The Afghan Conundrum: Examining The Possibility Of Victory

The US's objectives in Afghanistan were to destroy al-Qaeda, capture Osama Bin Laden, and prevent another terrorist attack on the US. While these goals were achieved, the US remained in Afghanistan for 20 years, with no clear vision for victory. The US's presence in Afghanistan was at odds with Afghan identity, which incorporates national pride, a history of fighting outsiders, and a religious commitment to defend the homeland. This presence inspired Afghans to fight against the US, giving the Taliban a significant advantage. The Taliban's ability to link their cause to the meaning of being Afghan was a crucial factor in the US's defeat. The US could have managed its strategy better by setting more realistic expectations and focusing on a long-term, sustainable strategy.

The US's failure to define what a 'win' in Afghanistan would look like

The US's failure to define what a win in Afghanistan would look like is a significant factor in its eventual defeat. From the outset, the US government never outlined the terms of victory. While the initial objective was to destroy al-Qaeda and prevent future attacks, this goal was achieved within six months. Instead of declaring victory, President Bush broadened the mission to include ambitious nation-building objectives such as establishing a stable democracy, a strong national army, and a modernised public education system. However, no benchmarks or timelines were provided for accomplishing these goals.

This pattern continued under subsequent administrations, with both Obama and Trump vowing to win in Afghanistan without specifying what that entailed. The lack of a clear definition of success or victory led to a prolonged conflict with shifting goals and expectations. As noted by Army Gen. Dan McNeill, who served during the Bush years, "I tried to get someone to define for me what winning meant, even before I went over, and nobody could."

The absence of a clear end state and constantly changing objectives made it challenging for military leaders and troops on the ground to develop effective strategies and measure progress. As the war dragged on, US officials publicly insisted they were winning even as evidence of setbacks and Taliban gains mounted. This disconnect between public statements and the reality on the ground contributed to a sense of confusion and uncertainty about the war's progress.

Moreover, the US underestimated the Taliban's ability to inspire Afghans to fight. The Taliban's call to resist foreign occupiers resonated with Afghan identity, tapping into a history of fighting outsiders and defending their homeland. This dynamic gave the Taliban a significant advantage, as they were able to tie themselves to religion and nationalism in a way that the US-backed government could not. The very presence of American troops in Afghanistan clashed with Afghan identity and sapped the will of Afghan soldiers and police, making it difficult for them to risk their lives fighting alongside what some perceived as occupiers.

In conclusion, the US's failure to define victory and its misunderstanding of the Taliban's appeal contributed to its inability to achieve a clear and decisive win in Afghanistan. The shifting goals, lack of benchmarks, and underestimation of the Taliban's resilience and motivation ultimately led to a protracted conflict with no clear end in sight.

The Taliban's ability to inspire Afghans to fight

The Taliban's ability to tie themselves to religion and Afghan identity gave them a significant advantage over the US-backed government, which was aligned with non-Muslim foreign occupiers. The presence of American troops in Afghanistan was seen as a violation of Afghan identity, which encompasses national pride, a history of fighting outsiders, and a religious commitment to defend their homeland. This dynamic inspired Afghans to defend their honour, religion, and homes, and it also sapped the will of Afghan soldiers and police to fight for the government.

The Taliban's religious scholars and leaders played a crucial role in spreading this message. They framed the fight against foreign occupiers as a religious duty, with one scholar stating, "The Taliban fight for belief, for janat (heaven) and ghazi (killing infidels)... The Taliban are willing to lose their head to fight... How can the army and police compete?". This framing of the conflict as a religious obligation was echoed by surveys of Taliban opinion, which found that they viewed jihad against foreign occupation as a religious obligation and a defence of their values.

The Taliban's success in inspiring Afghans to fight was a crucial factor in their ability to outlast a superpower and eventually regain control of Afghanistan.

The US's failure to address the problem of corruption

Corruption undermined the US mission by damaging the legitimacy of the Afghan government, strengthening popular support for the insurgency, and channelling material resources to insurgent groups. It also sapped the will of Afghan soldiers and police, who were often underpaid and neglected, and who saw their leaders pocket their pay, hoard their ammunition, and dilute rosters with ghost soldiers.

The US partnered with Afghan warlords, many of whom had committed war crimes and human rights abuses, to seek their help in eliminating al-Qaeda and remnants of the Taliban. These warlords were then brought into government, where they continued their abuses, maintained private militias, and had links to narcotics, smuggling, and criminal networks. With a weak central government and no fear of law enforcement, the warlords gained impunity and their patronage networks became more entrenched. US partnerships with such individuals gave the impression that the US tolerated corruption and other abuses, seriously undercutting its credibility.

