The Afghanistan Conundrum: Examining The Complexities Of Withdrawal

The US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 marked the end of America's longest war. The decision to leave was not without its challenges, and the question of whether the US could have stayed in Afghanistan is a complex one.

Some argue that the US had a responsibility to stay and secure a peace deal between the Taliban and the Afghan government. Others point to the enormous costs of the war, both human and financial, and the futility of continuing a war that could not be won.

The US had been attempting to degrade the threat of terrorism in the region since 2001, and while al-Qaeda's capabilities were diminished, the Taliban remained a powerful force. With the rise of other strategic threats, such as those posed by China and Russia, and the COVID-19 pandemic, the context had changed, and the US made the decision to end its military engagement in Afghanistan.

While the US withdrawal was a strategic choice, it is important to acknowledge the tragic losses and the potential for further humanitarian crises in Afghanistan.

The Taliban's ability to link their cause to Afghan identity

The Taliban were able to tie themselves to religion and to Afghan identity in a way that a government allied with non-Muslim foreign occupiers could not match. The presence of Americans in Afghanistan trod on a sense of Afghan identity that incorporated national pride, a long history of fighting outsiders, and a religious commitment to defend the homeland. It prodded men and women to defend their honour, their religion, and their homes. It dared young men to fight. It sapped the will of Afghan soldiers and police.

The Taliban's ability to link their cause to the very meaning of being Afghan was a powerful dynamic that gave them a significant advantage. It was also dangerous, as it could be twisted to mean that all Muslims are bent on war or are fanatics. However, this interpretation would be incorrect, as Islam is a source of unity and inspiration, not terrorism or atrocity. The point is that it is more difficult to risk one's life for one's country when fighting alongside what some call occupiers, especially when they do not share one's faith.

The failure of the Afghan army and police to compete with the Taliban's motivation

The Taliban fought with an ideological fervour, driven by their desire to rid the country of foreign invaders, which resonated strongly with Afghan identity. This motivation was lacking in the Afghan security forces, who were seen as fighting for money and lacked the will to risk their lives for a corrupt government. The Taliban's ability to link their cause to the very meaning of being Afghan was a crucial factor in their success.

Additionally, widespread corruption within Afghanistan's defence and interior ministries further demoralised the Afghan security forces. Funds, ammunition, and food meant for soldiers were often stolen and sold on the black market, ending up in the hands of the Taliban. Commanders embezzled money by creating "ghost soldiers" and skimming the pay of serving soldiers. This corruption undermined morale and led to high attrition and desertion rates within the army.

The lack of faith in the Afghan government and widespread conspiracy theories about secret deals with the Taliban further contributed to the low morale among security forces. There was a significant mistrust towards the country's political leadership, and soldiers were not willing to fight and die for President Ashraf Ghani or the government.

Furthermore, illiteracy among some Afghan military leaders created basic problems with tasks such as maintaining equipment, ordering spare parts, and even reading maps properly. This lack of basic education and leadership skills further hindered the effectiveness of the Afghan security forces.

The Taliban's smart military strategy of taking control of major border crossings, highways, and besieging cities also crippled the Afghan government's ability to send reinforcements and supplies, leading to the isolation and eventual surrender of many army units.

Ultimately, the Afghan security forces were unable to develop the capacity to stand on their own, and their weaknesses were exposed once U.S. and NATO troops began their withdrawal. The billions spent by the U.S. and NATO on training and equipping the Afghan military failed to address these internal flaws, leading to the rapid collapse of the Afghan army in the face of the Taliban's advance.

The US's inability to impose democracy on Afghanistan

Another factor was the selection of Hamid Karzai as the interim president by the US, despite the delegates at the Bonn meeting in 2001 voting for Abdul Satar Sirat, who represented those seeking a return to the constitutional monarchy. Karzai had strong connections with the US during the civil war and was crucial in transferring funds to the mujahideen. The US made it clear that no funds would be provided to Afghanistan unless Karzai was in power.

Additionally, the US and its allies supported radical Islamist organizations during the civil war, which later became the dominant political parties in Afghanistan. These parties hindered the development and participation of progressive democratic parties, alliances, and coalitions that aimed to build links across ethnic, religious, and regional lines. The US and its allies also blocked the exclusion of warlords, drug lords, and human rights abusers from holding office, allowing them to attain key positions in the Karzai government and dominate the parliament.

Moreover, the US-backed governments in Afghanistan failed to reduce corruption and security forces' violence against civilians. The Afghan military kept "ghost soldiers" on their payroll and national leaders paid off warlords instead of removing them from power.

The US-led intervention in Afghanistan also altered the existing ethnic balance in the country. The intervention ended the dominance of the Pushtuns, the largest ethnic group constituting about 40% of the population. Without the US military presence, the Pushtuns would have been in a stronger position to reestablish their dominance. This ethnic division created further challenges for stabilizing the country and building a democratic system.

