The Afghan Conundrum: Reflections On A War Won And Lost

The war in Afghanistan was America's longest war, lasting 20 years and costing the lives of 2,443 American troops, 1,144 allied troops, 66,000 Afghan troops, and 48,000 Afghan civilians. The US government spent \$837 billion on warfighting and \$145 billion on rebuilding Afghanistan.

The war began in 2001, triggered by the September 11 attacks, and consisted of three phases. The first phase was to topple the Taliban, which was achieved in two months. The second phase, from 2002 to 2008, was to defeat the Taliban militarily and rebuild core institutions of the Afghan state. The third phase, from 2008, was a turn to classic counterinsurgency doctrine, with a focus on protecting the population from Taliban attacks and reintegrating insurgents into Afghan society.

Despite the initial success of the first two phases, the third phase largely failed to achieve its aims. Insurgent attacks and civilian casualties remained high, and Afghan military and police units taking over security duties appeared ill-prepared to hold off the Taliban. By the time the US and NATO combat mission formally ended in December 2014, the war had become the longest in US history.

The US lost the war in Afghanistan due to a lack of understanding of the country's social, economic, and political dynamics

The US government continuously struggled to develop and implement a coherent strategy for what it hoped to achieve in Afghanistan. The challenges US officials faced in creating long-term, sustainable improvements raise questions about their ability to devise, implement, and evaluate reconstruction strategies. The division of responsibilities among agencies did not always take into account each agency's strengths and weaknesses. For example, the Department of State is supposed to lead reconstruction efforts, but it lacked the expertise and resources to take the lead and own the strategy in Afghanistan.

US officials were consistently operating in the dark, often because of the difficulty of collecting the necessary information. They clumsily forced Western technocratic models onto Afghan economic institutions, trained security forces in advanced weapon systems they could not understand, imposed formal rule of law in a country that addressed 80-90% of its disputes through informal means, and often struggled to understand or mitigate the cultural and social barriers to supporting women and girls.

The US government also failed to recognize the importance of religion and Afghan identity in the conflict. The Taliban had an advantage in inspiring Afghans to fight. Their call to fight foreign occupiers, steeped in references to Islamic teachings, resonated with Afghan identity. For Afghans, jihad—more accurately understood as "resistance" or "struggle" than the caricatured meaning it has acquired in the United States—has historically been a means of defense against oppression by outsiders, part of their endurance against invader after invader. Even though Islam preaches unity, justice, and peace, the Taliban were able to tie themselves to religion and to Afghan identity in a way that a government allied with non-Muslim foreign occupiers could not match.

The very presence of Americans in Afghanistan trod on a sense of Afghan identity that incorporated national pride, a long history of fighting outsiders, and a religious commitment to defend the homeland. It prodded men and women to defend their honor, their religion, and their home. It dared young men to fight. It sapped the will of Afghan soldiers and police. The Taliban's ability to link their cause to the very meaning of being Afghan was a crucial factor in America's defeat.

The US military—and perhaps American society—much prefers planning for classic, conventional wars like World War II. In some fundamental way, World War II is what Americans think war ought to look like: with a fairly clear enemy, progress on the battlefield, and a surrender ceremony. It is now a museum piece of war and not relevant to what war looks like today. The US tends to aim high, achieve a narrow goal, and then go home with as much dignity as possible.

The US government did not understand the Afghan context and, therefore, failed to tailor its efforts accordingly. This lack of understanding of Afghanistan's social, economic, and political dynamics was a major factor in the US's defeat in the war.

The US underestimated the time and resources needed to rebuild Afghanistan, leading to short-term solutions and increased corruption

The US government's efforts to rebuild Afghanistan were undermined by its underestimation of the time and resources required, leading to short-term solutions and increased corruption.

The US government's reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan were characterised by a lack of coherent strategy and an inability to implement long-term, sustainable improvements. This was due, in part, to a poor division of labour between government agencies. For example, the Department of State, which was supposed to lead reconstruction efforts, lacked the necessary expertise and resources. In contrast, the Department of Defense had the required resources and expertise but was not suited to manage large-scale reconstruction missions. This resulted in weak strategy and a lack of coordination between agencies, which further contributed to the problems faced by the US in Afghanistan.