The US was also responsible for fuelling corruption by doling out vast sums of money with limited foresight or regard for the consequences. The CIA, the US military, the State Department, and other agencies used cash and lucrative contracts to win the allegiance of Afghan warlords in the fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The US also abetted corruption by doling out payments or contracts to unsavoury Afghan power brokers in a misguided quest for stability.

The US failed to confront the reality that it was responsible for fuelling corruption, and instead tolerated the worst offenders because they were allies. US officials were desperate to have the warlords at the table, and so kept pouring drinks, not knowing or considering that they were killing them.

The US's failure to adequately train the Afghan army

The US spent $83 billion on training, equipping, and paying Afghanistan's security forces since 2001. Despite this assistance, the Afghan military and police proved incapable of securing the country. The US has historically struggled to train foreign militaries.

There are several reasons for the failure of the US to adequately train the Afghan army. Firstly, American soldiers training counterparts abroad operate in very different political and social conditions than the US military. American soldiers already internalize the importance of obeying the law, not taking bribes, and respecting human rights. However, these values are not always congruent with the political and social circumstances in which foreign forces are operating.

Secondly, the leaders of the forces being trained often have different objectives for their militaries than the US does. Leaders facing societal upheaval, insurgency, and civil war often prioritize preventing coups, consolidating political power, personal enrichment, or personal survival above the strength of their nation's military. This can lead to higher rates of corruption within the force as political leaders seek to encourage military officers and society at large not to revolt.

Thirdly, the US tends to undertake large-scale training and equipment programs when they do not want to do the fighting themselves. This heartens adversaries and weakens the very forces they are attempting to help. The surges of military forces in Afghanistan were supposed to have civilian counterparts to strengthen civilian governance, which is essential for military training programs not to outpace and undermine their civilian counterparts. However, this did not happen.

Additionally, the US engages in short-term deployments that make it difficult to establish long-term influence. American military leaders seldom have tours longer than two years, and it is common for many units to have six-to-nine-month rotations in Afghanistan. By contrast, Iran, a country very good at training foreign forces, has relationships spanning decades.

Finally, the US built an Afghan army dependent on outside support. The US attempted to build an army suitable for a modern, industrialized country like itself, rather than one that would fit the realities of a poor and agrarian state. The Afghan army was riddled with corruption and was designed to function only so long as foreign contractors and soldiers remained to manage it.

In conclusion, the US failed to adequately train the Afghan army due to a lack of understanding of the local political and social context, differing objectives, a lack of long-term commitment, and a failure to build an army that could function independently and was suited to the local context.

The US's failure to withdraw from Afghanistan earlier

Firstly, the US failed to define clear objectives and a strategy for victory in Afghanistan. From the outset, the US government never articulated what winning the war in Afghanistan would look like. While the initial goal was to destroy al-Qaeda and prevent future terrorist attacks, Bush broadened the mission to include nation-building and establishing a stable democracy. This lack of clear objectives made it difficult to measure progress and ultimately led to a prolonged military presence.

Secondly, the US adopted a counterinsurgency strategy that failed to address the underlying dynamics driving the conflict. The Taliban drew on religious and nationalist sentiments to inspire Afghans to fight against foreign occupiers. The very presence of US troops in Afghanistan clashed with Afghan identity, sapping the will of Afghan soldiers and police to fight. The US failed to recognize the power of this narrative and continued to pursue a military-first approach, neglecting the need for a political settlement.

Additionally, the US underestimated the resilience and adaptability of the Taliban. Despite their numerical and technological disadvantages, the Taliban consistently outfought government forces due to their higher morale and commitment to their cause. The US also failed to adequately address issues such as corruption, poor leadership, and infighting within the Afghan government and security forces, which further hindered their ability to mount an effective resistance against the Taliban.

Moreover, the US missed opportunities to withdraw earlier when conditions were more favorable. In 2011, following the death of Osama bin Laden, there was a chance to declare victory and execute withdrawal plans. However, the US stayed on, and the situation gradually deteriorated, making it politically more challenging to justify a withdrawal as time went on.

Finally, the US's prolonged military presence in Afghanistan had significant costs, including lives lost, economic resources spent, and a negative impact on America's global image. The failure to withdraw earlier resulted in a more chaotic and humiliating exit as the Taliban rapidly regained control of the country.

In conclusion, the US's failure to withdraw from Afghanistan earlier was a result of unclear objectives, a lack of understanding of the local dynamics, and a failure to adapt their strategy accordingly. Recognizing and addressing these issues earlier could have led to a more successful outcome and a more orderly withdrawal.

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