The Complex Friendship Between Pakistan And Afghanistan: A Delicate Balance

Pakistan and Afghanistan have historically had a strained relationship, with frequent border clashes and disputes over territory. Pakistan has been accused of supporting the Taliban, and in turn, Afghanistan has been accused of supporting terrorist groups that launch attacks on Pakistan. However, the two countries also have strong cultural, religious, and ethnic ties, and there have been efforts to improve relations, particularly through trade. The relationship between the countries is complex and multifaceted, with periods of cooperation and conflict.

The Taliban's relationship with Pakistan post-takeover

Pakistan and the Taliban have a complex and complicated relationship. Pakistan's intelligence service, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate of the army (ISI), has more influence over the Taliban than any other country or intelligence service. It provides a safe haven and sanctuary to the Taliban's leadership, advice on military and diplomatic issues, and assistance with fundraising. Pakistan has been intimately associated with the Taliban since its birth in the mid-1990s. The ISI provided support to Mullah Omar when he founded the organisation in Kandahar and trained him even earlier in the 1980s at one of its training camps for the mujahedin that fought the Soviet occupation of the country.

However, there are limits to Pakistani control of the Taliban. Mullah Omar, who calls himself the Commander of the Faithful, has never recognised the legitimacy of the Afghan-Pakistani border demarcated by the British in the 1890s, the so-called Durand line. The Afghan Taliban also provides some assistance to the Pakistani Taliban, which is engaged in an insurgency against the Pakistani army and ISI and is responsible for dozens of terrorist attacks inside Pakistani cities. The Pakistani Taliban recognises Mullah Omar as their emir, just like Al-Qaeda does.

The Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan has hurt Pakistan in several ways. Firstly, it has complicated Pakistan's relationship with its own religious groups and with Washington. Secondly, it has made it difficult for Pakistan to attract economic investment. Thirdly, Pakistan may become home to even more Afghan refugees as violence, fear, and displacement rise in Afghanistan. Finally, and most importantly, the Taliban's takeover has emboldened Islamist parties and groups within Pakistan's democracy and challenged the counter-extremism policies that Pakistani civilian and military leaders have attempted to implement.

The Taliban's takeover has also led to growing tension and a major crisis between Pakistan and the Taliban. The Taliban has defied Pakistan, its main state benefactor during the insurgency against the United States military and the deposed Afghan government, by challenging the status of the Afghan-Pakistan border and providing a haven to the anti-Pakistan insurgent group, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Tensions have mounted due to the TTP's growing attacks targeting Pakistani security forces in the months since the Taliban's takeover. In response to the TTP's spring offensive in April 2022, Pakistan carried out coordinated airstrikes inside Afghanistan at suspected TTP locations but ended up killing civilians. The Taliban summoned Islamabad's envoy in Kabul, and the group's defence minister, Mullah Yaqub, threatened retaliation.

The bottom line is that the Taliban is unwilling to act against the TTP in any meaningful way. Pakistan's use of airstrikes shows that it wanted to send a public message to the Taliban. However, the targeting capability of the airstrikes remains blunt, limiting its utility. More attacks that kill civilians can trigger a Taliban response and generate more recruits for the TTP. Given the concurrently metastasizing Baluch separatist threat in Pakistan, such a violent escalation will substantially add to Pakistan's security burdens amid a domestic economic crisis.

In the near term, Pakistan is likely to search for more coercive leverage against the Taliban. On the lower end of the spectrum, Pakistan may seek to manipulate the Taliban's internal politics by trying to marginalise Taliban leadership more supportive of the TTP. On the higher end, it can close border crossings to put an economic squeeze on the Taliban.

Pakistan's leverage over the Taliban

Pakistan has historically had significant influence over the Taliban, but the dynamics between the two have become increasingly strained and complex. While Pakistan has sought to exert leverage over the Taliban, the group's growing independence and pursuit of its own interests have challenged Pakistan's control. Here are some factors that highlight Pakistan's leverage over the Taliban:

