Serbia's Response To Austria-Hungary: A Fateful Decision

On 23 July 1914, Austria-Hungary delivered an ultimatum to Serbia, nearly a month after the assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife by a young Serbian nationalist. While the world waited for Serbia's response, Germany worked diplomatically to contain the effects of the ultimatum, but none of the other great powers were inclined to see Austria-Hungary, with its relatively weak military, as acting alone. Russia ordered a secret, but noticed, partial mobilisation of its armed forces, increasing Serbia's willingness to defy the threat of an Austro-Hungarian attack.

Russia's partial mobilisation

On 23 July 1914, Austria-Hungary delivered an ultimatum to Serbia, nearly one month after the assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife by a young Serbian nationalist in Sarajevo, Bosnia. In the final hours before the Serbian response was received at 6 pm on 25 July, Russia ordered a secret, but noticed, partial mobilisation of its armed forces. This was the first major military action not undertaken by a direct participant in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Russia's partial mobilisation increased the willingness of Serbia to defy the threat of an Austro-Hungarian attack, alarming the German leadership, who had not anticipated the idea of needing to fight Russia before France.

Germany's diplomatic efforts

Germany worked diplomatically to contain the effects of the ultimatum, but none of the other great powers were inclined to see Austria-Hungary, with its relatively weak military, as acting alone. Germany and Austria-Hungary tried to persuade Europe's other Great Powers not to get involved, hoping that France and Britain, which had no direct interest in Serbia, would urge moderation on Russia. In the end, their uncoordinated efforts were too little, too late.

Before Serbia replied to the ultimatum, Russia ordered a secret, but noticed, partial mobilisation of its armed forces. Russia's military leadership believed that the Austro-Hungarian grievance against Serbia was a pretext orchestrated by Germany, and considered a forceful response to be the best course of action. This increased the willingness of Serbia to defy the threat of an Austro-Hungarian attack.

Austria-Hungary's hard-line policy

On 23 July 1914, Austria-Hungary issued an ultimatum to Serbia, demanding that they accept responsibility for the assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife by a young Serbian nationalist in Sarajevo, Bosnia. The ultimatum was delivered by Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, ambassador of the Austro-Hungarian Empire to Serbia, with the full support of its allies in Berlin. Austria-Hungary had determined to pursue a hard-line policy towards Serbia in the aftermath of Franz Ferdinand’s assassination. Their plan, developed in coordination with the German foreign office, was to force a military conflict that would end quickly and decisively with an Austrian victory before Serbia’s powerful ally, Russia, had time to react.

The ultimatum triggered frantic activity across Europe as men of state tried to defuse the situation by getting Austria-Hungary to extend the deadline or soften the terms. However, their uncoordinated efforts were ultimately unsuccessful. While the world waited for Serbia’s response, Germany worked diplomatically to contain the effects of the ultimatum, but none of the other great powers were inclined to see Austria-Hungary, with its relatively weak military, as acting alone.

Russia, in particular, was preparing to mobilise in support of Serbia, marking a dangerous escalation of the situation. On the morning of 25 July, before Serbia even presented its response to the Austrian ultimatum, Tsar Nicholas II ordered “pre-mobilisation” measures including the return of troops on manoeuvre. Russia’s military leadership believed that the Austro-Hungarian grievance against Serbia was a pretext orchestrated by Germany, and considered a forceful response to be the best course of action. Russia’s partial mobilisation—the first major military action not undertaken by a direct participant in the conflict—increased the willingness of Serbia to defy the threat of an Austro-Hungarian attack.

The role of Britain and France

In the final hours before the Serbian response was received, Austria-Hungary and Germany tried to persuade the other Great Powers of Europe not to get involved. They hoped that France and Britain, which had no direct interest in Serbia, would urge moderation on Russia. Initially, it looked like their efforts might be successful. However, Russia's partial mobilisation of its armed forces increased Serbia's willingness to defy the threat of an Austro-Hungarian attack.

The British cabinet held a meeting in London to discuss the situation, which had previously been devoted to discussing Ireland's desire for independence.

The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand

On 23 July 1914, nearly a month after the assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife by a young Serbian nationalist in Sarajevo, Bosnia, Austria-Hungary delivered an ultimatum to Serbia. The ultimatum was delivered by Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, ambassador of the Austro-Hungarian Empire to Serbia, to the Serbian foreign ministry. Austria-Hungary had the full support of its allies in Berlin and had determined to pursue a hard-line policy towards Serbia following the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. Their plan, developed in coordination with the German foreign office, was to force a military conflict that would end quickly and decisively with an Austrian victory before Serbia's powerful ally, Russia, had time to react.

While the world waited for Serbia's response, Germany worked diplomatically to contain the effects of the ultimatum. However, none of the other great powers were inclined to see Austria-Hungary, with its relatively weak military, as acting alone. By 1914, the battle lines had been drawn in Europe: if Germany stood with Austria-Hungary against Serbia (and by extension, Russia), then Russia's allies, France and Britain, would be likely to step into the fray as well. The British cabinet, just after receiving the news of the Austrian note to Serbia, held a meeting in London, one that had previously been devoted to discussing Ireland's desire for independence.

In the final hours before the Serbian response was received at 6 pm on 25 July, Austria-Hungary and Germany tried to persuade Europe's other Great Powers not to get involved. They hoped that France and Britain, which had no direct interest in Serbia, would urge moderation on Russia—and at first, it looked like they might get their wish. However, Russia was preparing to mobilise in support of Serbia, marking a dangerous escalation of the situation. On the morning of 25 July, before Serbia even presented its response to the Austrian ultimatum, Tsar Nicholas II ordered "pre-mobilisation" measures, including the return of troops on manoeuvre. Russia's military leadership knew they were not yet strong enough for a general war, but they believed that the Austro-Hungarian grievance against Serbia was a pretext orchestrated by Germany, and considered a forceful response to be the best course of action. Russia's partial mobilisation—the first major military action not undertaken by a direct participant in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia—increased Serbia's willingness to defy the threat of an Austro-Hungarian attack and alarmed the German leadership, who had not anticipated the idea of needing to fight Russia before France.

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