Russia's Support: Armenia Or Azerbaijan?

Armenia and Azerbaijan have fought two wars over the Nagorno-Karabakh region since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia has historically been an important actor in Armenia, and the two countries are both members of the military alliance, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). However, in recent years, Armenia-Russia relations have deteriorated due to events such as the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the 2022-2023 Blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Russia has also been strengthening its relationship with Azerbaijan, as it shares a border with the country and needs it for a north-south trade corridor to the Persian Gulf. This has resulted in a souring of Russia-Armenia relations, with Armenia accusing Russia of failing to protect it from Azerbaijani aggression. Armenia has also been seeking to reduce its dependence on Russia and forge stronger ties with the West.

In June 2024, Armenia's Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan confirmed that the country would leave the CSTO, accusing members of the bloc of plotting with Azerbaijan to start a war against them. This decision comes after Azerbaijan retook Nagorno-Karabakh in a one-day war in September 2023, causing an exodus of the region's ethnic Armenian population, despite the presence of Russian peacekeepers.

Armenia's dependence on Russia

Historical Context

Armenia and Russia have a long history of relations, dating back to the early 19th century. After the Russo-Persian War (1826-1828), Eastern Armenia was ceded to Russia, and Russia was viewed as a protector of Christian subjects in the Ottoman Empire, including Armenians. This laid the foundation for Russia's influence in the region.

Military and Security Alliance

Armenia and Russia are members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a military alliance that Armenia considers essential for its security. Armenia also hosts a large Russian military base in Gyumri and several other smaller Russian military installations. The presence of Russian military forces in Armenia reinforces its dependence on Russia for security matters.

Economic Ties

Armenia's economy is closely tied to Russia, particularly in the energy sector. Armenia relies heavily on Russian gas imports, which account for 85% of its gas supply. Russia has leverage over Armenia's energy security and can exert pressure through gas prices and supply disruptions. Additionally, Russia has strong economic ties with Armenia, owning key sectors such as transport and telecommunications. Armenia is also a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), a Russia-led economic bloc, which provides tariff-free trade benefits.

Political Influence

Russia has exerted political influence in Armenia, and the two countries have had a "strategic partnership." Armenia's membership in the CSTO and EAEU is indicative of Russia's influence over Armenia's foreign policy and economic decisions. Armenia's attempts to diversify its economic and political relationships, such as considering joining the European Union, have been met with resistance from Russia.

Social and Cultural Connections

There are strong social and cultural connections between Armenia and Russia, including a significant Armenian population in Russia. Remittances from Armenians working in Russia contribute significantly to Armenia's economy. Additionally, historical and cultural ties between the two countries have played a role in shaping their relationship.

However, it is important to note that in recent years, Armenia-Russia relations have become strained due to various factors, including the 2018 Armenian Revolution, the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Armenia has sought to reduce its dependence on Russia by exploring alternative alliances and partnerships.

Russia's economic levers over Armenia

Russia has several economic levers over Armenia, which have strengthened since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Armenia's economy is heavily dependent on Russia, and any attempts to reduce this dependence will be challenging.

Firstly, about 40% of Armenia's exports go to Russia, and Yerevan's dependence on Russia for basic goods is overwhelming. Armenia's economy is also heavily reliant on migrant labourers sending their wages home from Russia. In 2022, money transfers from Russia accounted for $3.6 billion out of a total of $5.1 billion entering the country.

Secondly, Armenia's economy is heavily dependent on re-exports of Western products to Russia. In 2022, the volume of trade between Armenia and Russia nearly doubled, reaching $5.3 billion. Armenia's exports to Russia nearly tripled, from $850 million in 2021 to $2.4 billion the following year. This trend has continued, with the total trade volume for January-August 2023 surpassing $4.16 billion, a record level since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Thirdly, Armenia is very reliant on Russian imports, including vital food products and energy. Russia supplies 85% of Armenia's gas, which is needed to power thermal plants. Armenia's gas supply is vulnerable to arbitrary decisions by the Russian government, which can stop exports for political reasons. In March 2023, Russia suspended Armenian dairy exports during a period of political tensions.

Finally, Russian companies and individuals own some of Armenia's key assets, including its railways, gas pipeline, and major mining companies. This gives Russia significant influence over Armenia's economy and makes it difficult for Armenia to reduce its dependence.

