The Us Strategy For Success In Afghanistan: A Comprehensive Approach

The US war in Afghanistan, which lasted two decades, ended in August 2021 when the Taliban retook Kabul. The US spent $145 billion on rebuilding Afghanistan, its security forces, civilian government institutions, economy, and civil society. The Department of Defense spent a further $837 billion on warfighting, during which 2,443 American troops and 1,144 allied troops were killed. The war cost the US as much as $2.26 trillion in total.

The US government's efforts to rebuild Afghanistan were troubled by a lack of coherent strategy, poor division of labour, unrealistic timelines, and a failure to understand the Afghan context. The US also struggled to get the right personnel into the right jobs, and persistent insecurity undermined reconstruction efforts.

The public's judgment about whether the US won or lost the war will affect civilian-military relations for years to come.

The US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001

The US demanded that the Taliban hand over Bin Laden and other Al-Qaeda operatives, and shut down terrorist bases in the country. When the Taliban refused, the US, along with the UK, launched Operation Enduring Freedom on October 7, 2001, marking the beginning of the War in Afghanistan. The invasion was also supported by the local Northern Alliance, who had been fighting the Taliban during the Afghan Civil War.

The air strikes targeted Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces, with the Northern Alliance forces providing support on the ground. The coalition forces made rapid progress, capturing Kabul on November 13 and toppling the Taliban government by December 17. However, most members of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban leadership, including Bin Laden, escaped into neighbouring Pakistan or retreated to remote regions within Afghanistan.

The invasion led to the fall of the Taliban regime and the formation of a new transitional government in Afghanistan. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established by the United Nations Security Council to oversee military operations and train the Afghan National Security Forces. Hamid Karzai was selected as the leader of the interim government.

Despite the swift removal of the Taliban from power, the US and its allies remained in Afghanistan for nearly two decades, with the goal of countering the Taliban insurgency and supporting the reconstruction of the country. The war ultimately lasted 20 years and ended with the withdrawal of US and NATO troops in 2021, leading to the Taliban's recapture of Kabul and the country.

The US's failure to understand the Afghan context

The US government continuously struggled to develop and implement a coherent strategy for what it hoped to achieve. The US government was overwhelmed by the magnitude of rebuilding a country that, at the time of the US invasion, had already seen two decades of Soviet occupation, civil war, and Taliban brutality.

The US government did not understand the Afghan context and therefore failed to tailor its efforts accordingly. US officials were consistently operating in the dark, often because of the difficulty of collecting the necessary information. The US government also clumsily forced Western technocratic models onto Afghan economic institutions; trained security forces in advanced weapon systems they could not understand, much less maintain; imposed formal rule of law on a country that addressed 80 to 90% of its disputes through informal means; and often struggled to understand or mitigate the cultural and social barriers to supporting women and girls.

The US government did not have a fundamental understanding of Afghanistan. It did not know what it was doing. The US government did not understand the social, economic, and political dynamics of Afghanistan. US officials were incentivized to lie and show success. There was an incentive to show success, and this was for many reasons. There was a short timeframe, and officials were there for 6 months, 9 months, or a year. This got reported up the chain, and before long, the President was talking about a success that did not exist.

The US government did not understand the local context when projects were implemented, and they often stoked local conflicts because one interest group was prioritized over another, which allowed insurgents to create alliances.

The US government did not understand the Afghan context and therefore failed to tailor its efforts accordingly. The US government did not have a clear understanding of the realities of Afghanistan.

The US's inability to get the right people into the right jobs

One of the most significant failures of the US mission in Afghanistan was its inability to get the right people into the right jobs. US personnel in Afghanistan were often unqualified and poorly trained, and those who were qualified were difficult to retain. For example, DOD police advisors tried to learn about policing from American TV shows, and civil affairs teams were educated via PowerPoint presentations.

The high staff turnover rate meant that successors had to start from scratch, repeating the same mistakes. This was also an issue with the AfPak Hands program, where the rotation of members hindered the ability to retain institutional knowledge and fully leverage relationships and networks. This deficiency impacted the US's ability to understand and assess information and intelligence.