The US government consistently underestimated the amount of time and resources required to rebuild Afghanistan. This led to the adoption of short-term solutions, such as the surge of troops, money, and resources from 2009 to 2011. US officials prioritised their own political preferences over what was realistically achievable, given the constraints and conditions on the ground. This resulted in reckless compromises, perverse incentives to spend quickly, and a focus on short-term, unsustainable goals.

The lack of a long-term strategy and the pressure to spend quickly increased corruption and reduced the effectiveness of programs. Afghan institutions and powerbrokers found ways to co-opt funds for their own purposes, which only worsened the problems these programs were meant to address. US officials often failed to recognise or address these dynamics, leading to continued drawdowns in troops and resources despite the Afghan government's inability to address instability or prevent its worsening.

The US government's failure to develop and implement a coherent strategy, coupled with its underestimation of the time and resources needed, ultimately undermined its reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and contributed to increased corruption and reduced program effectiveness.

The US government's poor division of labour resulted in a weak strategy, with no single agency having the necessary expertise to develop and manage the strategy

The poor division of labour resulted in a weak strategy, with the US government continuously struggling to develop and implement a coherent strategy for what it hoped to achieve. The challenges US officials faced in creating long-term, sustainable improvements raised questions about the ability of US government agencies to devise, implement, and evaluate reconstruction strategies. The US government was simply not equipped to undertake something this ambitious in such an uncompromising environment, no matter the budget.

The US failed to tailor its reconstruction efforts to the Afghan context, instead imposing Western models that were ill-suited to the country

The US government's reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan were often not tailored to the Afghan context, instead imposing Western models that were ill-suited to the country.

One example of this is the US government's attempts to impose Western technocratic models on Afghan economic institutions. This included training security forces in advanced weapon systems that they could not understand or maintain. The US government also imposed formal rule of law on a country that addressed 80 to 90% of its disputes through informal means. Furthermore, the US struggled to understand or mitigate the cultural and social barriers to supporting women and girls in Afghanistan.

Another example of the US government's failure to tailor its reconstruction efforts is the building of unsustainable institutions and infrastructure projects. The US government often failed to ensure that its projects were sustainable over the long term. Billions of reconstruction dollars were wasted as projects went unused or fell into disrepair. Demands to make fast progress incentivized US officials to identify and implement short-term projects with little consideration for host government capacity and long-term sustainability.

The US government also failed to understand the Afghan context in terms of social, economic, and political dynamics. This lack of understanding meant that US officials often empowered powerbrokers who preyed on the population or diverted US assistance away from its intended recipients to enrich and empower themselves and their allies.

The US military's strength and precision do not translate to an ability to shape political realities on the ground

The US military's strength and precision are not enough to win a war. The war in Afghanistan was a "Clausewitzian" defeat. The US military's strength and precision did not translate to an ability to shape political realities on the ground. The Taliban had sanctuaries in neighbouring Pakistan and support from Islamabad, which meant they could withdraw when necessary, limit their costs, and wait it out.

The US military's strength and precision were also not enough to counter the Taliban's ability to link their cause to the very meaning of being Afghan. The Taliban's ability to tie their cause to the very meaning of being Afghan was a crucial factor in America's defeat. The US military's strength and precision could not compete with the Taliban's ability to mobilise Afghans to defend their honour, their religion, and their homes.

The US military's strength and precision were also not enough to overcome the challenges posed by the complex civil war in Afghanistan. The nature of war has changed since World War II. Nearly all wars now are civil wars, complex arenas of counterinsurgency and terrorism. The US military usually wins wars between countries that wear uniforms and meet on the battlefield. But in complex civil wars, the US military has really struggled.

The US military's strength and precision were further undermined by the lack of a clear and coherent strategy for what it hoped to achieve in Afghanistan. The US government continuously struggled to develop and implement a coherent strategy. The US military's strength and precision were also not enough to overcome the challenges posed by the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. The US government was often overwhelmed by the magnitude of rebuilding a country that had already seen decades of conflict and brutality.

Finally, the US military's strength and precision were not enough to counter the Taliban's greater commitment to the struggle. The Taliban were more committed to the struggle than America because, for the US, the conflict in Afghanistan was just one of many different challenges around the world. But for the Taliban, it was the only thing that mattered.

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