• Shared History and Support: Pakistan's intelligence service, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), has a long history of supporting the Taliban since its inception in the mid-1990s. The ISI provided critical sanctuary, military advice, diplomatic support, and assistance with fundraising for the Taliban leadership. Pakistan was one of the few countries that recognised the Taliban's Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan as a legitimate government.
• Geographic Advantage : Pakistan shares a long, porous border with landlocked Afghanistan, which gives it unique geographic leverage. This border has facilitated the movement of individuals and resources between the two countries, allowing Pakistan to exert influence over Afghanistan's politics and economy.
• Economic Pressure: Pakistan is Afghanistan's main export market, accounting for over 50% of its exports. Pakistan has the ability to impose economic pain on the Taliban by scaling back economic and trade ties, tightening rules for transit trade, and disrupting border crossings, which contribute significantly to Afghanistan's customs revenues.
• Military and Intelligence Support: Pakistan's military and intelligence services have provided extensive support to the Taliban, including training, planning of military operations, and even direct combat support. Pakistani officers have fought alongside Taliban forces in Afghanistan and contributed to their effectiveness as a military force.
• Refugee Leverage: Pakistan's decision to expel a large number of Afghan refugees has been used as a pressure tactic against the Taliban. This move not only impacts Afghanistan's economy and social stability but also signals Pakistan's dissatisfaction with the Taliban's policies.
• Diplomatic Influence: Pakistan has historically advocated for the Taliban on the international stage and provided diplomatic support as their virtual emissaries abroad. However, with the Taliban's growing independence, Pakistan has threatened to revoke this support and not advocate for their recognition or engagement with the international community.
• Internal Factions: Pakistan has attempted to manipulate the Taliban's internal politics by trying to marginalise leaders more supportive of anti-Pakistan groups, such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Pakistan's influence over certain factions within the Taliban can be leveraged to exert pressure and create divisions.

However, it is important to note that the Taliban's growing independence and pursuit of its ideological agenda have challenged Pakistan's leverage. The Taliban's support for the TTP and other extremist groups, as well as their reluctance to make concessions, have strained relations. Additionally, the Taliban's direct dealings with other countries, including India and the United States, have reduced Pakistan's influence over their interactions with the outside world.

The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

The TTP has historically maintained close ties to senior al-Qaeda leaders, and its leaders have pledged allegiance to the Afghan Taliban. The TTP has been designated a Foreign Terrorist Organisation by the US, and is banned in the UK and Canada.

The TTP has been responsible for numerous attacks in Pakistan, including the 2014 Peshawar school massacre, and has targeted civilians and security forces in waves of suicide bombings, improvised explosive device blasts, targeted killings and other forms of attacks.

The TTP's leadership has changed several times since its founding. Baitullah Mehsud, the first TTP leader, was succeeded by Hakimullah Mehsud, who was in turn succeeded by Mullah Fazlullah. In 2020, the TTP underwent reorganisation and reunification under the leadership of Noor Wali Mehsud, who steered the group in a new direction, ordering assaults only on security and law enforcement personnel and sparing civilians.

The TTP has experienced a strong resurgence since the Afghan Taliban and US government signed a peace deal in February 2020, and has been further emboldened by the Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan. Since July 2020, ten militant groups opposed to the Pakistani state have merged with the TTP, and the group has stepped up its cross-border attacks into Pakistan.

The Durand Line border dispute

The Durand Line is a 2,640-kilometre (1,640-mile) border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, established in 1893 as the border between the Emirate of Afghanistan and the British Indian Empire. The agreement was signed by Mortimer Durand, a British diplomat, and Abdur Rahman Khan, the Emir of Afghanistan. The Durand Line was established to fix the limit of their respective spheres of influence and improve diplomatic relations and trade.

The Durand Line has been a source of tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan, as it cuts through the lands of the Pashtun people, dividing them into two separate countries. The Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan and have a significant presence in northwestern Pakistan. Afghanistan has encouraged the Pashtun people inside Pakistan to have their own separate state, and there is growing support for a separate country called Pashtunistan. The Durand Line has been internationally recognised as the western border of Pakistan, but it remains largely unrecognized in Afghanistan.

The dispute over the Durand Line has led to periodic skirmishes and tensions between Pakistani and Afghan security personnel, with each side accusing the other of insincerity in fighting terrorism. Violent clashes near border posts have resulted in casualties on both sides. Afghanistan has refused to recognise the Durand Line as the official border and has instead asserted claims over territories that lie between the line and the Indus River, comprising nearly 60 percent of Pakistani territory. This dispute has influenced Afghanistan's relations with the United States, as well as with Pakistan, leading to tensions and conflicts.

Pakistan has argued that the Durand Line is a legitimate border and that it has legally inherited the border as the successor state of British India. Pakistan's construction of a fence at the border, starting in 2017, has led to increased hostilities. The dispute over the Durand Line continues to be a matter of contention between Afghanistan and Pakistan, with no resolution in sight.

The Pashtun people

Pashtun culture is based on Pashtunwali, Islam, and the Pashto language. The Pashtunwali code includes traditional features such as courage, revenge, hospitality, and generosity to the defeated. The Pashtun people are known to be very social, and their society is based on kinship, with each tribe consisting of kinsmen who trace descent in the male bloodline from a common tribal ancestor.

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