Uniting Turkey And Azerbaijan: A Geopolitical Alliance?

Azerbaijan and Turkey have historically shared strong relations, with both countries being the only two predominantly Turkic countries located west of the Caspian Sea. Former Azerbaijani president Heydar Aliyev often described the two as being one nation, two states. Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize Azerbaijan's independence on June 4, 1918, and has since been a strong supporter of Azerbaijan's efforts to consolidate its independence and preserve its territorial integrity. In recent years, the two countries have built upon their linguistic and cultural ties to form a close economic partnership, with joint infrastructure projects such as the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline and the South Caucasus Pipeline. In addition, Turkey has provided military support to Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, with some suggesting that the two countries could further unite by establishing a trade corridor through Armenia to connect Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan enclave. While there is no active discussion of political unification, the close cultural, economic, and military ties between the two countries suggest a strong and enduring relationship.

The Zangezur Corridor

The concept of the Zangezur corridor was introduced by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and has been promoted by both Azerbaijan and Turkey. Armenia has consistently objected to the proposal, arguing that it deviates from the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement, which does not include any provisions for establishing such a corridor. Armenia also asserts that the "corridor logic" is a form of propaganda and a threat to its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The dispute over the Zangezur corridor has broader geopolitical implications. Some analysts characterise it as a pan-Turkist agenda, while others emphasise the potential solution to the blockade as a key aspect. Russia has also expressed interest in the development of the corridor, as it would ostensibly be the security guarantor of the route. Additionally, the implementation of the corridor would provide a strategic advantage to Turkey, connecting it to Turkic Central Asia via Azerbaijan and enhancing its strategic autonomy.

The dispute over the Zangezur corridor remains unresolved, with both sides holding firm to their positions. While Azerbaijan continues to push for an unimpeded corridor, Armenia stands firm in its rejection, emphasising the importance of maintaining its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The Shusha Declaration

The declaration covers a wide range of issues, including political, economic, trade, cultural, educational, sports, and energy security sectors. It also discusses cooperation in the field of defence industry, military cooperation, and mutual military assistance.

One of the key points of the declaration is the emphasis on the historic significance of the meeting between the two presidents in Shusha, which is considered the ancient cradle of culture of Azerbaijan and the entire Turkic world. The declaration also reaffirms the adherence of both countries to all international documents signed between them, including the Treaty of Kars of 13 October 1921.

In terms of defence and security, the declaration states that an attack on either country would be considered an attack on both, and emphasises the need for mutual coordination and joint consultations in response to any threats or acts of aggression. It also mentions the establishment of the so-called "Zangezur corridor" and the possibility of cooperation within a proposed six-party platform (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia, Turkey, Iran, and Georgia).

The declaration also addresses the opening of a Turkish consulate in Shusha, which has been a source of controversy and condemnation from the Armenian Foreign Ministry, who consider it a provocation against regional security and peace.

Overall, the Shusha Declaration signifies the strong and close relationship between Azerbaijan and Turkey, with a focus on mutual support, cooperation, and the protection of their national interests.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

In 1923, the Soviet Union established the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, home to a 95% ethnically Armenian population, within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. However, throughout the Soviet period, Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh faced heavy discrimination from Soviet Azerbaijani authorities, who suppressed Armenian culture and identity, pressured Armenians to leave, and encouraged Azerbaijanis to settle in the region.

Amid the Soviet Union's collapse in 1988-89, a referendum was held in Nagorno-Karabakh, declaring its intention to join the Republic of Armenia, citing self-determination laws in the Soviet constitution. This act was met with a series of pogroms against Armenians across Azerbaijan, sparking the First Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988-1994). The war resulted in tens of thousands of casualties and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people on both sides. By 1993, Armenia had gained control of Nagorno-Karabakh and occupied 20% of Azerbaijan's geographic area.

A Russian-brokered ceasefire, known as the Bishkek Protocol, was signed in 1994, leaving Nagorno-Karabakh de facto independent, heavily reliant on Armenia, and with a self-proclaimed government in Stepanakert. This led to two decades of relative stability, though tensions remained high, and there were intermittent clashes and violations of the ceasefire.

In late 2020, the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War broke out, resulting in thousands of casualties and a significant Azerbaijani victory. An armistice was established by a tripartite ceasefire agreement on November 10, with Azerbaijan regaining all the occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh and capturing one-third of Nagorno-Karabakh itself.

Despite the ceasefire, tensions and hostilities continued, with Azerbaijan blockading Nagorno-Karabakh in December 2022 and launching a large-scale military offensive in September 2023, resulting in the dissolution of Artsakh and the displacement of almost the entire population of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia.

The conflict has been influenced and exacerbated by the involvement of external powers, including Russia, Turkey, and Iran, and the failure of international mediation efforts to produce a permanent solution. The ongoing dispute has had a profound impact on the region, causing widespread human suffering and displacement, and shaping the political and security landscape of the South Caucasus.

The Nakhchivan Military Base

The Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic is a landlocked exclave of Azerbaijan, with a population of 459,600. It is bordered by Armenia to the north and east, Iran to the southwest, and Turkey to the west. The region has a long history, dating back to about 1500 BC, and has been historically contested by Persians, Armenians, Mongols, and Turks.

The Nakhchivan Garrison was established on September 7, 1991, during the intensification of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, by order of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Heydar Aliyev. It consists of thousands of personnel consolidated into several branches, including the Separate Combined Arms Army, the Separate Border Division, the Separate Combined Arms Brigade of the Internal Troops, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, and the State Security Service.

The garrison regularly undergoes extensive training and has participated in joint exercises with Turkish troops, such as the Azerbaijan-Turkey joint tactical shooting exercise "Unshakable Brotherhood-2019." The Combined Army Training and Educational Center was opened in May 2018 to specifically train members of the garrison.

The Military Court of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic was established on May 27, 1992, and has been functioning under its current name since June 1, 2000. It has the power to consider cases as a court of first instance and performs the functions of the Military Court of the Azerbaijan Republic in grave crime cases.

The Armenian-Turkish diplomatic progress

The Armenian-Turkish relationship has been historically hostile, with no diplomatic relations between the two countries. However, in recent years, there have been efforts to normalise relations and reopen borders. Here is an overview of the Armenian-Turkish diplomatic progress:

2008-2009: A Brief Thaw

In 2008, Turkish President Abdullah Gül became the first Turkish head of state to visit Armenia, attending a football match between the two countries. This period also saw the signing of normalisation protocols in October 2009, which aimed to improve diplomatic relations and open borders.

2014: A Step Towards Reconciliation

In April 2014, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made a statement recognising the significance of April 24th for Armenians, describing the events of 1915 as "inhumane" and offering condolences. This marked a shift in Turkey's approach and was seen as a step towards reconciliation.

2021-2022: New Attempts at Normalisation

Following positive statements by Erdoğan and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in 2021, there was a renewed effort to normalise relations. This included the appointment of special envoys by both countries and direct bilateral negotiations. The focus has been on practical measures such as trade routes and borders, rather than broader historical reconciliation. Armenia has taken a "no preconditions" approach, removing direct linkages to issues like the Armenian genocide.

2023: A Border Crossing for Humanitarian Aid

In February 2023, Pashinyan called Erdoğan to express condolences regarding the earthquake in Turkey and offered Armenia's help. As a result, a border crossing was opened to allow the passage of humanitarian aid from Armenia to Turkey.

While there have been setbacks and challenges along the way, these developments represent progress towards normalising Armenian-Turkish relations and reopening borders.

Frequently asked questions