The Broken Promise Of Afghanistan: A Nation In Shambles

Afghanistan is often described as a failed state, a term that was first used to describe Somalia in the 1990s. The country has experienced a turbulent history since the 1979 Soviet invasion, with the creation of a state façade that collapsed as soon as international support was withdrawn. The country's landlocked geography, bordering Pakistan, a key backer of the Taliban, and Iran, whose leaders are more concerned with embarrassing the US, has also hindered attempts at nation-building.

Afghanistan's economy is another major factor in its status as a failed state. The country has no comparative advantage in any lawful trade, with narcotics, illegal mining, and logging providing the most significant income streams. The absence of profitable alternatives has made it difficult to establish a legitimate state, as economically significant actors oppose the extension of state power.

Additionally, Afghanistan is a complex society encompassing several ethnic groups, each with its own borders, making it challenging to manage internal dynamics and feuds between clans. The arrival of well-armed international troops attempting to resolve disputes further perpetuated conflict. The country has also struggled with corruption, with individuals within the state apparatus benefiting from illegal activities.

The lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people has also contributed to the country's status as a failed state. The 2004 Constitution created a centralised system of governance that provided citizens with limited opportunities to participate meaningfully in their government. The international community's focus on fighting insurgency and consolidating power, rather than democracy-building, further undermined state legitimacy.

The rise of warlords and the Taliban has also played a significant role in Afghanistan's failure as a state. The Taliban filled the power vacuum left by the collapse of the central communist government, but they failed to build state institutions and focused on maintaining military cohesion, preventing the establishment of a functioning state.

Overall, the combination of geographical challenges, economic reliance on illicit activities, complex societal dynamics, corruption, lack of state legitimacy, and the rise of warlords and the Taliban have contributed to Afghanistan's status as a failed state.

Lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people

Afghanistan is considered a failed state due to a multitude of factors, one of which is the lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people. This lack of legitimacy stems from various issues, including the centralized political institutions imposed after the 2001 US invasion, the failure to establish meaningful democratic processes, and the presence of corruption within the government.

The centralized political institutions imposed by external powers, particularly the US, undermined citizen trust in the government. The Afghan people had little opportunity to participate in or oversee their government, leading to a widening gap between the rhetoric of the US intervention and the realities faced by citizens. This dynamic was further exacerbated by the influx of vast amounts of foreign aid, which fostered corruption and weakened the legitimacy of the Afghan state.

Additionally, international efforts to establish democracy in Afghanistan fell short. The focus on fighting insurgency and consolidating power took precedence over democracy-building, and the creation of parallel state institutions further undermined state legitimacy. The international community's failure to recognize and incorporate Afghanistan's diverse ethnic groups and longstanding customs into the political system also contributed to the lack of legitimacy.

The intemperate rule of President Ashraf Ghani further contributed to the state's lack of legitimacy. Ghani's authoritarian tendencies, discrimination against ethnic minorities, and failure to address corruption alienated the Afghan people and weakened their trust in the government.

The absence of legitimate state institutions created a vacuum that the Taliban was able to exploit. The Taliban's messaging resonated with the grievances of the people, exposing the gulf between the government and the citizens. Ultimately, the lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people contributed significantly to the collapse of the Afghan state and the resurgence of the Taliban.

Failure to build state institutions

The failure to build state institutions in Afghanistan can be attributed to several factors, including the country's complex societal dynamics, the presence of warlords and strongmen, and the misguided policies of the US-led international coalition.

Firstly, Afghanistan's societal complexity, with its diverse ethnic groups, local customs, and norms, posed a significant challenge to state-building efforts. The international coalition attempted to impose a highly centralised political system, disregarding the need for local autonomy and representation. This top-down approach, characterised by the resurrection of old authoritarian institutions, undermined the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of the Afghan people.

Secondly, the presence of warlords and powerful individuals, often referred to as "strongmen," further hindered the establishment of effective state institutions. These warlords wielded significant coercive power and advanced claims to legitimacy, challenging the authority of the national government. President Hamid Karzai's decision to bring warlords like Atta Muhammad Noor and Abdul Rashid Dostum into his government, without disarming them, exemplified the challenges of managing violence and establishing a monopoly of legitimate violence.

