The Human Cost Of War: Remembering Sas Lives Lost In Afghanistan

The War in Afghanistan (2001-2021) was the longest war in US military history, surpassing the Vietnam War by approximately six months. The conflict was sparked by the September 11 attacks and ended with the Taliban's victory and the fall of Kabul in August 2021.

The war resulted in staggering losses for all parties involved. The US government spent $2.3 trillion, and the war led to the deaths of 2,324 US military personnel, 3,917 US contractors, and 1,144 allied troops. The human cost for Afghans was immense, with 70,000 Afghan military and police deaths, 46,319 civilians killed (although this is likely an underestimation), and about 53,000 opposition fighters killed. The war also had a devastating impact on Pakistan, with approximately 67,000 deaths related to the conflict.

The war's aftermath continues to affect Afghanistan, with 92% of the population facing food insecurity and 3 million children at risk of acute malnutrition. Unexploded ordnance and landmines continue to kill and injure civilians, and the war's environmental impact has left Afghan society vulnerable to natural disasters and health crises.

The SAS and civilian deaths

The war in Afghanistan, which lasted from 2001 to 2021, was the longest war in US military history. The conflict was sparked by the September 11 attacks and ended with the Taliban's re-establishment of the Islamic Emirate.

The war resulted in staggering costs for the US, Afghanistan, and other countries. The US government spent $2.3 trillion, and the war led to the deaths of 2,324 US military personnel, 3,917 US contractors, and 1,144 allied troops. The human cost for Afghanistan was immense, with 70,000 Afghan military and police deaths, 46,319 Afghan civilians killed (although this is likely an underestimation), and some 53,000 opposition fighters killed.

The war also had indirect consequences, such as injuries, illnesses, displacement, war widows and orphans, malnutrition, destruction of infrastructure, and environmental degradation. The impact of the war extended beyond Afghanistan, with approximately 67,000 people killed in Pakistan in relation to the conflict.

The US military's decision in 2017 to relax its rules of engagement for airstrikes in Afghanistan resulted in a dramatic increase in civilian casualties. The number of civilians killed by US-led airstrikes increased by 330% from the last year of the Obama administration to the final full year of recorded data during the Trump administration.

The CIA also armed and funded Afghan militia groups, which were implicated in grave human rights abuses and the extrajudicial killings of civilians. Furthermore, Afghan land is contaminated with unexploded ordnance and landmines, which continue to kill and injure civilians, especially children, in their daily lives.

The war exacerbated the effects of poverty, malnutrition, poor sanitation, lack of access to healthcare, and environmental degradation on Afghans' health. The mental health of Afghans was also impacted, with the Afghan Ministry of Public Health reporting in 2009 that two-thirds of Afghans suffered from mental health issues.

The SAS, an elite British special forces unit, has also been implicated in the deaths of Afghan civilians. A public inquiry was launched into allegations that SAS soldiers carried out a policy of terminating all fighting-age males during raids on family compounds, resulting in the deaths of more than 80 individuals between 2010 and 2013. The inquiry revealed concerns among senior army officers about a "casual disregard for life" and a "widespread and systematic pattern of unlawful extrajudicial killings."

The war in Afghanistan resulted in immense human suffering, with civilian deaths and injuries caused by both direct and indirect consequences of the conflict. The SAS was implicated in the deaths of Afghan civilians, contributing to the tragic toll of the war.

The US's counterterrorism goals

The US invaded Afghanistan in 2001 in response to the September 11 attacks, which were planned by al-Qaeda. The US's initial goal was to dismantle al-Qaeda and to prevent the Taliban from providing a safe haven for the group.

The US also wanted to prevent the destabilisation of the region. Afghanistan is bordered by Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and China. Pakistan, in particular, is a nuclear-armed nation in an "existential struggle with extremists and insurgents".

The US wanted to prevent the Taliban from providing a safe haven for al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. The US also wanted to prevent the Taliban from regaining control of Afghanistan and to support the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance.

The US wanted to create a new democratic authority in Afghanistan that would prevent the Taliban from returning to power.

