Air Force Soldiers In Afghanistan: Engaging In Direct Combat Or Supporting Roles?

The question of whether Air Force soldiers in Afghanistan have to fight is a complex one, and it depends on various factors such as the specific role and responsibilities of the soldiers, the overall military strategy, and the evolving situation on the ground.

In general, Air Force soldiers can be involved in both combat and non-combat roles. During the United States' war in Afghanistan, which lasted from 2001 to 2021, the U.S. Air Force played a crucial role in supporting ground operations, conducting airstrikes, and providing logistical and intelligence assistance.

However, it is important to note that the Afghan Air Force, established in 2006 and supported by NATO and the U.S., faced significant challenges. Despite billions of dollars in investment and training by the U.S., the Afghan Air Force struggled with issues such as corruption, lack of maintenance, and difficulty in maintaining and operating their aircraft, especially after the withdrawal of foreign troops.

In the end, the Afghan Air Force was unable to prevent the Taliban from retaking control of the country in 2021. Many Afghan pilots chose to flee the country rather than fight for the Taliban or face potential retaliation. The Taliban are now focused on rebuilding their air force and have called on former Afghan pilots to return, although these guarantees of amnesty are questionable given reports of forced disappearances and assassinations of former government officials and soldiers.

The Taliban's rapid advance and the Afghan security forces' collapse

The Taliban's rapid advance and the collapse of the Afghan security forces can be attributed to a multitude of factors, including the withdrawal of US and NATO forces, the lack of leadership and coordination within the Afghan security forces, and the Taliban's effective strategy.

The US withdrawal from Afghanistan left the Afghan security forces without critical air support, maintenance, and logistical assistance. The Afghan forces were heavily reliant on US contractors for aircraft maintenance, and the departure of these contractors resulted in a significant drop in aircraft readiness rates. The US had also been providing quick air support to Afghan ground forces, which was crucial in repelling Taliban attacks.

The Afghan security forces also lacked effective leadership and coordination, with reports of rampant corruption among Afghan military leaders. There was a lack of centralized command and control, with Afghan political leaders failing to implement a cohesive security strategy. Poor treatment of soldiers and police by their leaders further contributed to low morale within the Afghan security forces.

The Taliban, on the other hand, executed a well-planned and effective campaign, exploiting the weaknesses of the Afghan security forces. They targeted the morale and cohesion of the Afghan forces through deliberate and devastating psychological operations, including outreach to local units to convince them to defect or surrender. The Taliban also conducted a "flowing water" strategy, attacking everywhere all at once and laying siege where resistance was met. This approach resulted in slow but steady gains and eventually overwhelmed the Afghan forces.

The combination of these factors led to the rapid advance of the Taliban and the collapse of the Afghan security forces.

The US's $83 billion investment in the Afghan security forces

The US spent nearly $83 billion to build, equip and train the Afghan security forces. This included nearly $10 billion for vehicles and aircraft, $3.75 billion on fuel for the Afghan military between 2010-2020, and $5.8 billion for economic and government development and infrastructure.

The US also spent $82.9 billion on the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund since its inception, and $3.05 billion in 2021.

However, the US's investment in the Afghan security forces was ultimately a failure. The Taliban captured an array of modern military equipment when they overran Afghan forces, including combat aircraft, when they rolled up provincial capitals and military bases.

The US's failure to produce a sustainable Afghan army and police force will be studied for years by military analysts. The forces turned out to be hollow, equipped with superior arms but largely missing the crucial ingredient of combat motivation.

The Afghan security forces collapsed so quickly and completely—in some cases without a shot fired—that the ultimate beneficiary of the American investment turned out to be the Taliban.

The Afghan Air Force's Special Mission Wing

The Special Mission Wing (SMW) of the Afghan Air Force was established in the summer of 2012. It conducts day and night vision goggle (NVG) air assault and day and night intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), counter-narcotic (CN), and counter-terrorism (CT) operations in support of the Afghan Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense Special Security Forces (ASSF).

The SMW was created from a former Ministry of Interior (MoI) air unit that provided support to Afghan special units that conducted counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism operations. The unit was originally organized in 2005 as the MoI's Air Interdiction Unit. The SMW commenced operations as a joint MoD/MoI unit in 2012.

