The Shadow Of A Lost War: Afghanistan And The American Legacy

The US war in Afghanistan, spanning two decades, is considered a failure. Despite the US's superior military capabilities, the Taliban's greater commitment to the cause and ability to tie themselves to religion and Afghan identity gave them an advantage. The US failed to achieve its objectives, with the Taliban retaking control of the country. The war resulted in thousands of lives lost and hundreds of billions of dollars spent, with little to show for it. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan marks the end of a forever war, with the realisation that the country's objectives were not aligned with its national interests.

The US-led efforts in Afghanistan collapsed due to a lack of understanding of the country and its people

The US government did not understand the Afghan context and therefore failed to tailor its efforts accordingly. The US government clumsily forced Western technocratic models onto Afghan economic institutions; trained security forces in advanced weapon systems they could not understand, much less maintain; imposed formal rule of law on a country that addressed 80 to 90 percent of its disputes through informal means; and often struggled to understand or mitigate the cultural and social barriers to supporting women and girls. Without this background knowledge, US officials often empowered powerbrokers who preyed on the population or diverted US assistance away from its intended recipients to enrich and empower themselves and their allies.

The US government did not understand the Afghan context and therefore failed to tailor its efforts accordingly. The US government's lack of understanding of the Afghan context and failure to tailor its efforts accordingly led to the collapse of the US-led efforts in Afghanistan.

The Taliban's ability to link their cause to the very meaning of being Afghan was a crucial factor in America's defeat

The very presence of Americans in Afghanistan trod on a sense of Afghan identity that incorporated national pride, a long history of fighting outsiders, and a religious commitment to defend the homeland. It prodded men and women to defend their honour, their religion, and their home. It dared young men to fight. It sapped the will of Afghan soldiers and police. The Taliban's ability to link their cause to the very meaning of being Afghan was a crucial factor in America's defeat.

The Taliban exemplified something that inspired, something that made them powerful in battle, something tied to what it meant to be Afghan. They cast themselves as representatives of Islam and called for resistance to foreign occupation. Together, these two ideas formed a potent mix for ordinary Afghans, who tend to be devout Muslims but not extremists. Aligned with foreign occupiers, the government mustered no similar inspiration. It could not get its supporters, even if they outnumbered the Taliban, to go to the same lengths. Given its association with the Americans, the government's claim to Islam was fraught, even while the Taliban were able to co-opt Afghans' religiosity in service of their extremist vision. However wrongly, the Taliban could use U.S. occupation to differentiate themselves from the government as truer representatives of Islam. More Afghans were willing to serve on behalf of the government than the Taliban. But more Afghans were willing to kill and be killed for the Taliban. That edge made a difference on the battlefield.

The US military prefers to plan for classic, conventional wars, like World War II

The US military's preference for planning for classic, conventional wars, like World War II, has been attributed to several factors, including cultural underpinnings, military doctrine, and political considerations.

Cultural factors play a significant role in shaping the US military's preference for conventional warfare. Within Western military culture, there is a dominant emphasis on defeating the enemy through decisive battles, massive firepower, advanced technology, and large-scale manoeuvring. This approach aligns with the traditional concept of conventional warfare, which involves direct confrontations between states using conventional weapons and battlefield tactics.

Military doctrine and training also contribute to this preference. Western military forces, including the US military, are primarily optimized to fight against similar adversaries. As a result, they often have to reorient themselves when facing elusive insurgent opponents, as seen in counterinsurgency campaigns. The US military's focus on conventional warfare can be observed in its investment in advanced weaponry, such as F-35 planes and sophisticated ships, which are designed for conventional wars that may be less relevant in the modern era.

Additionally, political considerations come into play. The US military's preference for conventional warfare may be influenced by the political will and strategic priorities of policymakers. For example, the troubled campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have diminished the appetite for counterinsurgency efforts, shifting the focus towards interstate combat and conventional warfare.

However, it is important to recognize that the nature of war has evolved. Modern warfare often blurs the lines between conventional and unconventional tactics, giving rise to hybrid threats that require a more flexible and adaptive approach. To effectively counter these threats, the US military needs to develop capabilities that span the continuum of conventional and unconventional warfare, rather than treating them as mutually exclusive categories.

The US expended resources on objectives that were unlikely to be attained

The US spent trillions of dollars and two decades in Afghanistan, with the initial aim of defeating the Taliban and eliminating the presence of al-Qaeda. However, the Taliban's resilience and ability to outlast the US military presence proved to be a significant challenge.

The Taliban's motivation and ideological commitment to their cause played a crucial role in their ability to endure. They framed their fight as a religious duty and a resistance against foreign occupation, which resonated strongly with the Afghan population. This inspired Afghans to join their cause, as it tapped into their sense of national pride, historical resistance to outsiders, and religious identity.

In contrast, the Afghan government forces, despite being better equipped and numerically superior, lacked the same level of ideological motivation. They were seen as collaborators with non-Muslim foreign occupiers, which made it difficult for them to garner the same level of support and commitment from the Afghan people.

The US strategy, which focused primarily on military might and counterinsurgency, failed to adequately address the complex social, cultural, and ideological dynamics at play. The US underestimated the strength of the Taliban's ideological appeal and its alignment with Afghan identity, which proved to be a crucial factor in the outcome of the war.

By the time the US recognized the challenges posed by these factors, the Taliban had already gained significant momentum and advantage. The US found itself in a situation where it had to choose between escalating the conflict by committing more troops or withdrawing its forces.

Ultimately, the US decision to withdraw was influenced by the realization that the objectives set were unlikely to be attained, especially considering the changing nature of the terrorist threat and the need to refocus resources on other emerging global challenges.

In conclusion, the US expended significant resources, both human and financial, on objectives that proved to be unrealistic and out of alignment with the complexities of the Afghan context. This misalignment highlights the challenges of imposing external ideals and expectations on a society with deeply rooted cultural, religious, and historical differences.

The US could have managed its strategy better by setting more realistic expectations

Afghanistan is a landlocked country with a mountainous terrain. It is isolated and poor, with a diverse range of ethnonational groups. It has a long history of local autonomy and a deep antipathy towards foreign interference. The US underestimated the challenge of attempting to transform Afghanistan into a modern, Western-style democracy. This was an act of hubris that ignored the likelihood of generating resentment and resistance from the local population.

The US also failed to understand the appeal of the Taliban's message, which was steeped in references to Islamic teachings and Afghan identity. The Taliban's call to fight foreign occupiers resonated with Afghans, for whom jihad has historically been a means of defence against oppression by outsiders. The US presence in Afghanistan clashed with Afghan identity, sapping the will of Afghan soldiers and police. The Taliban was more successful in inspiring Afghans to fight, with more Afghans willing to kill and be killed for the Taliban than for the Afghan government.

The US could have set more realistic expectations by acknowledging the strength of the Taliban's position and the challenges of fighting an insurgency in a foreign country. The Taliban had sanctuaries in neighbouring Pakistan and enjoyed support from Islamabad. They were highly motivated and committed to their cause, willing to endure significant losses to achieve their objectives. The US, on the other hand, faced challenges in maintaining morale among its troops and struggled to match the Taliban's level of commitment.

By setting more realistic expectations, the US could have avoided expending resources on unattainable objectives. A more sustainable strategy could have been implemented, focusing on long-term muddling through with minimal forces and resources. This approach would have allowed the US to achieve a similar outcome with fewer losses and a reduced financial burden.

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