Additionally, the US-led international coalition's policies exacerbated the situation. The coalition prioritised counterterrorism and consolidating power over democracy-building, resulting in the creation of parallel structures that undermined the legitimacy of the Afghan state. The influx of foreign aid, coupled with minimal monitoring, fostered corruption and weakened the rule of law. The failure to effectively address corruption, coupled with the perception of a lack of accountability, further diminished the credibility of the Afghan state institutions.

Moreover, the international coalition's approach to dealing with warlords was inconsistent and contradictory. While the US military relied on warlords to hunt down al-Qaida members and fight the Taliban insurgency, the civilian side of the US government viewed them as impediments to building a functioning modern state. This internal contradiction frustrated state-building efforts and allowed warlords to maintain their power and influence.

Furthermore, the Afghan government's anti-warlord policies under President Ashraf Ghani failed to replace warlords with more effective and legitimate institutions. Ghani's efforts to centralise power and undermine the warlords' grasp on local communities often backfired, as the government failed to deliver on promises of good governance and improved security. This resulted in a loss of popular support and further weakened the legitimacy of the state.

In conclusion, the failure to build state institutions in Afghanistan was multifaceted and included societal complexities, the power of warlords, and misguided international policies. The lack of legitimacy and ineffective governance structures ultimately contributed to the collapse of the Afghan state.

Rampant corruption

Afghanistan has long been considered a failed state, and rampant corruption is one of the key reasons for this.

Corruption in Afghanistan is widespread and growing, with Transparency International's 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index ranking the country 162nd out of 180 countries. The country's score of 20 indicates high levels of corruption, with 0 being highly corrupt and 100 being very clean.

Corruption takes many forms in Afghanistan, including bribery, nepotism, graft, and illegal land transfers. It occurs at all levels of society, from demanding bribes for basic public services to high-level political corruption. The police and judiciary are particularly corrupt, with judges and prosecutors often inventing or misinterpreting laws to affect the outcome of cases, especially in women's rights cases.

Corruption has serious consequences for governance, weakening the capacity of the judicial system and decreasing citizens' trust in institutions. It also creates an environment where powerful individuals and groups can act with impunity, further eroding the rule of law.

The international community, particularly the US, has been complicit in enabling corruption in Afghanistan. The influx of billions of dollars in development assistance, with little oversight and inadequate monitoring, has provided ample opportunities for corruption. Additionally, the US and its allies empowered warlords, many of whom had committed war crimes and human rights abuses, in their counterterrorism efforts, further undermining the credibility of the Afghan government and perpetuating corruption.

Efforts to combat corruption in Afghanistan have been largely ineffective due to a lack of funding, political support, and skilled staff. The Afghan government's anti-corruption agencies often lacked the legal authority and capacity to properly investigate and prosecute corruption cases.

The failure to address corruption has severely undermined the legitimacy of the Afghan government and contributed to the rise of the Taliban. It has also weakened the security sector, with resources being diverted and soldiers being sent to fight without adequate equipment, pay, or support.

To prevent future failures, it is essential to prioritize anti-corruption efforts, improve oversight and monitoring of assistance, and ensure that solutions are politically driven and address the root causes of corruption.

Ethnic divisions

Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual country. The population of the country consists of numerous ethnolinguistic groups: mainly the Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek, as well as the minorities of Aimaq, Turkmen, Baloch, Pashai, Nuristani, Gujjar, Brahui, Qizilbash, Pamiri, Kyrgyz, Sadat, and others. The term "Afghan" is synonymous with the ethnonym "Pashtun", but in modern times the term became the national identity of the people, who live in Afghanistan.