Furthermore, the presence of American forces in Afghanistan clashed with Afghan identity, which incorporates national pride, a history of fighting outsiders, and a religious commitment to defend the homeland. This dynamic inspired Afghans to fight against what they perceived as foreign occupiers, giving the Taliban a significant advantage in rallying support.

Lastly, the US faced challenges in understanding Afghanistan's complex dynamics, including local grievances, political factionalism, and deep-seated resistance to occupation. The success of the surge in Iraq also led US leaders to believe that the Afghan democracy could be stabilized, which proved to be overly optimistic.

In conclusion, the US's inability to impose democracy in Afghanistan was influenced by factors such as the imposition of an unfavorable political system, the selection of leaders, support for certain political parties, the failure to address corruption and violence, ethnic divisions, the clash with Afghan identity, and a lack of understanding of the local context.

The US's failure to understand Afghanistan

Lack of Cultural Understanding

The US underestimated the complexity of Afghan society and the strong sense of national and religious identity that shapes the country. US leaders failed to recognize that their presence in Afghanistan was seen as a foreign occupation, which clashed with Afghan pride and religious commitments. This dynamic gave the Taliban a significant advantage in inspiring Afghans to fight against the US-backed government. The Taliban effectively leveraged Islamic teachings and framed the conflict as a jihad or struggle against foreign occupiers, tapping into a deep-rooted history of resisting outside invaders.

Overconfidence and Hubris

US leaders, including military officers, displayed overconfidence in their ability to achieve victory in Afghanistan. This hubris led to miscalculations and a failure to adapt strategies to the local context. The success of the US-led invasion in 2001 and the surge in Iraq a few years later created a false sense of optimism about the prospects of success in Afghanistan. However, they underestimated the Taliban's resilience, adaptability, and strong support base among a segment of the Afghan population.

Narrow Focus on Counterterrorism

The primary objective of the US in Afghanistan was to degrade the terrorist threat against the US and its allies. While this goal was largely achieved, with al-Qaeda's capabilities significantly diminished, the narrow focus on counterterrorism neglected other critical aspects necessary for long-term stability. Nation-building efforts, including attempts to establish a democratic government and improve governance, were challenging due to deep-seated political factionalism and corruption. The US also struggled to build an independent and effective Afghan army, which was plagued by issues such as poor leadership, corruption, and desertion.

Misunderstanding the Taliban

The US underestimated the Taliban's strength, resilience, and ability to adapt. They failed to recognize the Taliban's strong support base, particularly among conservative Pashtuns who embraced the Deobandi school of Islam. Additionally, the US-led strategy focused primarily on military solutions rather than exploring negotiated settlements. The Taliban's ideological commitment to their cause, combined with their ability to outfight and outlast the Afghan government forces, ultimately proved decisive.

Failure to Adapt Strategies

The US failed to adapt its strategies to the evolving dynamics in Afghanistan. The initial intervention, triggered by the 9/11 attacks, aimed to hunt down al-Qaeda. However, over time, the mission morphed into a complex nation-building effort, attempting to establish a stable democracy and improve living conditions. This shift in objectives led to a disconnect between the US's goals and the realities on the ground. The US tried to impose centralized models of governance and security institutions that were inappropriate for Afghanistan's history and political culture, neglecting the importance of local power brokers and traditional forms of defense.

In conclusion, the US's failure to understand Afghanistan was multifaceted and included a lack of cultural understanding, overconfidence, a narrow focus on counterterrorism, and a failure to adapt strategies to the complex dynamics on the ground. These factors contributed to the ultimate withdrawal of US troops and the Taliban's resurgence in the country.

The US's fear of terrorism and its domestic political implications

The fear of terrorism and its domestic political implications has been a significant factor in the US's foreign policy decisions. The September 11 attacks ignited a fear that presidents could not ignore. Terrorism transformed into a real threat to the United States, with the potential to involve chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.

The political atmosphere in the US after the attacks was charged with the risk of another attack on the homeland. Throughout 2002, various Gallup polls showed that 50-85% of Americans worried that a terrorist attack on the US was likely. The threat of terrorism declined during President Obama's presidency, yet he too could not ignore it. During the 2009 debate over whether to surge tens of thousands of troops to Afghanistan, Obama shelved any plans for withdrawal.

The overriding question in all policy debates was what level of terrorist threat would emerge if the democratic government in Afghanistan fell. Generals would have had no leg to stand on without the very real and palpable terrorist threat. The intelligence community assessed that if the drawdown went forward on schedule, security could deteriorate to the point that terrorist groups could form a safe haven in Afghanistan.

The shadow of September 11 was receding, finally. The Islamic State had been defeated, and its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, killed. In the Pentagon, fear of terrorism had been eclipsed by concern for the great power competition against China and Russia. As important, the COVID-19 pandemic was a vast new threat and ushered in new economic challenges.

It was no longer reasonable to assume that terrorism demanded that the United States worry about Afghanistan. In Biden's words in April 2021, "We went to war in Afghanistan because of a horrific attack that happened 20 years ago. That cannot explain why we should remain."

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