The Complex Origins Of The Us-Afghanistan War

The war in Afghanistan was triggered by the September 11 attacks in 2001. The US-led international coalition invaded Afghanistan to destroy the terrorist organisation Al-Qaeda, which was responsible for the attacks, and to capture its leader, Osama bin Laden. The Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which had provided sanctuary to Al-Qaeda, refused to hand over bin Laden, leading to the US declaring a 'War on Terror'. The US partnered with anti-Taliban groups, such as the Northern Alliance, and launched air strikes against the Taliban. Despite the Taliban being removed from power and a new government being formed, US troops remained in Afghanistan to support reconstruction efforts and carry out anti-terrorist operations. The war in Afghanistan became the longest war in US history, lasting 20 years and resulting in significant casualties and costs for the US and its allies.

The Taliban's refusal to hand over Osama bin Laden to the US

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the administration of US President George W. Bush was determined to bring to justice those responsible for the attacks. Al-Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden, was quickly identified as the perpetrator of the attacks.

The US demanded that the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which had provided sanctuary to Al-Qaeda, hand over Osama bin Laden and other Al-Qaeda leaders. The Taliban refused, leading to the US decision to take military action.

The US, along with its allies, launched air strikes against Afghanistan, working with anti-Taliban groups on the ground. Despite intense bombing, Osama bin Laden managed to escape, crossing the border into Pakistan.

The failure to capture or kill Osama bin Laden allowed him to continue to exert influence and inspire followers worldwide. This was a significant setback for the US and its allies, as it allowed Al-Qaeda to regroup and plan further attacks.

The US had demanded that the Taliban hand over Osama bin Laden and dismantle Al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. The Taliban's refusal to comply with these demands led to the US-led invasion of Afghanistan and marked a critical turning point in the global war on terrorism.

The US's aim to destroy Al-Qaeda

The US invaded Afghanistan in 2001 to destroy Al-Qaeda, a terrorist organisation responsible for the 9/11 attacks. The Taliban refused to hand over Osama bin Laden, the leader of Al-Qaeda, and so the US invaded Afghanistan to destroy Al-Qaeda and remove the Taliban from power.

The US's aim to remove the Taliban from power

In the wake of the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington, the US government identified Al-Qaeda and its leader, Osama Bin Laden, as responsible. Bin Laden was in Afghanistan, under the protection of the Taliban, the Islamists who had been in power since 1996.

When the Taliban refused to hand over Bin Laden, the US intervened militarily, removing the Taliban from power and vowing to support democracy and eliminate the terrorist threat. The Taliban regime was toppled within two months.

The Taliban regrouped across the border in Pakistan and began taking back territory less than ten years after their ouster. By August 2021, the Taliban had swept back into power.

The Taliban's swift offensive came as the United States withdrew its remaining troops from Afghanistan as outlined in a 2020 peace agreement with the group.

The US's aim to rebuild Afghanistan's core institutions

The September 11 attacks on the United States in 2001, planned by al-Qaeda, brought immediate attention to Afghanistan. This was because al-Qaeda's base was in Afghanistan, and some of the hijackers had trained there. In the aftermath of the attacks, the US government, under President George W. Bush, demanded that the Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar hand over all al-Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan. When Omar refused, the US began preparing for war.

The US subsequently invaded Afghanistan, with the support of the UK, and launched Operation Enduring Freedom. The US government's aim to rebuild Afghanistan's core institutions was twofold: to help the country build its institutions and to create conditions for political and economic construction.

The US Department of Defense played a significant role in this process, focusing on the security dimension. This included helping to build up the Afghan army and improving their ability to maintain security and run their own affairs. The US also assisted in rebuilding Afghanistan's civilian government institutions, economy, and civil society.

Specific initiatives included the construction of courthouses in all 16 provinces and the establishment of a National Legal Training Center for legal professionals. The US also helped rebuild 13 Afghan ministries, including the Ministries of Agriculture, Health, and Education, which had been destroyed during the conflict and Taliban rule. Additionally, a telecommunications system was set up to connect Afghanistan's 32 provinces with Kabul.

The US government spent 20 years and $145 billion on these reconstruction efforts, in addition to the $837 billion spent on warfighting. However, Afghanistan continued to face significant socio-economic challenges, with high mortality rates and a lack of basic services for many Afghans.

The US's aim to implement a classic counterinsurgency doctrine

> those political, economic, military, paramilitary, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency.

The manual also highlights the importance of protecting the population, eliminating insurgent leaders and infrastructure, and establishing a legitimate and accountable host-nation government.

The US military's counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan was based on the idea that the Taliban was an amalgam of local fighters and mercenary and criminal elements around a hard core of committed jihadists. The US military believed that by targeting militant leaders and foot soldiers and then leaving, they could defeat the insurgency. However, this strategy did not take into account the fact that local communities are unlikely to turn in favour of ISAF and the Afghan Government until these entities demonstrate that they are fully willing and able to drive out the insurgents and provide some level of lasting security and competent governance.

The US military's counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan also failed to take into account the decentralised nature of Afghan society and the history of its monarchy and its relationship to a centralised government. The US military's strategy was based on the idea that there was a clear distinction between the people and the insurgents, when in reality, the line between the two was indistinct.

The US military's counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan also failed to adequately train and equip Afghan security forces. The pre-existing numerical targets for the development of Afghan security forces were not based on the actual security requirements for the country. The US military's strategy also failed to adequately address the issue of corruption within the Afghan Government and the lack of basic services such as courts and police.

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