The US also struggled to recruit enough qualified volunteers for the program, as it was perceived as career-limiting. As a result, many top US commanders spent little time in Afghanistan and were appointed due to their biases toward military-led counter-insurgency operations.

Additionally, the underlying dynamics of Afghan leadership and institutions, characterized by weak governance and unreliable leaders, further complicated US efforts. The Karzai administration's appointment of warlords to political positions led to insurgencies, massive corruption, and a fraudulent government. This created a challenging environment for the US to navigate and contributed to its inability to place the right people in the right roles.

The US's lack of a coherent strategy

One issue has been the vague and ambiguous nature of the US military's strategic priorities. A US Special Forces officer described the commander's priorities as amounting to "go do good things", indicating a lack of specific and measurable objectives. The strategy has been criticised as being based on buzzwords and lacking substance. The approach adopted by military leaders, labelled "clear, hold and build", has been characterised as overly simplistic and ineffective.

The US has also been criticised for its approach to aid distribution, which has sometimes backfired. Aid was lavished on districts that remained supportive of the Taliban, while peaceful areas that sided with the government in Kabul were neglected. This created resentment and failed to reinforce cooperation with the government. The US also failed to effectively engage with the Taliban in negotiations for a lasting peace. The exclusion of the Taliban from international conferences and Afghan gatherings from 2001 to 2003, and the treatment of them as equivalent to al-Qaeda, were later recognised as mistakes by US officials.

Additionally, the US government's focus on Iraq after the declaration of an end to "major combat activity" in Afghanistan in 2003 allowed the Taliban to steadily regroup. This loss of sight of the big picture in Afghanistan at a pivotal time hindered the effectiveness of the US strategy.

Overall, the lack of a coherent and well-thought-out strategy has been a significant challenge for the US in Afghanistan, contributing to its inability to achieve a clear victory.

The US's failure to achieve its war aims

One major reason for the US's failure is contradictory and unrealistic war aims. President George W. Bush, President Barack Obama, and President Trump offered convoluted, incomplete, or unconvincing answers to essential questions such as why the US was in Afghanistan, what interests justified its sacrifices, and how the war would end. The US government's war aims evolved over time, initially focusing on eliminating al-Qaeda, then expanding to include defeating the Taliban, denying terrorist groups safe havens, and building legitimate and capable Afghan security forces and civilian institutions. However, these goals proved difficult to achieve and led to a lack of clarity and coherence in the US strategy.

Another factor contributing to the US's failure is poor strategic planning. The US government continuously struggled to develop and implement a coherent strategy for achieving its goals in Afghanistan. The division of responsibilities among agencies, such as the Department of State and the Department of Defense, did not take into account each agency's strengths and weaknesses. This resulted in a weak strategy that was unable to effectively address the complex and dynamic nature of the conflict.

Additionally, the US government did not have a fundamental understanding of the Afghan context, which further hindered its ability to achieve its war aims. US officials often operated in the dark due to the difficulty of collecting necessary information. They imposed Western technocratic models and approaches on Afghan institutions without considering the local context, such as informal dispute resolution mechanisms and social and cultural barriers to supporting women and girls. This lack of understanding led to empowering local powerbrokers who preyed on the population and diverting assistance away from intended recipients.

Furthermore, there was insufficient monitoring and evaluation of reconstruction efforts. US government agencies rarely conducted adequate monitoring and evaluation to understand the impact of their programs. They focused on doing as much as possible as quickly as possible, rather than ensuring that programs were well-designed and adaptable. This led to critical flaws in interventions and a failure to identify and act on problems in a timely manner, undermining progress toward strategic goals.

Finally, the US was ultimately unable to prevent the Taliban from regaining power in Afghanistan. Twenty years after being removed from power by US-led forces, the Taliban swept back into Kabul in 2021, facing little resistance from Afghan government forces. This marked an ignoble end to America's longest war, which resulted in significant human and economic costs. More than 2,400 US service members, 1,100 allied service members, 66,000 Afghan troops, and 47,000 civilians lost their lives, with the US price tag for two decades in Afghanistan running as high as $2.26 trillion.

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