US Counterterrorism Strategy in Afghanistan

The US's counterterrorism strategy in Afghanistan included:

• Drone strikes to eliminate Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders
• Building a sustainable system of governance in Afghanistan that could ensure stability and security for the Afghan people
• Building Afghan security forces capable of standing up to the Taliban
• Providing close air support for Afghan forces
• Training and equipping the Afghan National Army and National Police
• Providing economic development and humanitarian aid to Afghanistan
• Conducting counterterrorism operations in neighbouring countries, such as Somalia and Pakistan

The US's lack of political negotiations

Counterterrorism Priorities: Over four US administrations, counterterrorism remained the primary goal in Afghanistan. The peace process was often sidelined in favor of counterterrorism efforts against the Taliban and other extremist groups. The US viewed counterterrorism as a more urgent and achievable goal than a comprehensive political settlement.

Bureaucratic Silos: The US government's bureaucracy was not structured to facilitate a coordinated approach to the war in Afghanistan. Different agencies, such as the intelligence community, Defense Department, State Department, and USAID, operated in silos with their own goals and strategies. This lack of coordination hindered the development of a coherent strategy that integrated political and military efforts.

Focus on Total Military Victory: The US military's rules of engagement and counterinsurgency tactics often prioritized decisive military victories over negotiated settlements. The belief that "we were winning" and "we would beat the terrorists" made it politically unacceptable to negotiate with the Taliban, who were portrayed as terrorists and the worst enemies.

Lack of Political Will: There was a lack of political will within the US government to pursue a diplomatic solution to the conflict. The failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks had energized the national security and intelligence institutions, and the need for vengeance against the perpetrators took precedence over exploring political solutions.

Misjudgment of the Taliban: The US misjudged several critical factors, including the Taliban's external sanctuaries in Pakistan, their degree of indigenous support, and the Afghan government's inability to win the battle of legitimacy. These factors undermined US counterinsurgency efforts and made a purely military victory increasingly unlikely.

Consequences: The lack of political negotiations had severe consequences. It prolonged the war, resulting in more casualties and suffering for both Afghans and US personnel. It also contributed to the eventual Taliban victory and the collapse of the Afghan government, as the US failed to secure a sustainable peace agreement before withdrawing its troops.

The US's misjudgement of the Taliban's strength

The US's primary goal in Afghanistan was counterterrorism, and this remained the case over the course of four US administrations. This meant that a comprehensive political settlement was never prioritised. Instead, the US focused on building a new government in Kabul and its legitimacy, and believed that they were winning the war against terrorists.

US government perceptions of the battlefield also influenced their thinking about negotiating with the Taliban. They misjudged or failed to appreciate several critical factors, including the Taliban's external sanctuary in Pakistan, the degree of indigenous support for the Taliban, and the Afghan Republic government's inability to win the battle of legitimacy in insurgent-controlled or contested areas.

Another factor was bureaucratic silos within the US government, which meant that US agencies often operated without a strategic vision of a realistic end state. For example, the intelligence community, the Defense Department, the State Department, and the US Agency for International Development all had their own goals without an overarching strategy driving towards a common goal.

Finally, the US also failed to appreciate the Taliban's external sanctuary in Pakistan. Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) has long been accused of supporting the Taliban, and it is believed that the Taliban could not have regained control of Afghanistan without Pakistani support. Pakistan's objective has always been to ensure that Afghanistan has a regime favourable to them, as they want to gain strategic depth in the region.

The US's lack of a unified strategy

While there are no specific figures on the number of SAS soldiers who died in Afghanistan, there are allegations that British SAS troops killed Afghan civilians. An inquiry has been launched into these claims, with lawyers representing the bereaved families alleging that British soldiers carried out a policy of terminating all fighting-age men. It is estimated that there were 54 Afghan victims from a single SAS unit, with allegations covering a longer period and more British troops than previously suggested.

Now, here is some information about the US's lack of a unified strategy in Afghanistan:

One mistake identified was the treatment of the Taliban and al-Qaeda as the same. The US refused to negotiate with defeated Taliban leaders, excluding them from international conferences and Afghan gatherings. Instead, they offered bounties for their capture and sent them to Guantanamo Bay. This approach backfired when US officials realized they could not vanquish the group, and now seek a political settlement.

Additionally, the US lavished aid on districts supporting the Taliban while neglecting peaceful areas aligned with the government in Kabul. This led to resentment and a lack of incentive to cooperate with the government. The lack of a cohesive strategy and clear policy undermined US efforts, as they did not fully understand their adversary, strategic objectives, or the operating environment. Despite the assistance provided, positive gains remain fragile.

The US's lack of a clear war strategy in Afghanistan has been criticized, with officials acknowledging that they lost sight of the big picture and failed to understand their adversary and objectives. This has contributed to the ongoing challenges in the region.

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