Armenia's attempts to reduce reliance on Russia

Armenia's attempts to reduce its reliance on Russia:

Since gaining independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Armenia has been heavily reliant on Russia, particularly in the security realm. However, in recent years, Armenia has made attempts to reduce this reliance and diversify its partnerships. This is mainly due to Russia's failure to support Armenia during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War and the subsequent 2022-2023 Blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

• Seeking alternative security alliances: Armenia has expressed interest in developing closer security ties with the West, including NATO, the United States, France, and Greece. Armenia has also triggered Article 4 of the Collective Security Treaty (CST) with Russia, but the lack of Russian support during the conflict has led to criticism of the CST in Armenian political circles.
• Refusing Russian military drills: In January 2023, Armenia refused to hold common military drills with Russia due to the CST's failure to condemn Azerbaijan's perceived aggression. This led to diplomatic friction between the two countries.
• Expelling Russian border guards: In March 2024, Armenia officially expelled Russian border guards from the Zvartnots International Airport in Yerevan. This was a significant move, as the Russian guards had been based at the airport for three decades.
• Joining the International Criminal Court (ICC): In October 2023, Armenia ratified the Rome Statute, enabling it to join the ICC. This move was seen as a sign of worsening relations with Russia, as Armenia would be obligated to arrest Russian President Vladimir Putin if he entered Armenian territory due to the arrest warrant issued by the ICC.
• Boycotting military exercises and summits: Armenia declined to participate in military exercises and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) summit in Kyrgyzstan in October 2023. This was another indication of Armenia's dissatisfaction with Russia and its attempts to distance itself from Russian-led initiatives.
• Diversifying security arrangements: Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has confirmed that Armenia is trying to diversify its security arrangements, particularly with the European Union and the United States. This includes seeking alternative arms suppliers, such as India and potentially Western countries.
• Withdrawing Russian peacekeeping forces: Armenia has asked for Russian peacekeeping forces, which were deployed to Nagorno-Karabakh after the 2020 war, to return to Russia. This request highlights Armenia's dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of Russian peacekeepers in protecting Armenian interests.
• Deteriorating public trust: A March 2024 poll showed a significant decline in public trust in Russia-Armenia relations, with only 31% of Armenians considering the relationship positive, compared to 93% in 2019. This indicates a shift in Armenian public opinion away from Russia.
• Exploring alternative economic partners: Armenia has been exploring alternative economic partnerships, particularly with Western countries. While Armenia is highly dependent on Russian imports, Moscow has limited options for imposing effective economic sanctions on Armenia without damaging its own interests.
• Freezing CSTO membership: In February 2024, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan confirmed that Armenia had frozen its participation in the CSTO and was reviewing its membership. He later stated that the CSTO was a "threat to the national security of Armenia".

Russia's peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh

The peacekeeping contingent, consisting of 1,960 Russian servicemen, was led by Lieutenant General Rustam Muradov and headquartered near Stepanakert. The peacekeepers established observation posts along the contact line in Nagorno-Karabakh and along the Lachin corridor. They also assisted in finding and exchanging the bodies of fallen soldiers from both sides, as well as in demining operations in the region.

However, the peacekeepers faced criticism for their failure to prevent clashes and ensure freedom of movement along the Lachin corridor. In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched an offensive that resulted in a mass exodus of the Armenian population from Nagorno-Karabakh. The Russian peacekeepers did not intervene, and in April 2024, they began to withdraw from the region, leaving it under Azerbaijan's full control.

The presence of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh has been a source of tension and debate, with some accusing them of failing to uphold their mandate to maintain peace and security. The peacekeepers' withdrawal in 2024 came amid deteriorating relations between Armenia and Russia, with Armenia expressing dissatisfaction over Russia's role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and seeking to diversify its security arrangements with Western countries.

Russia's military bases in Armenia

Russia has a military base in Armenia, the 102nd Military Base, located in Gyumri, about 75 miles (120 km) north of the Armenian capital, Yerevan. The base was formerly the 127th Motor Rifle Division of the Soviet Seventh Guards Army. It is under the command of the Southern Military District of the Russian Armed Forces.

The base was established in 1941 in what is now Ukraine and was moved to Armenia in 1996. Armenia and Russia signed a friendship treaty in 1997, which allows Russian border guards to patrol Armenia's frontiers with Turkey and Iran. The treaty also calls for mutual assistance in the event of a military threat to either party. In 2010, the treaty was extended until 2044.

In 2005, the base had 74 tanks, 17 infantry fighting vehicles, 148 armoured personnel carriers, 84 artillery pieces, 18 MiG-29 fighters, and several batteries of S-300 anti-aircraft missiles. Military hardware has been moved to the base from other Russian bases in Georgia. The Armenian Air Force relies partially on the MiG-29s located at the base for the defence of its airspace.

In addition to the 102nd Military Base, Russia also has the 3624th Air Base at Erebuni Airport in Yerevan, which is part of the 102nd Military Base.

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