Austria-Hungary's Blank Check: Germany's Promise In Wwi

On July 5, 1914, Germany pledged its unconditional support for Austria-Hungary in its conflict with Serbia, an assurance that has since been referred to by historians as the blank cheque. This pledge was made by Kaiser Wilhelm II to Austria's ambassador to Germany, Ladislaus Szogyeny-Marich, during a lunch in Potsdam. The blank cheque was a decisive moment in the events leading up to World War I, as it meant that Germany would support Austria-Hungary's punitive actions towards Serbia, even if it led to war with Russia and its allies, France and Great Britain.

The blank cheque was designed to secure a triumph for the Central Powers in the Balkans. German leaders assumed that Austria-Hungary was ready to initiate war against Serbia immediately and that a rapid strike would present Europe with a fait accompli. They also believed that the Tsarist regime was not militarily ready to risk a general European war and that monarchical solidarity would take precedence over pan-Slav sentiment.

However, the prospect of a European war became a probability in late July, leading Kaiser Wilhelm II and Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg to attempt, unsuccessfully, to amend the cheque.

Kaiser Wilhelm II's pledge

On July 5, 1914, Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany pledged his country's unconditional support for whatever action Austria-Hungary chose to take in its conflict with Serbia. This assurance, known as the "blank cheque," was a decisive moment in the chain of events leading to World War I. The pledge was made to Austria's ambassador to Germany, Ladislaus Szogyeny-Marich, during a lunch in Potsdam.

The "blank cheque" assurance was in response to a memorandum from the Austrian foreign secretary, Leopold Berchtold, and a personal letter from Emperor Franz Josef to Kaiser Wilhelm. Both documents expressed the need for immediate action in the Balkans region due to increased Serbian and Russian aggression. They also stated the objective of eliminating Serbia as "a factor of political power in the Balkans." However, neither document specified that Austria-Hungary wanted war.

Kaiser Wilhelm was outraged by the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, with whom he had met just two weeks prior to discuss the situation in the Balkans. During the lunch with Szogyeny-Marich, Wilhelm initially demurred, saying he needed to consult the German chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg. However, when pressed by the ambassador, he promised Germany's "faithful support" for Austria-Hungary, even if it led to war with Russia and its allies, France and Great Britain.

Wilhelm's pledge was a victory for the war party in Vienna, as it bolstered Austro-Hungarian leaders in their decision to embark on war against Serbia. However, it was based on several faulty assumptions. German leaders believed that Austria-Hungary was ready to initiate war against Serbia immediately and that a rapid strike would present Europe with a fait accompli. They also assumed that the Tsarist regime was not militarily ready to risk a general European war and that monarchical solidarity would trump pan-Slav sentiment.

When the prospect of a European war became a probability in late July, Kaiser Wilhelm II and Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg sought to amend the cheque, but they failed. The "blank cheque" assurance thus played a significant role in escalating the regional crisis in the Balkans into a wider European conflict.

The July Crisis

The crisis was characterised by a complex web of alliances, coupled with the miscalculations of numerous political and military leaders. The crisis was also marked by a series of diplomatic and military escalations, which ultimately led to the outbreak of World War I.

The Blank Cheque

On 5 July 1914, Germany issued what became known as the 'blank cheque' to Austria-Hungary, promising its unconditional support for whatever action it chose to take against Serbia. This was a decisive moment in the chain of events leading to the outbreak of World War I in Europe. The 'blank cheque' marked a victory for the war party in Vienna, who were in favour of a 'reckoning' with Serbia.

On 23 July 1914, Austria-Hungary issued an ultimatum to Serbia, giving it 48 hours to reply. The ultimatum was deliberately unacceptable in character and demanded that Serbia formally and publicly condemn the "dangerous propaganda" against Austria-Hungary. It also demanded that Belgrade suppress all publications that "incite hatred and contempt" of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

On 25 July 1914, Russia ordered a partial mobilisation of over one million men of the Russian Army and the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets. This was the first major military action not undertaken by a direct participant in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

On 28 July 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. This marked the beginning of a 'local war' that Vienna's decision-makers had wanted for some time.

On 1 August 1914, Germany declared war on Russia. German troops invaded Luxembourg as part of its deployment plan.

On 4 August 1914, Germany declared war on Belgium and invaded the country. This act violated Belgian neutrality and provided the casus belli for Britain's declaration of war.

On 4 August 1914, Britain declared war on Germany.

German assumptions about Austria-Hungary's readiness for war

In issuing the blank cheque, German leaders made a number of faulty assumptions. They believed that Austria-Hungary was ready to initiate war against Serbia immediately and that a rapid strike would present Europe with a fait accompli. They reckoned that the Tsarist regime was not militarily ready to risk a general European war. Moreover, they thought that monarchical solidarity would trump pan-Slav sentiment, that the Tsar would not support a state that had allegedly harboured the assassins of the heir to the Habsburg throne. In other words, the “blank cheque” was designed first and foremost to secure a triumph, either political or military, for the Central Powers in the Balkans.

German assumptions about Russia's readiness for war

The German leadership believed that the Tsarist regime was not militarily ready to risk a general European war. They thought that the Tsar would not support a state that had allegedly harboured the assassins of the heir to the Habsburg throne. They also believed that monarchical solidarity would trump pan-Slav sentiment.

The German leadership also believed that Austria-Hungary was ready to initiate war against Serbia immediately and that a rapid strike would present Europe with a fait accompli.

German assumptions about the Tsar's support

The German leaders made several assumptions about the Tsar's support for Austria-Hungary's conflict with Serbia. Firstly, they believed that the Tsarist regime was not militarily ready to risk a general European war. They also thought that monarchical solidarity would outweigh pan-Slav sentiment, and that the Tsar would not support a state that had allegedly harboured the assassins of the heir to the Habsburg throne.

The German leaders assumed that the Tsar would not intervene in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and that a rapid strike would present Europe with a fait accompli. They were confident that the Tsar would not risk a general European war over a regional conflict. However, these assumptions proved faulty, and the Tsar did, in fact, order the mobilisation of Russian forces to deter Austria-Hungary from invading Serbia. This mobilisation ultimately led to Germany declaring war on Russia on 1 August 1914, marking the start of World War I.

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