The Afghanistan-Pakistan Borderlands: A War Within A War

Pakistan and Afghanistan have a long history of conflict, with Pakistan's military leaders and intelligence agencies playing a significant role in supporting the Taliban. Pakistan's intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), has been a key player in providing financial resources, training, weapons, and logistical support to the Taliban. The country's porous border with Afghanistan has also facilitated the movement of men and resources, contributing to cross-border smuggling and illegal activities.

In recent years, the relationship between Pakistan and the Taliban has become strained, with the Taliban's refusal to form an inclusive government and their violation of women's rights drawing widespread condemnation. Additionally, the release of members of the Pakistani Taliban, known as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), from Afghan jails has further escalated tensions. The TTP has sought to establish an Islamist government in Pakistan and poses significant security threats, leading to speculation about potential Pakistani military strikes against the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.

While Pakistan has denied providing military support to the Taliban, there is widespread skepticism about these denials. The Pakistani military's support for the Taliban is driven by a desire to counter Indian influence in Afghanistan and undercut Pashtun nationalism. However, the Taliban's growing strength and independence have created challenges for Pakistan, and the future of their relationship remains uncertain.

Pakistan's support of the Taliban

Historical Context

Pakistan has a history of involvement in Afghanistan, dating back to the early 1970s. During the Soviet-Afghan War in the 1980s, Pakistan served as a frontline state, hosting over two million Afghan refugees and providing a base for the mujahidin fighting against Soviet intervention. Pakistan's intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), played a significant role during this period.

Military and Financial Support

Pakistan has been accused of providing military and financial support to the Taliban, despite official denials. The ISI has allegedly offered assistance in various forms, including training, weapons, logistical support, and safe havens in Pakistani territory. The porous border between the two countries has facilitated the movement of personnel and resources. Additionally, private-sector actors in Pakistan are believed to provide financial assistance to the Taliban.

Strategic Objectives

Pakistan's support for the Taliban is driven by multiple strategic objectives. Firstly, Pakistan seeks to counter the influence of its rival, India, in Afghanistan. By supporting the Taliban, Pakistan aims to gain leverage and establish a friendly government in Afghanistan that would deny India a foothold in the region. Secondly, Pakistan aims to suppress Pashtun nationalism by supporting Islamist groups like the Taliban, as Pashtun nationalists have sought to carve out an independent Pashtun state from Pakistani and Afghan territory.

Recent Developments

With the Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan in 2021, tensions have arisen between the two groups. The Taliban has defied Pakistan by challenging the status of the Afghan-Pakistan border and providing haven to anti-Pakistan insurgent groups, such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). This has led to an increase in terrorist attacks in Pakistan, straining the relationship between the two countries.

International Implications

The complex dynamics between Pakistan and the Taliban have significant implications for the region and the broader international community. The United States, in particular, faces a complex situation due to its bilateral relationship with Pakistan and its strategic partnership with India. Additionally, China's growing interest in the region adds another layer of complexity.

In conclusion, Pakistan's support for the Taliban has been multifaceted and driven by strategic objectives related to regional influence and domestic stability. However, the evolving dynamics between the two groups and the international pressures at play create a complex and challenging situation for all involved parties.

The Taliban's double game with Pakistan and the US

The Taliban has long-standing ties to Pakistan's premiere intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which was instrumental in the group's creation during the Afghan Civil War in the 1990s. The ISI has been the Taliban's principal external patron, providing financial resources, training, weapons, logistical support, and safe havens in Pakistani territory. This support has been crucial to the Taliban's ability to wage an insurgency against the Afghan state and international forces.

Despite Pakistan's denials, it is widely believed that the country continues to provide sanctuary and diplomatic support to the Taliban. Members of the Taliban's leadership council safely reside in Pakistan and can freely move men and materiel into Afghanistan. The Taliban has also reportedly used Pakistani passports to travel abroad and owns lucrative real estate holdings and significant business interests in Pakistani cities.

The US, on the other hand, has been an adversary of the Taliban, particularly following the September 11 attacks and the group's refusal to hand over Osama bin Laden. The US has demanded that Pakistan use its influence over the Taliban to persuade them to accept a power-sharing agreement with the Afghan government. However, Pakistan has done little to restrain the Taliban from their relentless campaign to take over Afghanistan by force.

The Taliban has also attempted to pressure Pakistan by wooing India, Pakistan's arch-rival. Additionally, the group has refused to compromise with Kabul and has carried out attacks in Pakistan, resulting in increased tensions between the two countries.

The double game played by the Taliban has had significant implications for the region, with the group's resurgence causing instability and violence in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Pakistan's use of air power and drones against insurgents

However, the use of air power in counter-insurgency operations is a delicate issue. A basic principle followed by many countries is the avoidance of air strikes against one's own nationals, as it can aggravate the insurgency situation and lead to civilian casualties. Pakistan has generally adhered to this principle, refraining from using its Air Force for air strikes against insurgents and instead deploying ground forces for counter-insurgency operations. Nevertheless, there have been instances where Pakistan's use of air power has drawn criticism, such as in the case of Operation Blue Star in 1984.

