Austria's Eastern Expansion: Choice Or Compulsion?

Following the Anschluss in 1938, Austria was annexed by Nazi Germany, with the support of the majority of Austrians. After World War II, Austria was divided into four occupation zones by the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the United States, and France. This division was similar to that of Germany, but the geography of Austria and Vienna did not lend itself well to an easy partition.

The Soviets treated Austria as a defeated Axis power, but also adhered to the general line that Austria was a victim of Germany. Austria avoided losing any territory, and Austrians avoided the fate of the Volksdeutsche, ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe who were expelled to Germany or rounded up and deported to the Soviet Union for slave labour.

The Western Allies consented to Moscow's demand that the Soviets should be entitled to German assets in Austria in their zone of occupation. The Soviets considered German property to be all property that, at the end of the war, had German owners or investors. As a result, Austria ended up paying more than five times what Stalin originally demanded.

In 1943, the Allies agreed that Austria would be regarded as the first victim of Nazi aggression and treated as a liberated and independent country after the war. In 1945, the Soviets instructed Karl Renner, an Austrian socialist politician, to form a provisional government. Renner's cabinet took office, declared the independence of Austria from Nazi Germany, and called for the creation of a democratic state.

In 1947, the Truman administration proposed an East-West division of Austria, but the Soviets balked at this idea. The Soviets feared that settling the Austrian question on terms proposed by the West would only benefit the West and undercut Soviet security. The result was a stalemate until the negotiations for the Austrian State Treaty began after Stalin's death in 1953.

In 1955, Austria was granted full independence and the last occupation troops left. Austria was now a stable and socially progressive nation with a flourishing cultural life.

The geography of Austria and Vienna did not lend itself well to an easy partition. The military administration and occupation of Vienna was particularly cumbersome, with the Allies forming unified patrols (four men in a jeep) which was clumsy and did not lend itself well amidst the increasing suspicions of the early Cold War

The Allied occupation of Austria was a complex affair. Austria was divided into four zones of occupation, with Vienna itself being subdivided into four zones, with the historical centre of Vienna being declared an international zone, in which occupation forces changed every month. The zones were determined by the administrative changes made after the Anschluss, with the Western zones adhering to the pre-Anschluss borders and the Soviet zone disregarding them. The borders of the occupation zones were determined in July 1945, with movement of occupation troops ("zone swap") continuing until the end of July. The zones were as follows:

• Vorarlberg and North Tyrol were assigned to the French Zone
• Salzburg and Upper Austria south of the Danube were assigned to the American Zone
• East Tyrol, Carinthia, and Styria were assigned to the British Zone
• Burgenland, Lower Austria, and the Mühlviertel area of Upper Austria, north of the Danube, were assigned to the Soviet Zone

Vienna was divided among all four Allies, with the historical centre of Vienna being declared an international zone, in which occupation forces changed every month.

The first years of the occupation made Austria into one of the important sites for the early Cold War. The close proximity of American troops to Soviet troops and the unsettled nature of the occupation made Austria an epicentre for intelligence-gathering operations. The Austrian communist's electoral defeat in the November 1945 Austrian elections underscored to the Soviets the generally unfavourable attitude many Austrians held towards them. The fear in Moscow was that settling the Austrian question on terms proposed by the West would only benefit the West and undercut Soviet security. The result was stasis in Austria until the negotiations for the State Treaty began after Stalin's death.

After Stalin's death in 1953 and the resulting Thaw, the Soviets saw a renegotiation of the occupation as an opportunity to signal a new direction in the Soviet relationship in Europe. By negotiating an end to the Austrian occupation, the hope in Moscow was that the Soviets' position on a neutral Germany would gain traction in the FRG. On a more practical level, the ending of the occupation would end what was becoming a costly occupation for the Soviets. As negotiations for the Austrian State Treaty began, the Soviets staked out a basic position that Austria was to not seek a military alliance with an outside power and explicitly forbid any unification with Germany. A neutral Austria had an additional benefit to the Soviets by creating a gap in NATO's German and Italian front line, which would complicate NATO's existing military plans.

The first years of the occupation were also marked by the wild looting and sexual assaults committed by Soviet troops. The anti-German indoctrination campaign that had fuelled atrocities against civilians during the war now backfired as the Soviet soldiers understood their arrival on German soil as their victory and some were determined to exact a tribute from the defeated enemy by plundering, assaulting civilians, and committing rapes. The Soviet leadership tried to prevent or at least minimize the rampage through propaganda, although it balked at subjecting a large number of its victorious troops to capital punishment. The troops understood their arrival on the Third Reich's soil as their victory, and some were determined to exact a tribute from the defeated enemy by plundering, assaulting civilians, and committing rapes.

Order was gradually restored in the Soviet zone in the summer and fall of 1945. The number of troops greatly diminished, from around 700,000 during the Vienna Strategic Offensive to 150,000 in 1946, and 50,000 when the occupation ended in 1955. Moreover, the frontline troops were placed under much stricter control in encampments and barracks after the war. Perhaps most significantly, occupation troops became comprised of more disciplined and better-trained troops, most of whom were from the NKVD. As the war turned into occupation and the representatives of the Soviet occupation apparatus began to interact more closely with Austrian civilians, the sexual relations between the Soviet men and Austrian women became less physically violent, and more transactional—and, in many instances, consensual.

