The Insurgent's Path: Unraveling Afghanistan's Cycle Of Unemployment And Rebellion

In locations with active insurgencies, there is a perceived positive correlation between unemployment and violence. This has led to the belief that gainfully employed young men are less likely to participate in political violence. However, in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines, data does not support this theory. There is no significant relationship between unemployment and the rate of insurgent attacks against government and allied forces or civilians. This raises questions about the effectiveness of aid spending by governments seeking to rebuild social and political order through gainful employment.

Positive correlation between unemployment and violence

The positive correlation between unemployment and violence in locations with active insurgencies is a theory that has been explored by several scholars. The opportunity-cost theory, which suggests that gainfully employed young men are less likely to participate in political violence, has been used as a basis for government aid spending aimed at rebuilding social and political order.

However, studies examining the relationship between unemployment and insurgency in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines have found no significant correlation between unemployment and attacks against government and allied forces, or the rate of insurgent attacks that kill civilians. The authors of these studies, Eli Berman, Michael Callen, Joseph H. Felter, and Jacob N. Shapiro, introduce the notion of "insurgent precision" to explain the negative correlation between unemployment and violence in these specific contexts. They suggest that other factors, such as predation, security measures, and information costs, may be more influential in driving insurgent activity.

While the opportunity-cost theory suggests a positive link between unemployment and violence, the empirical evidence from Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines does not support this hypothesis. This discrepancy highlights the complex nature of insurgent behaviour and the need for further research to understand the diverse factors that contribute to political violence.

In conclusion, while unemployment may be a factor that influences an individual's decision to engage in political violence, it is not the sole determinant. A range of social, economic, and political factors interact to shape an individual's propensity for insurgent activity. Thus, addressing unemployment alone may not be sufficient to prevent violence, and a more comprehensive understanding of the underlying causes is necessary for effective policy interventions.

Government aid spending

US Military Aid

The United States has been the largest provider of military aid to Afghanistan, investing billions of dollars to strengthen the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF). Between 2001 and 2020, US military aid to Afghanistan totalled $72.7 billion, with the Department of Defense (DOD) contributing the majority of this aid. This included equipment, supplies, services, training, and funding for salaries and infrastructure.

US Foreign Assistance

In addition to military aid, the US has provided significant foreign assistance to Afghanistan. In 2019, US foreign assistance to Afghanistan amounted to $4.89 billion, with a peak of $15.3 billion in 2011. Since 2001, military spending has accounted for 70% of total foreign aid to Afghanistan, while economic aid has accounted for 30%. However, there have been concerns about the effectiveness and sustainability of this aid.

Challenges and Criticisms

Afghanistan has struggled with poverty, high unemployment, and poor living conditions despite receiving substantial international aid. A significant portion of US aid has been lost to corruption, waste, and inefficient use. There have been issues with "phantom aid," where aid never reaches the intended recipients and ends up in the pockets of corrupt officials or is spent on projects that have little impact on improving economic conditions.

Impact on Governance and Development

The influx of foreign aid has also impacted governance and development efforts in Afghanistan. The Afghan government became heavily reliant on foreign aid, which comprised a large portion of its national budget. This created challenges in terms of sustainability and ownership of development projects. There have been criticisms that aid efforts focused too much on short-term stabilisation rather than long-term development, and that they failed to adequately address issues of corruption and capacity-building within the Afghan government.

Humanitarian Crisis and Future Challenges

With the withdrawal of US and allied forces, Afghanistan faces a humanitarian crisis, with urgent needs for food and basic services. There are concerns about the future of the Afghan economy and the potential for massive humanitarian aid requirements. However, there are also challenges in effectively administering and ensuring the proper use of humanitarian aid.

Way Forward

The way forward for Afghanistan in terms of aid and development is uncertain. There are discussions about potential aid consortiums led by neutral states or international consortia, but it is unclear if these will materialise and gain the necessary support. The US faces a difficult decision about its level of involvement and the conditions under which it might provide aid to Afghanistan going forward.

