The Afghanistan Conundrum: A Study Of Unique Conflict Characteristics

The conflict in Afghanistan has kept the country in a near-continuous state of armed conflict since the 1970s. The war has been characterised by a series of events, including the collapse of the Kingdom of Afghanistan in 1973, the Soviet–Afghan War from 1979 to 1989, and the subsequent Afghan Civil War from 1989 to 2001. The US-led war in Afghanistan, which began in 2001, was triggered by the September 11 attacks and consisted of three phases: toppling the Taliban, defeating the Taliban militarily, and implementing a counterinsurgency doctrine.

The conflict in Afghanistan has resulted in significant casualties, with about 243,000 people killed since 2001, including more than 70,000 civilians. The war has also caused immense destruction to the economy, public health, security, and infrastructure in Afghanistan. The US has spent an estimated $132 billion on development assistance, but much of this money has been wasted, stolen, or failed to address the underlying issues.

The Afghan conflict can be compared to other conflicts in terms of their causes, consequences, and strategies employed. For example, the Soviet–Afghan War can be compared to the Vietnam War in terms of the challenges faced by the Soviet army in fighting on mountainous terrain. Additionally, the US-led war in Afghanistan has been compared to the war in Iraq, with some arguing that the focus on Iraq led to a loss of focus on Afghanistan and hindered efforts to stabilise the country.

Overall, the Afghan conflict has been characterised by a complex interplay of political, military, and social factors, resulting in a prolonged state of armed conflict with significant human and economic costs.

The Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan in 2021 marked the end of the US's longest war

The US-led invasion toppled the Taliban government, but the group did not disappear. Instead, they regrouped, with their leadership relocating to southern Afghanistan and across the border to Pakistan. From these bases, the Taliban waged an insurgency against the US-backed government in Kabul, Afghan national security forces, and international coalition troops.

Despite the US spending over a trillion dollars and losing more than 2,400 American service members, the war was marked by repeated strategic missteps, a lack of consistency across four administrations, and a failure to address corruption and human rights abuses.

The Taliban gradually regained strength and, by 2021, controlled or contested nearly half of the country. In April 2021, US President Joe Biden announced the withdrawal of US troops by September of that year. The Afghan security forces, despite billions of dollars in US support, were unable to withstand the Taliban's offensive and collapsed within weeks.

On August 15, 2021, the Taliban entered Kabul, and President Ashraf Ghani fled the country. This triggered a chaotic evacuation effort as thousands of Afghans and foreign nationals rushed to the airport, desperate to leave. The evacuation was marred by a deadly suicide attack that killed over 180 people, including 13 American troops.

The Taliban's rapid takeover took many by surprise, including US officials and allies, and signalled the end of America's longest war. The conflict resulted in immense human suffering, with tens of thousands of Afghan civilians killed and millions displaced. The war also had a devastating impact on Afghanistan's infrastructure, economy, and social fabric.

The Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan was facilitated by support from Pakistan

Pakistan's support for the Taliban stems from its desire to have a Pakistan-friendly government in Afghanistan. Pakistan has historically viewed an ideologically and religiously like-minded Afghanistan as a necessary bulwark against its traditional rival, India. Pakistan also wanted to contain Pashtun nationalism and prevent the emergence of an independent Pashtun state from Pakistani and Afghan territory.

The Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan has been detrimental to Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. The Taliban has refused to accept the Durand Line, which separates Pakistani Pashtun-dominated territories from Afghanistan. The Taliban's close ties with the Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP), also known as the Pakistani Taliban, have also caused friction between the two countries. The TTP is responsible for the deaths of thousands of Pakistani civilians and has vowed to continue fighting until it secures an independent Pashtunistan.

The Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan was also facilitated by the US's rushed withdrawal

The Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan was facilitated by the rushed withdrawal of US and NATO troops, which left the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) vulnerable to attack. The US-led coalition formally ended its combat mission in 2014, putting the ANDSF in charge of Afghanistan's security. However, the ANDSF faced significant challenges in holding territory and defending population centers.

In February 2020, the US government and the Taliban signed the Doha Agreement, which set a timeline for the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan. Under the agreement, the US pledged to withdraw all troops within 14 months. In return, the Taliban pledged to prevent territory under its control from being used by terrorist groups and to enter negotiations with the Afghan government. However, no official ceasefire was put in place.

In April 2021, US President Joe Biden announced that US military forces would leave Afghanistan by September 2021. As US forces began to withdraw in May, the Taliban stepped up attacks on ANDSF bases and outposts and rapidly seized territory. By the end of July 2021, the US had completed nearly 95% of its withdrawal, leaving just 650 troops to protect the US embassy in Kabul.