The use of drones, on the other hand, has become an increasingly important tool in Pakistan's counter-insurgency arsenal. Pakistan's first use of armed drones surprised many, as it had previously been ambivalent about drone warfare due to ethical concerns. However, with the CIA's offer to kill the insurgent leader Nek Mohammad, Pakistan gained the right to use drones in Waziristan to target its enemies. Drone strikes have been effective in reducing insurgent attacks and casualties, as they can pinpoint targets and compromise insurgent movement and communication abilities. Small, unarmed surveillance drones, or "micro-UAVs", are used to monitor potential targets at close range for extended periods without detection. This technology increases the accuracy of strikes and reduces the likelihood of civilian casualties by targeting insurgents in vehicles rather than residences.

While Pakistan's use of drones has shown effectiveness, there are concerns about the potential for interservice rivalry between the Army, Air Force, and Navy, each of which has its own UAVs. Additionally, the use of drones in counter-insurgency operations inside Afghanistan carries significant risks, including accidental civilian casualties and sovereignty issues, which could lead to open conflict with the Afghan Taliban. With the Taliban already facing criticism for providing sanctuaries to terrorists, Pakistani military actions could further embolden Islamic State and other militant groups in the region.

The Taliban's refusal to accept the Pakistan-Afghanistan border

The Taliban's refusal to accept the Durand Line, the internationally recognised border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, has led to increased tensions between the two countries. The 2,640-kilometre border was drawn by the British Empire in 1893 and has been a source of conflict ever since. While Pakistan argues that the Durand Line is a legal international border, the Taliban, like many Afghan governments before them, refuse to recognise it as such. The Taliban argue that the Durand Line disrupts the Pashtun community's trade and free movement, leaving them divided between countries.

The Durand Line cuts through Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan in Pakistan, and the northeastern and southern provinces of Afghanistan. The region is home to Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), often considered the deadliest terrorist group in Pakistan, which has killed thousands of Pakistanis since 2007. The TTP is associated with the Taliban, and many of its leaders have sought refuge in Afghanistan.

Pakistan had likely hoped that a Taliban government in Kabul would accept the Durand Line as legitimate. However, this has not been the case. The Taliban has not only refused to accept the border's legality but has also attacked Pakistanis building a fence along it. While the Taliban's stance has popular support domestically, it is unlikely to be a sustainable strategy as the country is dependent on Pakistan for military, humanitarian, and government support.

The refusal to accept the Durand Line will likely prompt the Pakistani government to restrict some support to Afghanistan. This feeling is reinforced by the failure of Pakistan and the TTP to sign a peace agreement, with Islamabad blaming the Taliban for the increase in attacks by the TTP. Pakistan's Army Chief, General Qamar Bajwa, claimed that the Taliban and the TTP are "two faces of the same coin".

The Taliban's stance on the Durand Line will likely increase domestic support, especially in the border region, where opposition to the line is dominant. However, it is unlikely to be in the Taliban's interests to encourage the TTP to conduct more attacks in Pakistan, given their dependence on the country. Nevertheless, the Taliban's refusal to accept the border has serious implications for the region's stability and will likely lead to more border skirmishes.

The Taliban's pressure on Pakistan by wooing the Indians

After 9/11, American and allied forces intervened in Afghanistan with a UN mandate and toppled the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The defeated Taliban fighters were ordered by Mullah Omar to scatter and avoid further direct confrontation with the enemy while they regrouped. The leadership and the hard core fled south from Kandahar into Pakistan. Most relocated in Baluchistan around the city of Quetta, where Omar himself settled. He began rebuilding his Taliban in exile. By 2004, it resumed the war inside Afghanistan with critical help and assistance from Pakistan.

Pakistan's intelligence service, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate of the army (ISI), has more influence over the Taliban than any other country or intelligence service. It provides critical safe haven and sanctuary to the groups’ leadership, advice on military and diplomatic issues, and assistance with fundraising. The ISI is thoroughly aware of Taliban activities and the whereabouts of all senior Taliban personnel.

However, there are some limits to Pakistani control of the Afghan Taliban. Even when Mullah Omar was in power in Afghanistan in the late 1990s, he refused to recognise the legitimacy of the Afghan-Pakistani border demarcated by the British in the 1890s, the so-called Durand line. The Afghan Taliban provides some assistance to the Pakistani Taliban, which is engaged in an insurgency against the army and ISI and is responsible for dozens of terrorist attacks inside Pakistani cities. The Pakistani Taliban recognises Mullah Omar as their emir just like al-Qaeda does.

The Taliban has made little effort to conceal their support for the Pakistani Taliban. Some argue that at the heart of the Taliban-Pakistani Taliban relationship is an ideological alignment on a jihadist project seeking to implement a Shariah-compliant political order through force. The Pakistani Taliban subordinating themselves to the Taliban by pledging allegiance to Taliban chief adds to the alignment. Others point to history: Many in the Pakistani Taliban supported the Taliban in its nascence, including by providing suicide bombers. The Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban also share al-Qaida as an ally. There are strong interpersonal, wartime bonds between the influential Haqqani family and the Pakistani Taliban and between some southern Taliban leaders and Pakistani Taliban’s political leadership. There is abundant ethnic amity, built around tribal ties and disdain of the Pakistani state — at least in the rank-and-file and middle tier of the Taliban.

The bottom line is that the Taliban are unwilling to act against the Pakistani Taliban in any meaningful way. The Taliban's support for the Pakistani Taliban and Pakistan’s emerging pressure campaign sets the Taliban-Pakistan relationship on a path of long-term deterioration.

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