The SMW is an MoD independent air wing organized into four squadrons. The headquarters and two squadrons are located in Kabul. One squadron is located in Kandahar, and a fourth is in Mazar-e-Sharif in northern Afghanistan.

The SMW provides rapid, precision airlift to aid Afghanistan's elite forces in dismantling terror networks and conducting targeted operations against insurgent leaders and organizations. It also supports Afghan units in preventing the cultivation, production, and smuggling of illegal narcotics, which is considered a major funding source for insurgents and other criminal networks.

The SMW has thirty Mi-17s in its fleet, some provided by the U.S., Germany, and the UK, and ten on loan from the Afghan Air Force (AAF). It also has some Mi-35 Hind Attack Helicopters, which carry twin-barrelled Gryazev-Shipunov GSh-23 mm guns, a Yak-B 12.7 mm machine gun, and the S-5 57 mm rocket pod.

The SMW has been charged with supporting the counter-narcotics mission in Afghanistan since its inception and has expanded to include carrying Afghan commandos and operators from the elite General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU) into and out of combat for counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations. The unit has been described as "the best aviation unit in that part of the world."

The SMW has about 800 personnel and is funded by the Afghan Security Forces Fund and a separate counter-narcotics fund, with the U.S. contributing the majority of the money to both.

The US's lack of a plan to prevent the Taliban from gaining control of aircraft

The Afghan Air Force relied heavily on US-funded contractors to repair and maintain its fleet of aircraft, armoured vehicles, and other equipment. However, the departure of these contractors, along with the withdrawal of US troops, has left the Afghan Air Force without the necessary support to maintain its aircraft. This has resulted in the grounding of most of the fleet, with the Taliban gaining access to the remaining aircraft.

The Taliban now has access to US-provided planes and helicopters, including Black Hawks, Mi-17s, A-29 attack planes, and MD-530 utility helicopters. While some of these aircraft were flown to safety in neighbouring countries by Afghan pilots, many were left behind and captured by the Taliban.

The consequences of the Taliban's access to these aircraft are significant. Firstly, it eliminates the Afghan government's main military advantage over the Taliban, which was air power. Secondly, there are concerns that the Taliban could use these aircraft against civilians or rival groups within Afghanistan. There is also a possibility that the aircraft could be sold or given to rival states, although this is considered unlikely as these countries likely already have access to similar technology.

The US considered several options to prevent the Taliban from gaining access to the aircraft, including airstrikes to destroy them. However, this option was not pursued as it could have antagonised the Taliban during the evacuation process.

The lack of a clear plan to prevent the Taliban from gaining control of aircraft highlights a broader failure of the US strategy in Afghanistan. The rapid collapse of the Afghan military and the Taliban's seizure of power took many by surprise, and the US was left scrambling to respond. This has led to criticism of the Biden administration's handling of the withdrawal and questions about the future of Afghanistan under Taliban rule.

The Afghan Air Force's struggle to stay alive

The Afghan Air Force has struggled to stay alive since the US withdrawal and the Taliban takeover.

The AAF was established in 1921 and has since been through several iterations, including under the Taliban from 1997 to 2001. The US-led NATO forces had been working to rebuild and modernise the AAF since 2007, with the aim of creating a force capable of defending Afghanistan.

However, following the withdrawal of NATO forces in the summer of 2021, the AAF largely disintegrated. This was due to a number of factors, including:

• The collapse of the Afghan government and the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces
• The Taliban's large-scale offensive
• The flight of President Ashraf Ghani to the United Arab Emirates
• The lack of a clear US plan to prevent the Taliban from gaining control of aircraft, pilots and other support staff
• The lack of logistical support from the US military
• The departure of US contractors, which left Afghan mechanics unable to repair aircraft

Many AAF pilots chose to flee the country rather than serve the Taliban, taking aircraft with them to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. This has left the AAF with very few operational aircraft and a lack of trained personnel.

The Taliban has expressed its intention to rebuild the AAF and has called on US-trained Afghan pilots to return to Afghanistan. However, only a few pilots have returned, and the Taliban is struggling to get its air force ambitions off the ground. It is heavily reliant on outdated aircraft and lacks the trained personnel needed to maintain and fly them.

The AAF is a long way from being a viable fighting force and is currently unable to secure the skies against foreign incursions or domestic insurgencies.

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