Political violence and insurgency

The authors of the study, Eli Berman, Michael Callen, Joseph H. Felter, and Jacob N. Shapiro, analysed survey data on unemployment and two measures of insurgency: attacks on government and allied forces, and violence resulting in civilian deaths. Their findings challenge the assumption that unemployment directly leads to increased political violence and insurgency. This negative correlation between unemployment and violence in these contexts suggests that other factors, such as insurgent precision, security measures, and information costs, may play a more significant role in driving insurgent activity.

The absence of a positive correlation between unemployment and insurgent attacks challenges the notion that unemployment is a primary driver of political violence. This has important implications for policy responses aimed at addressing insurgency and promoting social and political stability. The findings suggest that simply providing employment opportunities may not be sufficient to deter potential recruits from joining insurgent groups. Instead, a more nuanced understanding of the factors influencing insurgent participation is necessary to develop effective counterinsurgency strategies.

While unemployment may not be the sole or primary factor driving insurgency, it is essential to recognise that economic conditions can still influence political violence. The opportunity-cost theory, though not supported by the data in this specific context, highlights the potential impact of economic factors on individual choices to engage in political violence. Therefore, addressing unemployment and creating economic opportunities can still be vital components of a comprehensive strategy to address insurgency and promote long-term stability.

In conclusion, the relationship between political violence, insurgency, and unemployment in Afghanistan is complex and influenced by various factors. While unemployment alone may not be the primary driver of insurgent activity, economic conditions and opportunity costs can still shape the landscape of political violence. A comprehensive understanding of these dynamics is crucial for developing effective policies and strategies to address insurgency and promote sustainable peace in Afghanistan.

Opportunity-cost theory

The opportunity-cost theory is a concept in microeconomic theory used to maximise value through better decision-making. It is the potential benefit that a business, an investor, or an individual misses out on when choosing one alternative over another. In other words, it is the "cost" incurred by not enjoying the benefit that would have been derived from taking the second-best available choice.

The opportunity-cost theory is often used to understand the correlation between unemployment and violence in locations with active insurgencies. The logic is that gainfully employed young men are less likely to participate in political violence, implying a positive correlation between unemployment and violence.

In the context of Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines, the opportunity-cost theory has been tested using survey data on unemployment and two newly available measures of insurgency:

• Attacks against government and allied forces
• Violence that kills civilians

Contrary to the theory, the data does not support a positive correlation between unemployment and attacks against government and allied forces. There is also no significant relationship between unemployment and the rate of insurgent attacks that kill civilians.

The authors of the study introduce the notion of insurgent precision to explain the negative correlation between unemployment and violence in these three conflicts. They suggest that predation, security measures, and information costs may account for the lack of correlation.

The opportunity-cost theory is a valuable tool for understanding the complex relationship between unemployment and political violence. By considering the potential benefits missed out on by choosing one alternative over another, we can gain insights into the decision-making processes of individuals and organisations.

Recruitment of young men

Afghanistan has a very young population, with approximately 60% of its population under the age of 25. Youth literacy is low, and ensuring that decent jobs are available is one of the country's biggest challenges. Decades of conflict have resulted in a loss of educational opportunities, and young men are often forced to assume the role of breadwinner at a very early age. This has led to a significant number of young men becoming involved in organised crime or other illegal activities.

The Taliban has been accused of exploiting this situation by recruiting children to their ranks, in violation of international law. Human Rights Watch has reported that the Taliban has been training and deploying children for various military operations, including the use of firearms and the production and planting of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The Taliban has denied these allegations, claiming that they only enlist fighters who have achieved "mental and physical maturity". However, some of the children recruited from madrasas (Islamic religious schools) in Kunduz, Takhar, and Badakhshan provinces are 13 years old or younger.

The Taliban's recruitment strategy targets children because they are easily convinced of the righteousness of jihad and are not yet responsible for providing for their families. In addition, the Taliban madrasas attract many poor families because they cover expenses and provide food, clothing, and even cash for the children. The indoctrination of children begins as early as six years old, and by the time they are 13, they have learned military skills.

The recruitment of young men by insurgent groups in Afghanistan is a complex issue influenced by various social, economic, and political factors. The lack of educational and economic opportunities, as well as the normalisation of violence and aggression, especially among young men, creates an environment where insurgent groups can find a steady stream of recruits.

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