turnover rate and lack of cohesion within the forces made it difficult to build an effective fighting force. The US also failed to provide adequate ammunition, weaponry, and salaries for the Afghan forces.

Finally, the short timelines involved in the US training program did not allow enough time for the Afghan security forces to develop the solid institutional structure they needed to survive. The frequent rotation of US military personnel also disrupted the continuity of the training program and prevented the resolution of systemic problems.

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