The Enduring Conflict: Afghanistan's War And The Elusive Quest For Peace

Afghanistan's war defies solutions due to a combination of state collapse, civil conflict, ethnic disintegration, and multisided intervention, locking the country in a self-perpetuating cycle that may be beyond outside resolution. The war has now lasted over 20 years, becoming the longest war in US history.

The conflict was triggered by the September 11 attacks and consisted of three phases. The first phase was brief, lasting just two months and involving the toppling of the Taliban regime. The second phase, from 2002 to 2008, was marked by a US strategy to defeat the Taliban and rebuild core institutions of the Afghan state. The third phase, from 2008, turned to classic counterinsurgency doctrine, with a focus on protecting the population and reintegrating insurgents. However, this strategy largely failed, with insurgent attacks and civilian casualties remaining high.

The US and its allies faced several challenges in Afghanistan, including the strong position of the Taliban, the incompetence and corruption of the Afghan government, and the difficulty of imposing a new political system and security institutions on the country. Additionally, the US focus on Iraq after the ouster of the Taliban diverted resources and attention from Afghanistan, hindering reconstruction and nation-building efforts.

The war has resulted in thousands of casualties, the loss of human rights and freedoms, and a humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan. The rapid withdrawal of US troops and the collapse of the Afghan government have also raised questions about the potential for diplomacy and humanitarian aid to remedy the situation.

The war in Afghanistan is the longest war in US history

The war in Afghanistan was the longest war in US history, lasting 20 years. It began in 2001, triggered by the September 11 attacks, and consisted of three phases.

The first phase was brief, lasting just two months, and involved toppling the Taliban regime and al-Qaeda, perpetrators of the September 11 attacks. The second phase, from 2002 to 2008, focused on defeating the Taliban and rebuilding core institutions of the Afghan state. However, despite billions of dollars spent on material for the Afghan army, the Taliban continued to wage an insurgency from southern Afghanistan and across the border in Pakistan.

The third phase began in 2008 and involved a shift to classic counterinsurgency doctrine, with a temporary increase in US troop presence. This strategy aimed to protect the population from Taliban attacks and reintegrate insurgents into Afghan society. However, it largely failed to achieve its aims, with insurgent attacks and civilian casualties remaining high.

By the time the US and NATO combat mission ended in 2014, the war had become the longest in US history, with American military casualties including around 2,400 service members killed and over 20,700 wounded. The rapid success of the Taliban brought back memories of the fall of Saigon in 1975 and represented a significant blow to American foreign policy.

The US withdrawal from Afghanistan left a power vacuum, and the Taliban quickly seized control of the country. This raised concerns about a potential resurgence of international terrorism and a rollback of human rights gains, particularly for women and girls. The war's legacy includes a humanitarian crisis, with Afghans facing food shortages, economic collapse, and a rollback of basic rights and freedoms.

The US failed to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people

The US military believed that building roads, schools, and governing institutions would be enough to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. However, they failed to recognize that these material developments were not in line with the values and culture of the Afghan people, which were rooted in their religion and philosophy. The US leadership saw the Afghan tribal Muslims as embryonic Westerners, believing that with the right circumstances, the Afghan people's appreciation for a division between religion and state, feminism, pluralism, and tolerance would take root and blossom. This was a fundamental misunderstanding of the unique and ancient worldview and set of principles held by the Afghan people, which resulted in the US leadership acting in ways that ultimately alienated everyday Afghans.

The US also failed to recognize that the counterinsurgency strategy was not suitable for the circumstances in Afghanistan. Counterinsurgency strategies are most effective in a colonial or domestically authoritarian political environment, where there is a vested interest in the outcome of counterinsurgency efforts. In Afghanistan, there was no comparable constituency driving US actions, and long-term investment, both political and financial, was meagre. The US did not have deep ties of patronage or information networks in Afghanistan, and their influence largely derived from the money and force they deployed.

Furthermore, the US military's aid projects in contested areas of Afghanistan actually increased the level of violence carried out by insurgents against civilians and US troops. Insurgents had a strong incentive to sabotage these initiatives and punish civilians who collaborated. This resulted in increased bombings, insurgent actions, and improvised explosive device (IED) incidents against US forces.