In the summer of 2021, the Taliban continued its offensive, threatening government-controlled urban areas and seizing border crossings. On August 6, 2021, the Taliban captured the capital of southern Nimruz Province, the first provincial capital to fall. Within days, the Taliban captured more than ten other capitals, leaving Kabul the only major urban area under government control. On August 15, 2021, over two weeks before the official US withdrawal deadline, Taliban fighters entered Kabul, leading to the collapse of the Afghan government and the flight of President Ashraf Ghani from the country.

The speed of the Taliban's territorial gains and the collapse of the ANDSF surprised US officials and allies. The Biden administration authorized the deployment of an additional 5,000 troops to assist with the evacuation of US and allied personnel, as well as Afghans who had worked with the US. On August 31, 2021, the Pentagon announced the completion of the US troop withdrawal.

The rushed US withdrawal left the ANDSF ill-prepared to maintain security and vulnerable to attack by the Taliban. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction cited the decision to withdraw US forces and contractors as the "single most important near-term factor" in the ANDSF's collapse. The report also noted that the ANDSF was poorly prepared due to factors such as the creation of US long-term dependencies and Afghan corruption.

The Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan was facilitated by the US's failure to negotiate with the Taliban

Firstly, the US failed to negotiate with the Taliban due to an intelligence failure. The Taliban's rapid takeover of Afghanistan, including its capital and the presidential palace, suggests that US military intelligence failed in its assessment of the situation. The Taliban pre-positioned equipment and materials, organised, planned and executed a massive offensive since early May before beginning its final assault, while US officials said the local government and military forces should be able to hold out for six months to a year.

Secondly, the US's decision to withdraw troops from Afghanistan was a key factor in the Taliban's takeover. The news from the Biden administration of the full US withdrawal sped up the Taliban's takeover. When the US announced a total withdrawal, it sent a signal to Afghan soldiers and police that the end was near, and many chose to give in to the Taliban rather than fight.

Thirdly, the US failed to understand the tribal dynamics in Afghanistan, and the strength of the Taliban. The Taliban had become much more effective since the 1990s, and had grown in numbers while developing new strategies. The Taliban also let ground commanders make decisions, and brought people into captured territories to provide small-scale social services to the residents.

Finally, the US failed to address the corruption and military weakness of the Afghan government and security forces. The Afghan National Army was comprised of units that were systemically corrupt, had no effective command and control, and did not know how many people were in their units. Many army units would sell their equipment to the Taliban for cash, and there were frequent desertions that went unaccounted for, leaving inflated troop numbers on the books.

The Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan was facilitated by the US's failure to adequately train the Afghan army

The Afghanistan conflict, which has kept the country in a near-continuous state of armed conflict since the 1970s, has seen various phases, including the Soviet-Afghan conflict, the Afghan Civil War, and the recent Taliban takeover. The Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, which established their control over the entirety of Afghanistan for the first time, was facilitated by multiple factors, including the US's failure to adequately train the Afghan army.

The US's $83 billion effort to train and equip the Afghan military faced several shortcomings. Firstly, there was a lack of focus on imparting higher-level expertise in logistics, planning, training, and command control, with an excessive emphasis on tactical infantry skills. This neglect of strategic-level training left the Afghan military reliant on US support for crucial areas like airpower, intelligence, and logistics. Secondly, the US training effort struggled due to language and cultural barriers, and the trainers were more suited to training soldiers rather than police, impacting local-level security. Moreover, the pervasive corruption and lack of education in Afghanistan posed additional challenges.

The US decision to withdraw troops and abandon the Afghan military severely demoralized the Afghan forces, as they had grown accustomed to relying on US assistance. This demoralization, coupled with the inadequate training that failed to instill the necessary skills for effective resistance, contributed to the rapid collapse of the Afghan army in the face of the Taliban offensive. Many Afghan troops chose to surrender or avoid risking their lives for what appeared to be a futile cause.

The failure of the US to adequately train the Afghan army can be attributed to a lack of strategic foresight and understanding of the local context. This oversight led to a misplaced focus on tactical skills over the higher-level expertise necessary to sustain a resilient military force. The consequences of this failure were evident in the swift fall of provincial capitals and the Taliban's unprecedented control over Afghanistan.

In conclusion, the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan was facilitated by a combination of factors, including the shortcomings in the US training program for the Afghan army, the sudden withdrawal of US support, and the resulting demoralization of the Afghan forces. These factors critically undermined the ability of the Afghan military to mount an effective defense against the Taliban's offensive, leading to their rapid collapse and the subsequent Taliban rule.

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