Russia's Role In Mediating Afghanistan's Long Road To Peace

Russia has been seeking to establish a leading role in the stabilisation of Afghanistan. A peace settlement in Afghanistan would enhance the security of crucial Russian allies in Central Asia, like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and stem the inflow of narcotics and militants into Russia's southern frontiers.

Russia's strategy to achieve peace in Afghanistan consists of three main policies. Firstly, Russia believes that Afghan National Army (ANA) forces and international actors should intensify their efforts to defeat the Islamic State's South Asia branch, Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP). Secondly, Russia believes that stability in Afghanistan is impossible as long as the narcotics trade continues to provide revenues for militant groups. The narcotics trade in Afghanistan is a highly salient political issue in Russia, as the diffusion of heroin and opium from Afghanistan to Russia contributed to a sustained rise in drug-related fatalities since 1991. Thirdly, Russia is seeking to divide the Taliban between moderate members that are willing to entertain a political settlement and extremist members that seek the prolongation of the war at all costs.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

The invasion was met with fierce resistance from the Afghan mujahideen, who were backed by the United States and other countries. The mujahideen employed guerrilla warfare tactics, attacking quickly and retreating into the mountains. The Soviets, on the other hand, used their air power to deal with both Afghan resistance and civilians, levelling villages and destroying irrigation ditches.

The invasion sparked a nine-year civil war, resulting in the deaths of approximately one million civilians and contributing to the downfall of the Soviet Union. The last Soviet troops left Afghanistan on 15 February 1989.

The Soviet Union's strategic interests in Afghanistan

The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was the culmination of a series of events that threatened the stability of the Soviet-backed communist government in Afghanistan. Here are some key strategic interests that influenced the Soviet Union's decision to invade Afghanistan:

Containment of Islamic Extremism:

• The Soviet Union feared the rise of Islamic extremism in Afghanistan, which could pose a threat to the stability of its southern borders.
• They believed that the failure of the communist government in Afghanistan would result in an anti-Soviet, Islamist state on their doorstep.

Preservation of the Brezhnev Doctrine:

• The Brezhnev Doctrine stated that once a country became socialist, Moscow would never allow it to return to the capitalist camp.
• The invasion was seen as a way to uphold this doctrine and prevent Afghanistan from falling into the hands of Islamic extremists or Western influence.

Response to US Encroachment:

• The Soviet Union was concerned about the potential encroachment of the United States in the region, especially after the Iranian Revolution and the presence of American warships in the Persian Gulf.
• They believed that the US was supporting counter-insurgency forces against the communist government in Afghanistan.

Protection of Southern Border:

• The Soviet Union wanted to protect its southern border from potential encirclement by hostile powers, including China, Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan.
• They feared a repetition of the Cuban Missile Crisis, where the US deployed missiles to Turkey, threatening the Soviet Union's western border.

Influence of KGB:

• The KGB played a significant role in influencing the Soviet decision-making process.
• They exaggerated the threat posed by Islamic extremism and Western encroachment, emphasizing the urgency of intervention.

Failure of Alternative Options:

• The Soviet Union initially tried negotiation and sending advisors to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan, but these attempts failed.
• The overthrow of the pro-Soviet leader, Taraki, by Hafizullah Amin in September 1979 heightened their paranoia about a potential shift towards the US.

Influence of Politburo Troika:

• The decision to invade was largely driven by a "troika" consisting of Andrei Gromyko (Foreign Minister), Yuri Andropov (KGB Chairman), and Dmitriy Ustinov (Defense Minister).
• They dominated the Politburo decision-making process and manipulated information to justify the invasion.

End of Détente:

The demise of détente between the US and the Soviet Union in 1979 removed constraints on Soviet policy, making it easier to choose military intervention.

The US response to the Soviet invasion

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was a watershed event of the Cold War. It was the only time the Soviet Union invaded a country outside the Eastern Bloc. The invasion was met with worldwide condemnation, including from the United States and its European allies. Here is how the US responded to the Soviet invasion:

Economic sanctions

President Jimmy Carter imposed economic sanctions on the Soviet Union, including a restriction on grain trade. The Soviet Union depended on grain imports from the US, and Carter hoped that this would pressure the Soviets to leave Afghanistan.

Boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics

Carter also led a boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympic Games in Moscow, with around 60 countries refusing to attend the games in protest of the Soviet invasion. This was controversial, as athletes who had trained for years felt they were being punished and used as political pawns.

Aid to the Afghan mujahideen

The US also provided aid to the Afghan mujahideen, or Islamic insurgents, who were fighting against the Soviet invasion. This aid included weapons and funds funnelled through the CIA. The mujahideen were seen as freedom fighters in the West, and the US continued to arm them through the Reagan years.

Diplomatic actions

In addition, the Carter administration took several diplomatic actions to signal its strong disapproval of the Soviet invasion. It requested that the Senate postpone action on the SALT-II nuclear weapons treaty and recalled the US ambassador to the Soviet Union. These actions indicated that US-Soviet relations had been severely damaged and that the age of détente was over.

The Afghan Civil War

The mujahideen had previously been fighting against the Soviet-backed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) government, which was led by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). The mujahideen were a collective of anti-communist Islamic guerrillas, and their uprising was sparked by the radical reforms that were being pushed by the PDPA.

The Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan in 1979 to support the local pro-Soviet government. The invasion was ordered by Leonid Brezhnev, and resulted in the deployment of around 30,000 troops. The Soviets attempted to prop up their new but faltering client state, now headed by Babrak Karmal, but Karmal was unable to attain significant popular support. The mujahideen rebellion grew, spreading to all parts of the country.

The Soviet-Afghan War resulted in the deaths of approximately 3,000,000 Afghans, and millions more fled the country as refugees. The war caused grave destruction throughout Afghanistan and has been cited as a significant factor that contributed to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union's exit strategy

Gorbachev's government attempted to aid the consolidation of power by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). The Soviet Union directed Afghanistan's president, Mohammad Najibullah, towards a policy of "National Reconciliation" through diplomacy between his PDPA government and the rebelling Islamists of the Afghan mujahideen. Gorbachev wanted to create stability within Afghanistan, which the Soviet Union would attempt to accomplish until its eventual withdrawal in 1988-89.

Three objectives were viewed by Gorbachev as conditions needed for withdrawal: internal stability, limited foreign intervention, and international recognition of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan's Communist government. Gorbachev also wanted to retain prestige in the eyes of third-world allies and satisfy the hawkish military-industrial complex, military leadership, and intelligence agencies at home.

The Soviet Union began the gradual process of withdrawal from Afghanistan by installing Muhammed Najibullah Ahmadzai as the General Secretary of the Afghan Communist Party, seeing him as capable of ruling without serious involvement from the Soviet Union. Najibullah was seen as a leader who could work with the Soviet Union to find a negotiated settlement.

The Soviet Union dedicated serious effort to helping the Najibullah government establish relations with rebel factions, sent record packages of aid, and promised that "absolutely all of the military infrastructure would be handed over to the DRA armed forces" upon Soviet withdrawal. Najibullah achieved considerable success in reinvigorating the government security apparatus and consolidating his power within the state.

In April 1988, Gorbachev signed a peace accord with Afghanistan, and in February 1989, the last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan.

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