Overall, the US failed to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people due to a lack of understanding of Afghan culture and values, an unsuitable counterinsurgency strategy, and counterproductive aid projects that increased violence in contested areas.

The US underestimated the level of corruption and incompetence of the Afghan government

The US government's anti-corruption efforts in Afghanistan were largely ineffective, as they failed to address the systemic and entrenched nature of corruption in the country. The US was slow to acknowledge the problem, and its interventions often lacked coherence and political will. The US also failed to adequately train and equip the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), which faced significant challenges in maintaining security and suffered heavy casualties.

The US's initial intervention in Afghanistan, triggered by the September 11 attacks, aimed to topple the Taliban regime and dismantle al-Qaeda. However, over time, the mission evolved into nation-building and counterinsurgency efforts. The US attempted to implement centralized models of governance and security institutions that were inappropriate for Afghanistan's history and political culture.

The US also underestimated the strength of the Taliban, who had a solid base of support among nationalistic, religious, and conservative Pashtuns. The Taliban's proficiency at low-cost insurgency, combined with the US's focus on attrition warfare, resulted in high civilian casualties and friction with the Afghan government and population.

The US's failure to adequately address corruption and incompetence in the Afghan government, as well as its misguided strategies, contributed to the war's defiance of solutions and the eventual collapse of the Afghan government and military.

The US was unable to prevent the rapid Taliban success throughout the countryside and cities

• The Taliban's ability to inspire Afghans to fight, drawing on Islamic teachings and a history of resistance to outsiders. This tapped into a sense of Afghan identity and national pride, which was at odds with the US-backed government.
• The US's initial success in toppling the Taliban regime led to overconfidence, causing them to shift their focus to Iraq and underestimate the Taliban's ability to regroup.
• The US failed to address key issues such as corruption, poor governance, and human rights abuses, which fuelled resentment and support for the Taliban.
• The US military strategy was flawed, with a focus on attrition warfare and civilian casualties that caused friction with the Afghan government and population.
• The US attempted to impose inappropriate political and security systems on Afghanistan, rather than working with traditional forms of governance and defence.
• The US set aspirational goals for societal transformation that could not be achieved, particularly in rural areas.
• The US presence in Afghanistan was not adequately resourced or sustained, with a focus on short-term gains rather than long-term stability.
• The US failed to adequately train and support the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), leading to high casualty rates and a lack of preparedness to counter the Taliban.

The US military and foreign policy communities underestimated the unwillingness and inability of the Afghan army to defend itself

The US military and foreign policy communities' underestimation of the Afghan army's unwillingness and inability to defend itself against the Taliban has been a critical factor in the war's defiance of solutions.

The US spent over $83 billion trying to build a strong and integrated national army in Afghanistan, only to see it disintegrate in a matter of days following the US military withdrawal. This raises significant questions about the effectiveness of the Defense Department's advise-and-assist programs. The rapid collapse of the Afghan army indicates a failure to address the underlying issues of corruption and grievances that provided the Taliban with a resilient support base.

The US-funded political and military leadership in Afghanistan had ample time to develop a robust strategy to defend the country after international combat missions ended in 2014. However, the speed and intensity of the Taliban's advance exposed a lack of preparedness and a failure to capitalize on early opportunities when the Taliban was in disarray and public support for the new Afghan government was relatively high.

The Afghan army faced challenges with recruitment and training, resulting in a small force that struggled to counter the Taliban's attacks. The Bush administration acknowledged the mistake of keeping the army too small to avoid burdening the Afghan government with unsustainable expenses. This oversight, coupled with overconfidence, hindered the peace process and contributed to the cycle of violence and fragmentation in the country.

The Taliban's ideological advantage and the Afghan government's inability to match their inspiration further exacerbated the situation. The Taliban's willingness to fight and die for their cause resonated with many Afghans, giving them an edge that the US military might could not counter. The US intervention in Afghanistan, driven by the emotional reaction to the September 11 attacks, ultimately failed to achieve its mission of punishing those responsible and ensuring the country would not harbor international terrorists.

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