The Soviets feared that settling the Austrian question on terms proposed by the West would only benefit the West and undercut Soviet security

The Truman administration's proposal for an East-West division of Austria in 1947 was rejected by the Soviets, who instead staked out a basic position that Austria was not to seek a military alliance with an outside power and explicitly forbid any unification with Germany. A neutral Austria had the additional benefit to the Soviets of creating a gap in NATO's German and Italian front line, which would complicate NATO's existing military plans.

The Soviets' insistence on Austria's military neutrality was a marked change from other Soviet peace treaties, and the Americans gambled that although neutral, Austria would politically and culturally align itself with the West—a gamble that did pay off as the emerging political consensus in Austria was largely pro-Western.

The fear in Moscow was that the Austrian communists' electoral defeats in November 1945 Austrian elections had underscored to the Soviets the generally unfavorable attitude many Austrians held towards the Soviets

The Austrian legislative elections of 1945 were the first to be held after World War II, with all citizens over 21 eligible to vote, except former Nazis. The Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) won a decisive victory, receiving just under half of the vote and 85 of the 165 seats in the National Council. Despite this, the ÖVP's Leopold Figl retained the three-party grand coalition alongside the Socialists and Communists. The Communists, who had been equally represented in the government of Figl's predecessor, only received one cabinet post. The Communists' poor performance was blamed on the conduct of the Red Army in the Soviet-occupied zone of Austria. This was the beginning of a long decline for the Austrian communists, who stayed in the chamber until May 1959.

The fear in Moscow was that the Austrian communists' electoral defeat in the November 1945 Austrian elections had underscored to the Soviets the generally unfavourable attitude many Austrians held towards them. This fear was not unfounded, as the closeness of the KPÖ to Moscow made many Austrian voters wary of the party and its aims. In the former territories of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, multiparty democratic systems were slowly but surely being penetrated and undermined by local pro-Soviet communist parties with covert or even overt support of the Soviets, as was observable in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. As the Iron Curtain was being drawn closed, Austrians feared the same fate as their neighbours.

Talks between party leader Johann Koplenig and Stalin resulted in proposals of a possible division of Austria between East and West, similar to Germany. Since the KPÖ was constantly losing votes in parliamentary elections, a division and establishment of a communist-led East Austria would have been a practical way to consolidate at least a part of their dwindling power. The Soviet authorities in Moscow showed little interest in such a division for various reasons. Firstly, the size of a newly established East Austria would have been quite small, and may not have been capable of existing without significant Soviet assistance. Secondly, the situation in the Soviet sector of Austria was difficult as the Soviets confiscated all industries, factories, and goods and transported anything of economic value back to the Soviet Union as part of war reparations. Strategically, a division of Austria would have ultimately meant that a West Austria, closely linked to NATO, would have provided a connection between West Germany and Italy. A united, neutral Austria, however, could act as a barrier, together with Switzerland, thereby securing a part of the Central European front for the Soviets. The proposals by the Austrian communists were therefore brushed aside.

The Soviets hoped that by negotiating an end to the Austrian occupation, the Soviets' position on a neutral Germany would gain traction in the FRG

The Soviets hoped that by negotiating an end to the Austrian occupation, their position on a neutral Germany would gain traction in the FRG. This was part of the Soviets' strategy to signal a new direction in the Soviet relationship in Europe. Ending the Austrian occupation would also be beneficial to the Soviets on a practical level, as it would end what was becoming a costly occupation.

The Soviets' position on a neutral Germany was that Austria was to not seek a military alliance with an outside power and explicitly forbid any unification with Germany. A neutral Austria would also create a gap in NATO's German and Italian front line, which would complicate NATO's existing military plans.

The Soviets' insistence on Austrian neutrality was markedly different from other Soviet peace treaties. Many in the US State Department saw the Austrian State Treaty as Austria undertaking a voluntary decision to become another Switzerland. The Soviets gambled that although neutral, Austria would politically and culturally align itself with the West, and this gamble paid off as the emerging political consensus in Austria was largely pro-Western.

The Soviets' stance on Austrian neutrality was part of a broader strategy to signal a new direction in the Soviet relationship in Europe.

The Americans gambled that although neutral, Austria would politically and culturally align itself with the West

The Americans' gamble that Austria would align itself with the West politically and culturally was based on a number of factors. Firstly, the US played a significant role in granting Austria independence from Nazi Germany in 1945. This was a joint effort with the Soviets, British and French, but the US also resisted Soviet expansionist intentions and supported Truman's tough stance against the Soviets.

Secondly, the US was instrumental in the Marshall Plan, which was deployed against the Soviet zone in Austria. The Marshall Plan was not universally popular, but it did help to remove many of the causes of popular unrest that shook the country in 1947.

Thirdly, the US had a hand in the creation of a proper Austrian military, which was seen as a counter to the threat of another Berlin Blockade. The Americans also set up emergency food dumps and prepared to airlift supplies to Vienna.

Finally, the US was one of the signatories of the Austrian State Treaty in 1955, which granted Austria independence and arranged for the withdrawal of all occupation forces.

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