The national culture of Afghanistan is not uniform, and the various ethnic groups have no clear boundaries between each other and there is much overlap. Ethnic groups in Afghanistan have adopted traditions and celebrations from each other and all share a similar culture. For example, Nauruz is a New Year festival celebrated by various ethnic groups in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan has never experienced sustained, successful, direct rule from the centre. The central government struggled to "see" what was happening in the country writ large, running blind most of the time. Non-local district and provincial governors, appointed by Kabul for their loyalty to the centre, often failed to understand the areas and people they were given to govern. At times, people would resist the appointment of outside governors or campaign for one of their own to be appointed governor. The central government, however, would perceive these movements as a warlord's gambit to regain power and weaken the central government.

The Pashtuns have largely dominated Afghan politics though other ethnic groups, notably the Tajiks, have, at various stages of history, also maintained a strong political influence. Many attribute the worsening of ethnic relations and the emerging tensions between the groups to the Afghan-Soviet war, which is said to have changed society significantly.

The first Taliban era

In 1994, a group of previous Pashtun Mujahideen formed the Taliban and managed to control most of Afghanistan, including Kabul, by the time the U.S. invaded in late 2001. The Taliban’s rise was fuelled by rural Pashtun support for its agenda of ending warlord-generated insecurity, bringing back Pashtun prominence, and recreating traditional Pashtun village life – as they imagined it to have been. The Taliban’s conservative views reflected the values of a large section of the public they governed in the south and east of the country.

The conservative rural Taliban, traumatized by decades of war, encountered an alien cultural environment when they took over Kabul. They reacted forcefully, limited urban women's access to education and labour, and imposed strict limitations on dress, appearance, and public behaviour. Afghans in urban areas, particularly women, and members of Afghan minorities did not, by and large, share the parochial Taliban understanding of their common faith. They were undermined, threatened, or punished when they attempted to challenge Taliban restrictions. The Shiite Hazara, in particular, were subjected to brutal retaliatory attacks when they resisted Taliban rule.

The U.S. military invaded Afghanistan and allied with minority local leaders and some Pashtun warlords to oust the Taliban. These warlords ended up filling most key posts in the regime the U.S.-led coalition established in Kabul. For warlords from all backgrounds, it appeared to be a golden age. The rest of the Afghan population, even more so in Pashtun areas than in others, went back to suffering from warlords' predatory behaviour.

The return of the Taliban

The return of the Taliban to Kabul after the withdrawal of U.S. troops in August 2021 is a return to a rural Pashtun order. Most Taliban leaders are rural Pashtuns who received their education in conservative madrassas in Afghanistan or Pashtun areas of Pakistan. Only three of the 24 members of the Taliban interim government are not Pashtuns – they are Tajiks.

Ineffective international intervention

The international intervention in Afghanistan was ineffective due to a lack of a clear strategy, a lack of coordination, and a lack of understanding of the historical, social, legal, and political traditions of the host nation.

The U.S. intervention in Afghanistan was part of the War on Terror, which was declared in response to the 9/11 attacks. The U.S. invaded Afghanistan to topple the Taliban regime and initially succeeded in doing so. However, the intervention lacked a clear strategy for the long-term future of Afghanistan, and the U.S. military presence was reduced as the focus shifted to Iraq.

The U.S. and its allies failed to establish a functioning state in Afghanistan. The U.S. and the U.N. hosted a conference in Bonn, Germany, to form a new government, but the new government was headed by a relatively weak figure, Hamid Karzai. The U.S. government was divided on how to deal with the warlords, who were relied upon for hunting down al-Qaida members and fighting the Taliban insurgency. The civilian side of the U.S. government saw the warlords as impediments to building a functioning modern state. This internal contradiction within the U.S. government, with the military working alongside Afghanistan's strongmen warlords, frustrated civilian efforts to build a functioning modern state.

The U.S. also failed to understand the historical, social, legal, and political traditions of Afghanistan. For example, the U.S. pursued a policy of democratization and attempted to impose a highly centralized political system. However, Afghanistan has never experienced sustained, successful, direct rule from the center, and the central government has struggled to "see" what was happening in the country. The U.S. also failed to understand the importance of tribal networks at the heart of Afghanistan's society.

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